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ABSTRACT 
  
This dissertation consists of three chapters in corporate finance and private equity. Chapter 1, 
“Incentives of Private Equity General Partners from Future Fundraising”, co-authored with Ji-
Woong Chung, Berk Sensoy and Michael Weisbach, studies the incentives of private equity 
general partners (GPs). Lifetime incomes of GPs are affected by their current funds’ performance 
not only directly, through carried interest profit-sharing provisions, but also indirectly by the 
effect of the current fund’s performance on GP’s abilities to raise capital for future funds. In the 
context of a rational learning model, which we show better matches the empirical relations 
between future fundraising and current performance than behavioral alternatives, we estimate 
that indirect pay for performance from future fundraising is of the same order of magnitude as 
direct pay for performance from carried interest. Consistent with the learning framework, 
indirect pay for performance is stronger when managerial abilities are more scalable and weaker 
when current performance is less informative about ability. Specifically, it is stronger for buyout 
funds than for venture capital funds, and declines in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. Total 
pay for performance in private equity is both considerably larger and much more heterogeneous 
than implied by the carried interest alone. Our framework can be adapted to estimate indirect pay 
for performance in other asset management settings. 
Uncertainty is ubiquitous in financial markets, and market participants form expectations and 
learn about parameters, which may be the ability of general partners or the quality of a firm’s 
governance structure. Assessing the quality of a firm's governance is valuable, which might 
explain the recent growth of the governance industry. Yet, governance indices have been 
criticized by researchers and practitioners alike, mainly on the grounds of overlooking firms' 
  
heterogeneity and their specific governance needs. Chapter 2, “D&O Insurance and IPO 
Performance: what can we learn from insurers?”, co-authored with Martin Boyer, provides new 
insights into the ability of directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurers to price risk, and in particular 
risk related to governance characteristics. Therefore, learning by investors about governance 
quality could be facilitated by providing investors with a market-based assessment of governance 
as reflected in the D&O insurance premium. We investigate whether a firm’s D&O liability 
insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO 
performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the 
directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock 
performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and 
lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that 
even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers 
have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors. 
In Chapter 3, “A Learning-Based Approach to Evaluating Boards of Directors”, I develop a 
general framework based on a theoretical model of learning to assess how investors react to the 
appointment of new directors. Using predictions from a learning model, this chapter exploits the 
cross-sectional variation in the learning-induced decline in stock return volatility over director 
tenure to infer the marginal value of different kinds of directors. This new framework confirms 
prior empirical findings and documents new results. For example, directors joining better 
compensated boards have higher marginal value while the marginal value of a director joining an 
entrenched board is muted. Furthermore, the estimates imply that governance related uncertainty 
associated with the arrival of a new director accounts for 7% of return volatility, shedding light 
on the extent to which governance matters. 
  
ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
by 
Léa H. Stern 
M.Sc., HEC Montréal, 2009 
B.B.A., HEC Montréal, 2007 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
Syracuse University 
May 2017 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Léa H. Stern 2017 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 
 
  v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my advisor, David Weinbaum for his wise and friendly guidance 
during my years at Syracuse University. I would also like to thank the members on my 
dissertation committee for their advice throughout this process: Amber Anand, Ravi Shukla, 
Yildiray Yildirim and Mike Weisbach. I am deeply grateful to Mike Weisbach, who has always 
been the perfect mentor. He set the example and he set the bar, and I am incredibly fortunate to 
have been his student. 
I would like to thank Martin Boyer, who has been instrumental in my career and without 
whom I would not have decided to pursue a Ph.D. 
I would also like to thank Michel Benaroch for how helpful he has always been.  
I would like to thank my amazing parents, Karl Ferdinand Stern and Catherine Stern. I 
couldn’t be more proud of them and I thank them for their unwavering support and their 
inspiring spirit. 
Finally, I also want to thank my husband, Ronan Le Bras and my sons, Eitan and Eli, for 
making this whole journey an incredibly fun one. 
  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... xii 
 
Chapter 1. Incentives of Private Equity General Partners from Future Fundraising ........... 1 
1. Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................................... 10 
1.1 Setup ............................................................................................................................... 10 
1.1.1 Updating beliefs ...................................................................................................... 11 
1.1.2 Follow-on fund size, conditional on raising a follow-on ........................................ 12 
1.1.3 Probability of raising a follow-on ........................................................................... 12 
1.2 Cross-sectional implications .......................................................................................... 13 
1.2.1 Sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance across partnership types 13 
1.2.2 Sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance in the sequence of funds 
within a partnership............................................................................................................... 15 
1.2.3 Sensitivity of future fundraising to the sequence of funds within a partnership .... 15 
1.3 Lifetime compensation of GPs ....................................................................................... 16 
1.4 Empirical Implementation .............................................................................................. 18 
2. Data ....................................................................................................................................... 19 
3. The Empirical Relations between Current Performance and Future Fundraising ................ 22 
3.1 Estimates without sequence effects ................................................................................ 23 
  vii 
3.2 Sequence-specific estimates ........................................................................................... 26 
3.3 Measurement issues........................................................................................................ 29 
4. Estimating Direct and Indirect Pay for Performance ............................................................ 30 
4.1 Discounting future GP compensation ............................................................................ 31 
4.2 Direct (explicit) pay for performance ............................................................................. 32 
4.3 Indirect pay for performance from future fundraising ................................................... 33 
4.3.1 Estimates ignoring sequence effects ....................................................................... 36 
4.3.2 Estimates accounting for sequence effects ............................................................. 37 
4.4 Factors Omitted from the Estimates ............................................................................... 39 
5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 42 
 
Chapter 2. D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: what can we learn from insurers? ..... 63 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 63 
2. Directors’ and officers’ insurance: a primer ......................................................................... 66 
2.1 Timing of D&O insurance information release.............................................................. 67 
2.2 The pricing of D&O insurance coverage ....................................................................... 67 
3. Hypotheses development, data and variables description ..................................................... 69 
3.1 Hypotheses and data ....................................................................................................... 69 
3.2 Description of variables ................................................................................................. 73 
3.2.1 Dependent variables ................................................................................................ 73 
3.2.2 Main independent variables .................................................................................... 74 
3.3 Sample Statistics ............................................................................................................ 75 
4. Analysis of results ................................................................................................................. 76 
  viii 
4.1 Preliminary results.......................................................................................................... 76 
4.2 The Predictive Power of D&O Insurance Rate-on-Line ................................................ 78 
5. Robustness checks ................................................................................................................ 82 
5.1 Likelihood of carrying D&O insurance and two-step regression .................................. 83 
5.2 Simultaneous (feedback) effects of risk and return ........................................................ 85 
6. Discussion and conclusion .................................................................................................... 85 
 
Chapter 3. A Learning-Based Approach to Evaluating Boards of Directors ..................... 113 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 113 
2. Background and related literature ....................................................................................... 122 
3. A learning model of board quality: theoretical framework and empirical implementation 124 
3.1 Bayesian learning ......................................................................................................... 124 
3.2 Empirical design ........................................................................................................... 125 
3.2.1 Regression model .................................................................................................. 125 
3.2.2 Data sources and descriptive statistics .................................................................. 126 
4. Empirical relationship between volatility and director tenure ............................................ 127 
4.1 Full sample ................................................................................................................... 127 
4.2 Samples of plausibly exogenous director appointments .............................................. 130 
4.3 Additional tests ............................................................................................................. 133 
4.3.1 Young vs. seasoned boards ................................................................................... 133 
4.3.2 All firm-months, ex-ante uncertainty and professional directors ......................... 134 
4.3.3 Matched sample .................................................................................................... 136 
4.4 The importance of directors ......................................................................................... 137 
  ix 
4.4.1 How much do directors matter? ............................................................................ 137 
4.4.2 Importance of directors and value creation ........................................................... 138 
5. The marginal return to ability of directors .......................................................................... 140 
5.1 Prior empirical evidence on board and director characteristics ................................... 140 
5.2 Cross-sectional analysis ............................................................................................... 143 
5.2.1 Director characteristics ......................................................................................... 144 
5.2.2 Board characteristics ............................................................................................. 145 
5.2.3 Firm level characteristics ...................................................................................... 147 
6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 148 
 
Appendix 1-A: Interim IRR ........................................................................................................ 174 
Appendix 2-A: Timeline of the D&O insurance acquisition and information release ............... 178 
Appendix 2-B: Examples. ........................................................................................................... 179 
Appendix 2-C: Definition of control variables. .......................................................................... 180 
Appendix 3-A: Variable Definitions ........................................................................................... 185 
Appendix 3-B: Learning Model .................................................................................................. 188 
Appendix 3-C: SimScore ............................................................................................................ 192 
Appendix 3-D: Estimating Director Related Uncertainty ........................................................... 194 
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 195 
VITA ........................................................................................................................................... 209 
 
  x 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1-1 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................... 49 
Table 1-2 Descriptive Statistics by Fund Sequence ...................................................................... 50 
Table 1-3 Follow-on Fundraising Regressions ............................................................................. 55 
Table 1-4 Follow-on Fundraising Regressions: Sequence Interactions ........................................ 56 
Table 1-5 Sensitivity of GP Lifetime Revenue to Current Performance ...................................... 59 
Table 1-6 Sensitivity of GP Lifetime Revenue to Current Performance: Sequence Interactions . 60 
Table 2-1 Number of Canadian IPOs per year in sample: Year of IPO initiation and year of IPO 
completion..................................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 2-2 Summary statistics of the sample data set .................................................................... 89 
Table 2-3 Separation and test between firms that have D&O insurance or not ............................ 90 
Table 2-4 Marginal impact on the decision to purchase D&O insurance. .................................... 92 
Table 2-5A OLS regression that measures the firms' first year excess return – Panel A ............. 93 
Table 2-5B OLS regression that measures the firms' first year total return – Panel B ................. 95 
Table 2-6 OLS regression that measures the firms' idiosyncratic risk in the first year post-IPO . 96 
Table 2-7 OLS regression that measures the firms' stock volatility in the first year post-IPO .... 98 
Table 2-8 OLS regression that measures the firms' return-to-risk ratio in the first year post-IPO
..................................................................................................................................................... 100 
Table 2-9A OLS regression that measures the firms' first year return and risk assuming all the 
information is incorporated in the price on the first day. ............................................................ 101 
Table 2-9B OLS regression that measures the firms' first year return assuming all the information 
is incorporated in the price on the first day, net of the first day. ................................................ 102 
  xi 
Table 2-10A Two-step regression that measures the first year's stock return and return-to-risk 
ratio by controlling for the purchase of insurance ...................................................................... 103 
Table 2-10B Two-step regression that measures the first year's stock return by controlling for the 
decision to reveal the D&O insurance premium and policy limit .............................................. 104 
Table 2-11A Two-stage least square simultaneous regressions for the first year total return and 
risk............................................................................................................................................... 105 
Table 2-11B Three-stage least square simultaneous regressions for the first year total return and 
risk............................................................................................................................................... 109 
Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 153 
Table 3-2A Volatility and Director Tenure – Panel A ................................................................ 155 
Table 3-2B Volatility and Director Tenure – Panel B ................................................................ 156 
Table 3-2C Volatility and Director Tenure – Panel C ................................................................ 157 
Table 3-3A Exogenous Director Appointments – Panel A ......................................................... 159 
Table 3-3B Exogenous Director Appointments – Panel B ......................................................... 160 
Table 3-4A Additional Tests – Panel A ...................................................................................... 162 
Table 3-4B Additional Tests – Panel B ...................................................................................... 163 
Table 3-4C Additional Tests – Panel C ...................................................................................... 164 
Table 3-5 Summary of Previous Empirical Evidence and Evidence from the Learning-based 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 166 
Table 3-6A Cross-sectional Tests – Panel A .............................................................................. 169 
Table 3-6B Cross-sectional Tests – Panel B ............................................................................... 170 
Table 3-6C Cross-sectional Tests – Panel C ............................................................................... 171 
Table 3-6D Cross-sectional Tests – Panel D .............................................................................. 173 
  xii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1-1 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 12%, 
Buyout 9%,Venture Capital 15%, Real Estate 9% ....................................................................... 45 
Figure 1-2 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 17%, 
Buyout 14%,Venture Capital 20%, Real Estate 14% ................................................................... 46 
Figure 1-3 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 10%, 
Buyout 11%,Venture Capital 8%, Real Estate 11% ..................................................................... 47 
Figure 1-4 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 16%, 
Buyout 11%, Venture Capital 21%, Real Estate 11% .................................................................. 48 
Figure 3-1 Volatility and Director Tenure .................................................................................. 150 
Figure 3-2 Volatility and Average Board Tenure ....................................................................... 151 
Figure 3-3 Learning Slopes and Firm Performance .................................................................... 152 
Figure 3-4 Learning Slopes and Stock Performance .................................................................. 152 
 
  1 
Chapter 1. Incentives of Private Equity General Partners from Future Fundraising 
 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in The 
Review of Financial Studies following peer review. The version of record Chung, J., B. A. 
Sensoy, L. H. Stern and M.S. Weisbach (2012), Pay for Performance from Future Fund Flows: 
The Case of Private Equity, Review of Financial Studies, 25(11): 3259-3304 is available online 
at: https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr141. 
 
Compensation agreements in private equity (PE) partnerships typically give general partners 
(GPs) a fixed management fee that is a percentage (usually 1.5% to 2.5%) of the amount of 
capital committed to the fund, as well as a variable “carried interest” equal to a percentage of the 
profits (almost always 20%). Many observers credit pay for performance from carried interest as 
an important driver of the success of private equity firms (e.g., Jensen 1989; Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2009). Others, especially in the popular press, argue that pay for performance from 
carried interest is not strong enough to provide adequate incentives to GPs, especially because 
fixed management fees alone are often a source of considerable income.1 
Missing from these arguments is the fact that explicit compensation formulas provide 
only part of the total pay for performance in private equity. GPs’ lifetime incomes depend on 
their ability to raise capital in the future, which in turn depends on the performance of their 
current funds. Consequently, GPs’ total pay for performance is also impacted by the indirect, 
market-based pay for performance caused by the relation between today’s performance and 
future fundraising. 
                                                 
1 See for example, “It’s the Fees, Not the Profits,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 13, 2007. 
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Indirect pay for performance is not specific to private equity; it is a potentially 
important source of incentives in many settings.2 Yet, despite the widespread theoretical interest 
in indirect incentives and their importance to real-world organizations, little is known about their 
actual magnitude or the nature of the economic forces that give rise to them. This gap in our 
knowledge is important because understanding the magnitude of indirect pay for performance, 
and how it varies over time and across firms, is essential to drawing inferences about managers’ 
motives. 
This article seeks to understand the economic forces that lead to a relation between 
performance and future fundraising in private equity, and to estimate the magnitude of the 
resulting indirect pay for performance. We first present a rational learning model in which the 
ability of a GP to earn profits is uncertain and rationally inferred by market participants. We 
develop testable predictions from this model about the way a fund’s current performance affects 
the partnership’s ability to raise subsequent funds. Using a database of fund sizes and returns, we 
estimate the relations between fund performance and future fundraising, and evaluate the 
predictions of our learning model relative to those of behavioral alternatives. We next provide an 
approach that transforms the empirical relations between fund performance and future 
fundraising into estimates of indirect pay for performance in private equity. We present estimates 
of the magnitude of indirect pay for performance and the way in which it varies across types of 
partnerships and over a given partnership’s life cycle. We present our estimates in both absolute 
magnitude and, to gauge their relative importance, relative to the much-discussed direct (explicit) 
                                                 
2 Examples include promotion or elimination tournaments inside corporations (e.g., Lazear and 
Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986; Han et al. 2009), the possibility that a CEO will be fired for poor 
performance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998), and the possibility 
that the careers of securities analysts depend on the accuracy of their forecasts (Hong and Kubik 
2000; Hong et al. 2003). Market-based indirect pay for performance in other asset management 
settings can also arise from a relation between current performance and future fund flows. 
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pay for performance from carried interest.3 Finally, we construct estimates of the total pay for 
performance facing private equity GPs and show that these incentives are both much larger than 
commonly believed, and also vary substantially across types of partnerships and over time within 
a given partnership. 
We begin by presenting a rational learning model in the spirit of Berk and Green (2004) 
to formalize the logic by which good performance in the current fund could lead to higher future 
incomes for GPs through an effect on expected future fundraising. In the model, a private equity 
partnership potentially has an ability to earn (abnormal) returns for its investors, but this ability is 
unknown. Given a performance signal, investors update their assessment of the GP’s ability and, 
in turn, decide whether the GP is able to raise another fund and, if so, how much capital to 
allocate to it (in the presence of diminishing returns to scale). 
The rational learning framework predicts that both the likelihood of raising a follow-on 
fund and the size of the follow-on if it is raised depend on current performance, and offers 
intuitive cross-sectional predictions that have not been tested in the literature. First, when 
abilities are more “scalable,” investors are willing to commit more capital for a given assessment 
of managerial ability. Second, the more informative the fund’s performance (signal) about GPs’ 
abilities, the more sensitive future fundraising is to today’s performance. Third, holding 
performance fixed, follow-on fundraising is more likely when the prior assessment of ability is 
greater. 
These predictions suggest that the future fundraising of buyout funds should be more 
sensitive to performance than that of venture capital funds, both because buyout funds are more 
                                                 
3 It is sometimes argued in the literature that GPs’ indirect incentives are strong enough to 
motivate their behavior (e.g., Gompers 1996; Gompers and Lerner 1999). Our work is the first to 
estimate the strength of these incentives. 
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scalable (Metrick and Yasuda 2010), and because the variance of buyout returns is lower 
(informativeness is higher) than that of venture capital returns. In addition, because ability is 
known with more precision as a partnership ages, the performance of later funds should have less 
impact on the assessment of ability and hence be less strongly related to future inflows of capital 
than the performance of earlier funds. Thus the learning model predicts that the sensitivity of 
future fundraising to performance should decline in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. 
Finally, for a given performance, later sequence funds should be more likely to raise a follow-on 
fund because the average assessment of ability will be higher in later sequence funds than in 
earlier ones, for the simple reason of their survival. 
Our estimates from a sample of buyout, venture capital, and real estate private equity 
funds from 1969 to 2009 are consistent with these predictions, and favor the rational learning 
model over behavioral alternatives of “naive reinvestment” or “return chasing.” For all types of 
funds, we find that both the probability of raising a follow-on fund and the size of the follow-on if 
one is raised are significantly positively related to the final performance of the current fund.4 
These results suggest that even though final performance is generally not known with certainty at 
the time of fundraising, there is more to whether a GP can raise another fund than simple naive 
reinvestment. At least some limited partners (LPs) appear to have and use information about what 
final fund performance is likely to be.5 These results complement Lerner, Schoar, and 
                                                 
4 While Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and subsequently others find a positive relation between 
follow-on size and performance in tobit specifications with left-censoring at zero, such 
specifications do not allow for separate identification of the effect of performance on the 
likelihood of raising a follow-on fund. Consistent with our results, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) find that intermediate fund performance is positively related to the 
likelihood of raising a follow-on fund in a sample of venture capital funds. 
5 In our tests, we use a fund’s ex post realized final performance (IRR) as our empirical proxy for 
investors’ expectation at the time of subsequent fundraising about what final performance will 
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Wongsunwai’s (2007) findings that at the level of individual LPs, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the extent to which performance is taken into account in reinvestment decisions.  
We also find that the relation between future fundraising and current performance is 
strongest for buyout funds, which relative to venture capital funds are both more scalable and 
likely have more informative returns. This relation is stronger for younger partnerships than for 
older, so the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance declines in the sequence of a 
partnership’s funds. Controlling for performance, older partnerships are more likely to raise a 
follow-on fund. All of these results match the predictions of the learning model.  
In contrast, our findings are inconsistent with behavioral “return chasing” or “dumb 
money” explanations for private equity fund flows, in which investors chase returns without 
regard to their informativeness or disproportionately react to the performance of older, more 
famous partnerships. These explanations predict, contrary to our results, either a flat or an 
increasing sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance in the sequence of a 
partnership’s funds.6  
We next turn to estimating the magnitude of total pay for performance in private equity, 
and evaluate the relative magnitudes of its direct (from contractual carried interest) and indirect 
(from future fundraising) components. Our theoretical framework provides an explicit formula 
for the sensitivity of GPs’ lifetime incomes to the return of the current fund. Our calculations use 
this formula, our estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance, 
                                                                                                                                                             
turn out to be. This is analogous to the common practice in asset pricing studies of using ex post 
realized returns to proxy for ex ante expected returns. We discuss performance measurement 
issues in detail in Section 3.3. 
6 A declining sensitivity of fund size to performance as a partnership ages could be consistent 
with return chasing if GPs are shutting out willing investors in order to avoid growing too large. 
However, this alternative does not explain our finding that the likelihood that a follow-on fund is 
raised at all also loses sensitivity to performance as the partnership ages. 
  6 
parameters reflecting the characteristics of our sample of private equity funds, and estimates of 
expected GP 5 revenue as a fraction of fund size from Metrick and Yasuda (2010). 
For an average-sized first-time buyout fund in our sample ($417.5 million), we estimate 
that for an extra percentage point of internal rate of return (IRR) to limited partners in the current 
fund, general partners receive on average an extra $3.32 million7 in direct carried interest, 
assuming a carried interest of 20%.8 For the same incremental percentage point of IRR in this 
current fund, our estimates of the present value of expected incremental revenue from future 
funds range from $4.27 million to $7.81 million, depending on whether we assume the GP 
potentially runs up to three or up to five more funds, resulting in estimated ratios of present 
values of indirect to direct pay for performance of 1.29 to 2.35. These estimates suggest that 
indirect pay for performance from future fundraising is at least as large as direct pay for 
performance from carried interest for first-time buyout funds. 
We also perform the same calculations for venture capital and real estate funds. Expected 
compensation from future fundraising is less sensitive to current performance for these types of 
funds than for buyout funds, with venture capital funds displaying the least sensitivity. For an 
average-sized first-time venture capital fund, our estimates of the ratio of indirect to direct pay 
                                                 
7 All dollar amounts and ratios are present values using annual discount rates of 9% for buyout 
and real estate funds, and 15% for venture capital funds. Though the exact estimates of pay for 
performance do vary with the chosen discount rate, our key cross-sectional conclusions are 
robust to reasonable alternatives. 
8 Carried interest rarely differs from 20%, especially during the post-1990 time period that covers 
the bulk of our sample. In Gompers and Lerner’s (1999) sample of 419 venture capital funds 
raised before 1992, 81% have carry between 20% and 21%. In Metrick and Yasuda’s (2010) 
sample of 238 funds from 1993 to 2006, 95% of venture capital funds and 100% of buyout funds 
have carry equal to 20%. In Robinson and Sensoy’s (2011b) sample of 837 funds from 1984 to 
2010, carry is equal to 20% for 89% and 97% of venture capital and buyout funds, respectively, 
and the average carry is 20.44% and 19.96%, respectively. 
  7 
for performance range from 0.39 to 0.44, and for an average first-time real estate fund they range 
from 1.37 to 1.96. 
Consistent with the learning framework, the ratio declines in the sequence of funds for all 
types of funds. The decline is fairly weak for buyout funds, sharper for real estate funds, and 
sharpest for venture capital funds. Assuming the GP potentially runs up to five more future funds, 
our estimates of the present values of the ratios of indirect to direct pay for performance for 
buyout funds are 2.35 if the current fund is the first in a buyout partnership’s sequence, 2.10 if it 
is the second fund in a buyout partnership’s sequence, and 1.75 if it is the third. For real estate 
funds, the corresponding ratios are 1.96, 1.39, and 1.12, while for venture capital funds, they are 
0.44, 0.35, and 0.18. Figure 1-1 depicts these patterns graphically, and Figures 1-2 to 1-4 show 
that our cross-sectional conclusions are robust to reasonable alternative discount rates used to 
compute present values. 
Overall, our results are consistent with indirect pay for performance from future 
fundraising in private equity being driven by rational learning about ability. They suggest that 
indirect pay for performance is of the same order of magnitude as the often-discussed direct, 
explicit pay for performance coming from carried interest. For the typical first-time private 
equity fund, the estimates indicate that GP lifetime income increases by about $0.50 for every $1 
increase in LP income in the current fund, double the $0.25 implied by a 20% in-the-money 
carry alone. In short, total pay for performance in private equity is much stronger, by a factor of 
about two, than implied by the carried interest alone. Consequently, discussions of the incentives 
of private equity GPs that focus on carried interest alone are substantially incomplete. 
Our estimates also imply that total pay for performance in private equity exhibits 
substantially more heterogeneity than suggested by the carried interest alone. Given that carried 
  8 
interest typically does not change much over time, the results imply that total pay for 
performance in private equity declines as funds mature.9 Why does the carry remain relatively 
flat over time despite the declining indirect pay for performance, instead of increasing to 
compensate for career concerns over time, as models such as Gibbons and Murphy (1992) 
predict? One possibility is that because of learning, low-ability agents are forced out of the 
profession over time. The remaining high-ability agents could require lower total incentives, 
possibly because learning-by-doing decreases the marginal cost of effort, or because effort and 
ability are substitutes in generating profits from private equity investments. Another possibility is 
that the carried interest reflects rent-splitting between GPs and LPs rather than agency problems. 
In this case, the observed pay-performance relations are a consequence of this rent-splitting 
together with learning about ability, rather than the solution to an agency problem. An important 
topic for future research is to understand whether the pattern of explicit compensation over a 
partnership’s life cycle is efficient, given the declining indirect pay for performance that we find.  
Our work is related to the large literature, surveyed by Frydman and Jenter (2010), 
studying the magnitude of the pay-performance incentives of CEOs. Important contributions to 
this literature are Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebman (1998) for public company 
CEOs, and Leslie and Oyer (2009) for CEOs of private equity portfolio companies. We are the 
first to estimate the magnitude of the total pay-for-performance incentives of private equity 
general partners. 
                                                 
9 Gompers and Lerner (1999) argue that the dynamics of GP compensation are also consistent 
with learning, and are the first to show that the largest and most successful venture capital funds 
do sometimes raise their carried interest above 20%. The average effect is, however, much too 
small to compensate for the declining indirect pay for performance we document. They find that 
the average carry among first-time venture capital funds is 20.5%, and 21.4% among 
partnerships older than eight years. 
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Closely related to our work is a large literature, beginning with Ippolito (1992), 
investigating mutual fund inflows and their strongly positive relation to historical performance. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that the sensitivity of mutual fund flows to performance is 
greater for younger funds, consistent with our results. Berk and Green (2004) rationalize many of 
these findings with a learning model of investor behavior similar to our approach. However, 
there is also considerable evidence that mutual fund investors chase returns in a manner difficult 
to reconcile with rational theories (e.g., Frazzini and Lamont 2008 and Sensoy 2009). Our work 
is also closely related to Chevalier and Ellison (1999), who find that younger mutual fund 
managers are more likely to be terminated for poor performance than older ones, consistent with 
our results. No prior work has attempted to quantify the total pay-for-performance relations 
facing managers in other asset management settings in light of the flow- and termination-
performance relations in those industries. An additional contribution of this article is to provide 
an approach and framework that can be readily adapted for use for these interesting topics for 
future research. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 1 lays out the theoretical 
learning framework. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents estimates of the effect of 
current performance on future fundraising, and contrasts the predictions of the learning model 
with those of behavioral alternatives. Section 4 transforms these estimates into pay-for-
performance sensitivities, using the formula derived in Section 1 as a basis for the calculations. 
Section 5 discusses the implications of this work and concludes. 
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1. Theoretical Framework 
In this section we present a theoretical framework based on rational learning in which 
investors assign cash flows to private equity partnerships based on their perceptions of GPs’ 
abilities to earn profits. This framework provides intuitive cross-sectional predictions that 
contrast with behavioral alternatives and guide our empirical tests. This framework also enables 
us to derive a formula expressing GP total pay for performance (direct from carried interest plus 
indirect from future fundraising) in terms of quantities we can estimate from the data. We 
assume that investors observe signals about the performance of a partnership, and based on their 
posterior estimate of GP ability decide whether the GP is able to raise another fund, and if so, 
how much to invest in it. This capital allocation process leads to a strong relation between 
performance in a current fund and GPs’ future compensation. 
1.1 Setup 
We assume that a particular GP currently manages a fund and could potentially manage 
up to N more funds in the future (e.g., the GP will retire after managing N more funds). The GP 
has ability to earn returns through private equity investing equal to θ.10 Ability θ is unobservable 
and there is symmetric information, so all agents, including the GP, have the same estimate of its 
value.11 We assume that θ is constant over time for a particular partnership, which abstracts 
                                                 
10 It is possible that GPs could be rewarded through future fundraising for either absolute or 
relative (abnormal) returns. Our empirical analysis examines both possibilities. 
11 The assumption that there is symmetric information about managers’ abilities dates to 
Holmstrom (1999), and has been used in similar learning models by Gibbons and Murphy 
(1992), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, forthcoming), Berk and Green (2004), and others. 
Implicitly, the idea is that anyone who can become a GP is smart, hard-working, well-educated, 
and so on, but the key factor determining who can earn returns is an unobservable match 
between the individual and the tasks associated with earning profits as a general partner. 
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away from issues of changing partnership composition, investment environments, or changing 
ability over time due to health or other considerations. Before any returns are observed, the 
commonly held prior assessment of θ is . 12 
The parameter θ can be thought of as the ability to generate returns in absence of 
decreasing returns to scale. With decreasing returns to scale, greater fund size erodes the ability 
to translate θ into returns. To capture this idea, let the net return to LPs of the ith fund managed 
by the GP be given by , where  is the size (committed capital) of fund i, 
 is an increasing, convex, and differentiable function (representing the return cost of each 
unit of capital) and is common knowledge, and .  for all i, where s is the precision of 
the distribution. 
1.1.1 Updating beliefs 
Under these assumptions, after observing the returns on i funds, the market’s updated 
assessment of θ, θi, is given by: 
 
for all i (DeGroot (1970) provides a derivation of this Bayesian updating formula). In other 
words, θi is the expectation (posterior mean) of θ conditional on observing the returns on i funds. 
                                                 
12 The assessment represents the expected skill of a particular GP conditional on all observable 
characteristics prior to any returns being observed. Different GPs will have different values of  
and consequently raise initial funds of different sizes. 
(1) 
  12 
Note that because qi and c (.) are known to all, observing ri is equivalent to observing  
.13 
1.1.2 Follow-on fund size, conditional on raising a follow-on 
Given that it is raised, the conditional expected return on fund i+1 is given by 
. The equilibrium , denoted , is obtained by imposing the 
equilibrium condition that investors allocate capital so that the expected return on fund i + 1 is 
equal to their cost of capital, which for simplicity we normalize to zero. In equilibrium, then, 
, and consequently is given implicitly by . For our purpose, it is more 
convenient to invert this function. Define , so that . 
1.1.3 Probability of raising a follow-on 
We further assume that there is a minimum viable fund size, so funds smaller than this 
size are not raised. This minimum size could occur as a result of, for example, a minimum 
investment scale in the industry or a fixed cost of running a fund. Since the factors that determine 
a fund’s minimum size change over time, a fund’s minimum viable size varies through time 
following exogenous shocks to these parameters. That is, at the time a follow-on to fund i, fund 
, is potentially raised, we assume there exists a such that the follow-on is not raised if 
is such that . Because the shocks are not observed until the time fund is to be 
                                                 
13 While we speak of investors observing returns for convenience of exposition, in practice the 
final performance of a private equity fund is generally not known with certainty at the time a 
follow-on fund is raised. A more flexible interpretation of our model is that the “return” ri that 
investors observe is actually a signal about what eventual performance will be. In our empirical 
analysis, we use a fund’s actual final performance, known only ex post, as an empirical proxy for 
the information about performance that investors have at time of fundraising. We discuss this 
measurement issue in detail in Section 3. 
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(potentially) raised, the GP does not know ex ante (at the time fund i is raised) whether a given 
return ri will suffice to pass the hurdle for raising fund .
14 Denote by  the ex ante 
probability that fund  will be raised if, ex post, the assessment of ability turns out to be . 
1.2 Cross-sectional implications 
This learning formulation characterizes the way in which fund returns affect future 
fundraising and, consequently, the future expected compensation for the funds’ partners. 
Conditional on the sequence of returns earned in the first i funds, the expected size of the next 
fund is given by  for , and zero for . 
1.2.1 Sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance across partnership types 
The sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance is governed by the 
derivatives of and with respect to ri, which are equal to  and , 
respectively. Intuitively, a more steeply sloped  function means that for a small increase in 
the assessment of ability, the market is relatively more willing to allocate capital to a fund. More 
formally, by the definition of , we have , where  represents the degree 
of diminution of returns for a given increase in fund size. In other words, greater  represents 
lower “scalability” of the investment technology, so greater , represents greater scalability. 
Holding i fixed, a larger weighting term  reflects a greater relative infomativeness of the 
return to the market’s perception of the GP’s ability. 
                                                 
14 If the minimum viable fund size were known ex ante, raising a follow-on would be a 
deterministic function of ri. 
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We expect buyout funds to be more scalable, and hence have a larger , than other 
types of funds, particularly venture funds. If a GP of a buyout partnership is shown to be talented 
at increasing value by buying out companies, he can potentially employ the same skills to buy 
out larger companies and increase their value, and hence make effective use of a larger pool of 
capital. In contrast, if a venture capitalist has demonstrated that she is talented at investing in 
startup companies, she is not able to increase fund size as much because the size of startup 
investments is not scalable (and because, given the time-consuming value-added nature of the 
private equity investing process, it is not feasible simply to increase the number of investments). 
Metrick and Yasuda (2010) present evidence consistent with greater scalability of buyout 
compared to venture capital. Further consistent is the observation that the largest buyout 
investments in portfolio companies are on the order of tens of billions of dollars, whereas the 
largest venture capital investments rarely exceed a few tens of millions of dollars. Moreover, the 
most successful buyout funds, such as KKR and Blackstone, have steadily increased the size of 
their funds to the point where the largest funds are between $15 and $20 billion in committed 
capital, while the most successful Silicon Valley venture capitalists, such as Kleiner Perkins and 
Sequoia, have remained at or under $1 billion in committed capital in a given fund. 
We also expect that the informativeness of returns about ability is likely to be greater for 
buyout funds than for venture capital funds. If a venture fund performs particularly well, this 
performance likely comes from the success of a small number of investments in the fund’s 
portfolio. As a result, there is likely to be a greater variance of returns to specific investments in 
venture capital than in buyouts, implying a lower precision of the estimate of the fund-level 
return. In addition, the cross-sectional standard deviation of fund returns (IRR) is much lower in 
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buyout (20.7% in our data) than in venture capital (52.5%), which also suggests greater 
informativeness of buyout returns relative to venture capital returns. 
It is less clear how  should vary across types of funds. Nonetheless, it seems likely 
that  would be higher for buyout funds than for venture capital funds for similar scalability 
reasons. In the buyout industry, marginal underperformers are potentially more likely to be shut 
out of future fundraising completely because the more successful buyout partnerships can scale 
up to absorb the demand of investors to a greater extent than is possible in the venture capital 
industry. For all of these reasons, we expect the sensitivity of future fundraising to current 
performance to be greater for buyout funds than venture capital funds. 
1.2.2 Sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance in the sequence of funds 
within a partnership 
Holding fixed, both  and are decreasing in i because of the 
weighting term . Intuitively, as partnerships progress through time, the partnership’s  
becomes known more precisely. The optimal updating rule therefore implies that subsequent s 
do not change as much as earlier s for a given return. Consequently, in the data we expect to 
observe the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance to decline as a given 
partnership manages subsequent funds. 
1.2.3 Sensitivity of future fundraising to the sequence of funds within a partnership 
Holding performance ri fixed, the updated assessment of ability will be greater when 
the just-prior assessment of ability is higher. Because the probability of raising funds 
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throughout a partnership’s life depends on the market’s assessment of its ability, later sequence 
funds will on average have higher prior assessments of ability  than earlier sequence funds. 
Consequently, in the data we expect to observe that holding performance fixed, later sequence 
funds are more likely to raise a follow-on fund, so the probability of raising a follow-on fund 
should increase with the sequence number of the current fund. 
1.3 Lifetime compensation of GPs 
Let  be the fraction of the size of fund i that accrues as revenue to the GP with 
performance of , including management fees, carried interest, and other income earned by the 
fund, such as additional fees earned by funds for managing portfolio companies.15 
The total expected revenue earned by the GP over his lifetime is then given by: 
 
As stated above, this formulation assumes that the GP can run a maximum of N future 
funds. If the GP ever fails to raise a follow-on fund, he is unable to raise any funds subsequently 
and earns no subsequent income from managing private equity investments. For example, a third 
fund cannot be raised unless a second fund is raised. Hence the expected revenue from the third 
fund depends on the probability that the third fund is raised conditional on the assessment of 
ability following the second fund ( ), multiplied by the probability that the second fund is 
                                                 
15 We refer to revenue and compensation synonymously throughout the article. While private 
equity partnerships do have some costs that create a wedge between revenue and partner 
compensation, many of these costs are more or less fixed and do not affect marginal 
compensation. We discuss potential omitted marginal costs in Section 4.4. 
(2) 
  17 
raised ). We are interested in calculating the magnitude of the total pay-performance 
relation facing general partners. This pay-for-performance relation is made up of a direct 
component, from carried interest in the current fund, and an indirect component, from the greater 
probability of raising future funds and greater future fund size conditional on raising future funds. 
The total pay-performance relation is the sensitivity of total lifetime revenue to r1: 
 
 + 
 + 
 + 
 + 
 
 
The terms above have natural interpretations. The first line represents the direct effect 
from carried interest in the current fund. The subsequent lines together make up the indirect 
component. The second line is the incremental expected revenue from the next fund. Intuitively, 
improving performance has two effects on incremental revenue from the next fund. The first 
term in brackets represents the increase in the probability that a follow-on fund will be raised 
multiplied by the size of the follow-on fund conditional on one being raised. The second term in 
brackets represents the probability of raising a follow-on multiplied by the increase in fund size 
conditional on one being raised. Similarly, the third line is the incremental expected revenue 
(3) 
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from the third fund. The three components in brackets represent, respectively, the increments to 
expected fund size from the increase in probability of raising the second fund, the increase in 
probability of raising the third fund, and the increase in size of the third fund. The weighting 
terms, of the form , represent the extent to which an incremental change in r affects the 
update of . The terms represent the expected fraction of future fund sizes that accrues to 
the GPs as revenue. 
1.4 Empirical Implementation 
We test the predictions of our learning model against those of behavioral alternatives 
using regressions that estimate the sensitivities to current performance of both the probability of 
raising a follow-on fund, and the size of the follow-on fund conditional on raising one. These 
equations also yield estimates of the  and  terms in Equation (3). We 
estimate other terms in Equation (3) as follows: Incremental expected revenue to the GPs from 
the current fund, , is based on the standard 20% carried interest, which, as Gompers and 
Lerner (1999), Metrick and Yasuda (2010), and Robinson and Sensoy (2011b) document, 
involves only a slight approximation. For the terms for future funds, we use the estimates 
provided by Metrick and Yasuda (2010), who estimate the expected revenue to GPs as a fraction 
of a fund’s size using simulations. For the and terms, we use the respective fund type- 
and sequence-specific averages in our data: the fraction of funds that raise a follow-on, and the 
  19 
average size of follow-on funds conditional on raising one.16 Finally, we discount future 
compensation using a range of fund type-specific discount rates. 
2. Data 
Our analysis uses fund-level data provided by Preqin for the three major types of private 
equity funds: buyout, venture capital, and real estate. There are a total of 9,523 funds in Preqin as 
of June 2009, which, according to Preqin’s documentation, represent about 70% of all capital 
ever raised in the private equity industry. In addition, in private communication Preqin informs 
us that about 85% of their data is collected via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests 
made to limited partners subject to the act and thereby is not subject to self-reporting biases.17 In 
all of our analysis, we exclude funds without vintage year data (64), without fund size data 
(1,137), and which are still being raised (78), and we construct our sample from the remaining 
8,244 funds. We begin by constructing a sample of “preceding,” or current, funds. To obtain 
                                                 
16 Equation (3) involves product terms of the form p’f and f’p. Our approach is to estimate each 
term separately and multiply them together. This approach is an appropriate estimate of the 
expectation of the product if the estimation errors of the two terms are uncorrelated—i.e., if the 
sampling error in p and f is uncorrelated with the regression errors associated with the estimates 
of p’ and f’, respectively. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition under which this will be true 
is if our sample is representative of the population of private equity funds. In that case, sampling 
error is uncorrelated with all other characteristics of the funds. 
17 Harris, Jenkinson, and Stucke (2010) demonstrate than Preqin has better coverage than other 
commercially available private equity databases, particularly of buyout funds, and perform a 
comprehensive comparison of performance statistics across different data sources. Despite the 
broad coverage, Preqin could be subject to a bias if the types of LPs subject to FOIA, the most 
notable type of which is public pension funds, invest in private equity funds that systematically 
differ from the population of funds. Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) provide reassuring 
evidence that public pension funds have middle-of-the-road (i.e., representative) performance, 
and report that Preqin has also been successful in obtaining performance information from a 
number of successful, established partnerships. In addition, any bias from self-reporting by non-
FOIA sources would likely oversample funds with good performance that do raise a follow-on 
fund. This effect would lead to downward-biased estimates of the fundraising/performance 
relation. In the limit, if every fund in the sample raises a follow-on, then performance is 
unrelated to the likelihood 38 of raising a follow-on. 
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estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance, we require a sample of 
funds for which performance (IRR) data are available. From this sample of funds, we follow 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and drop funds with less than $5 million (in 1990 dollars) in 
committed capital (nine funds), to reduce the influence of potentially extreme growth rates of 
small funds on our results. In addition, to allow for sufficient time to ascertain whether a fund 
raises a follow-on, we drop funds raised after 2005. Finally, when a private equity firm raises 
multiple funds in a given year, we aggregate funds in that year and compute the fund-size-
weighted IRR. There are two exceptions to this rule. The first is a few cases in which the same 
partnership manages, for example, both buyout and real estate funds. In these cases, we treat the 
partnership for econometric purposes as two separate partnerships, one each for buyout and real 
estate funds. The second (rare) exception is when the same partnership manages funds of the 
same type but different geographical focus, such as a fund focusing on European buyouts and 
another focusing on U.S. buyouts. In this case, we treat the European buyout funds and U.S. 
buyout funds as two separate partnerships. This process leaves us with a sample of 1,745 
preceding funds, consisting of 645 (37%) buyout funds, 851 (49%) venture capital funds, and 
249 (14%) real estate funds. The preceding funds range from 1969 to 2005, with 91% in the 
1990–2005 period. For each of these preceding funds, we determine whether there is a follow-on 
fund in the full sample of 8,244 funds. We define a follow-on fund as the next fund raised by the 
same partnership for which we have information on fund size (we do not require information on 
the performance of the follow-on fund). If we do not observe a follow-on fund by the end of our 
sample period (June 2009), or if the data indicate a follow-on fund but do not provide size 
information, we treat this as if the partnership did not raise a follow-on fund. The working 
assumption we use throughout the article is that the absence of a follow-on fund with size 
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information in the data means the partnership was unable to raise one.18 Of the 1,745 preceding 
funds, 1,469 (84.2%) raise a follow-on fund. Table 1-1 presents descriptive statistics for this 
sample of preceding and follow-on funds. Panel A reports that the sample represents 843 distinct 
partnerships: 314 buyout, 412 venture capital, and 117 real estate. The distribution of number of 
preceding funds per partnership is clearly skewed, with many partnerships having just one or two 
preceding funds and a few substantially more (the maximum in the sample is twelve preceding 
funds). Note that these are the numbers of preceding funds used in our analysis, not the actual 
number of funds per partnership. 
Panel B of Table 1-1 reports additional descriptive statistics. The mean (median) 
preceding fund size is $497.9 ($210.0) million for all funds taken together, $866.4 ($380.0) 
million for buyout funds, $217.7 ($125.0) million for venture capital funds, and $501.0 ($314.9) 
million for real estate funds. These statistics show that buyout funds are typically larger than 
venture capital funds, and that the distribution of private equity fund size is highly skewed. The 
mean (median) preceding fund performance (IRR) is 15.1% (10.6%) for all funds taken together, 
16.5% (14.3%) for buyout funds, 14.1% (5.8%) for venture capital funds, and 14.6% (14.1%) for 
real estate funds. The mean (median) growth in fund size from preceding to follow-on fund, 
conditional on raising a follow-on, is 92.4% (53.8%) for all funds taken together, 110.9% (70.0%) 
for buyout funds, 78.6% (42.9%) for venture capital funds, and 89.7% (48.9%) for real estate 
funds. The time between successive fundraisings averages 3.3 years for the entire sample, 3.8 
years for buyout funds, 3.3 years for venture capital funds, and 2.4 years for real estate funds. 
                                                 
18 This assumption has the effect of downward-biasing our estimates of the relation between 
current performance and future fundraising. Undoubtedly some partnerships do raise follow-on 
funds that are missing from the data because the data are incomplete. Additionally, in practice, 
partnerships sometimes dissolve even though the market would have been willing to provide 
capital for a follow-on fund had the partnership desired one. 
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Table 1-2 reports the same fund characteristics broken out by the focal fund’s position in the 
partnership’s sequence of funds in the full Preqin database. Table 1-2 shows that higher sequence 
number funds are substantially larger than lower sequence number funds, both because they 
represent successful partnerships and also because they tend to be located later in time when 
funds were larger. The growth rate in fund size from preceding to follow-on funds tends to 
decrease in the sequence of funds. The time between successive fundraisings generally decreases 
in the sequence of funds, suggesting that older partnerships are more able to raise new funds on 
the basis of their past track records and rely less on performance in the current fund. The 
percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on is generally increasing in the sequence of 
funds. All of these patterns are consistent with the learning framework developed in Section 1. 
3. The Empirical Relations between Current Performance and Future Fundraising 
In this section, we estimate the sensitivities of the probability of raising a follow-on fund, 
and the size of the follow-on if one is raised, to current performance. All of our estimates in this 
section use a fund’s realized final performance (IRR) as our measure of performance. We are 
therefore using the realized final IRR as a proxy for investors’ expectation at the time of 
subsequent fundraising about what final performance of the current fund will turn out to be, even 
though final IRR is not generally known with certainty at that time. In other words, we use ex 
post realized returns to proxy for ex ante expected returns, in keeping with common practice in 
asset pricing studies. We discuss the measurement issues implicit in this proxy in more detail in 
Section 3.3, and present results using the interim IRR available at the time of fundraising for 
robustness in the Appendix. 
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3.1 Estimates without sequence effects 
Table 1-3 reports estimates of the relation between future fundraising and current 
performance that do not allow for the possibility that the sensitivities can vary in the sequence of 
funds. In Table 1-3, columns labeled “(1)” use the IRR of the “current” (preceding) fund as the 
sole regressor, and columns labeled “(2)” contain vintage year (of the preceding fund) fixed 
effects to control for any market-wide, time-varying factors that potentially affect the ability to 
raise a follow-on fund, and to control for systematic differences in fund performance across 
different vintage years. These factors are likely to be important in light of the well-documented 
cyclicality of the private equity market (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 1998). In all specifications, we 
cluster standard errors at the partnership level, following Kaplan and Schoar (2005).19 
Panel A of Table 1-3 presents marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of all independent 
variables, from probit specifications predicting the probability of raising a follow-on fund as a 
function of current (preceding) fund performance (IRR). The relation between current 
performance and the likelihood of raising a follow-on is statistically significantly positive for all 
fund types. The point estimates from the specifications with vintage year fixed effects are 
slightly larger than those from the specifications without. The marginal effects for the “All 
Funds” regressions imply that a one percentage point improvement in IRR relative to the sample 
mean is associated with a 0.316–0.324 percentage point increase in the probability of raising a 
follow-on fund. Consistent with the learning framework, the estimated marginal effects are larger 
                                                 
19 In addition, we estimate but to conserve space do not report specifications using as the 
independent variable the preceding fund IRR minus the preceding fund’s benchmark IRR 
provided by Preqin. Preqin defines the benchmark IRR as the average IRR of all funds of the 
same type, vintage year, and geographic focus. Our results using this “risk-adjusted” measure of 
IRR are virtually identical to those reported below. 
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for buyout funds (0.467–0.588 percentage points) than for venture capital funds (0.288–0.297 
percentage points), and the differences in the probit coefficients between buyout funds and 
venture capital funds are statistically significant (p-value 0.057), as are the differences between 
real estate and venture capital funds (p-value 0.086).20 The differences between buyout and real 
estate are not statistically significant (p-value 0.633). In unreported analysis, we obtain 
statistically and economically similar results using linear probability (OLS) models instead of 
probit. These findings reject the “naive reinvestment” hypothesis that limited partners on average 
do not have or are too unsophisticated to use information about what final fund performance is 
likely to be when deciding whether to allow a GP to raise a subsequent fund, and complement 
Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai’s (2007) findings of considerable heterogeneity at the LP level 
in the extent to which performance is taken into account in reinvestment decisions. These 
findings are consistent with Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and subsequently others who find a 
positive relation between follow-on size and performance in tobit specifications with left-
censoring at zero. However, these prior specifications do not allow for separate identification of 
the effect of performance on the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund, which is key to the 
“naive reinvestment” hypothesis. Panel B of Table 1-3 presents OLS estimates of equations 
predicting the growth in fund size from preceding to follow-on fund as a function of IRR, for the 
subsample of preceding funds that raise a follow-on fund. Growth in fund size is defined as 
follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size minus one. The estimates indicate that 
current performance is strongly positively related to follow-on fund size, consistent with Kaplan 
                                                 
20 Here and in all similar tests, we assess statistical significance by pooling the observations of 
different fund types into a single regression, and including an interaction of IRR with a dummy 
variable indicating fund type (either). A significant coefficient on the interaction term indicates a 
significant difference across fund types. We report p-values based on the specifications with 
vintage year fixed effects, which are estimated more precisely. 
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and Schoar (2005).The coefficients are all positive and are all statistically significant except 
those for venture capital funds. The magnitudes of the coefficients in the “All Funds” regressions 
imply that a one percentage point increase in IRR is associated with a 0.623–0.663 percentage 
point increase in fund growth. As in Panel A, the estimated effects for buyout funds (2.152–
2.314 percentage points) are considerably larger than those for venture capital funds (0.426–
0.492 percentage points), with real estate in between (1.723–1.955 percentage points). The 
differences between buyout and venture capital, and between real estate and venture capital, are 
statistically significant (p-values 0.016 and 0.062, respectively), while the differences between 
buyout and real estate are not (p-value 0.635). Panel C of Table 1-3 reports estimates of similar 
equations in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of follow-on fund size divided 
by preceding fund size plus one. (We add one to avoid taking the logarithm of a number close to 
zero.) Because the distribution of growth rates in the data is skewed, a logarithmic specification 
is likely to fit the data better, which is confirmed by the fact that the R2 values in Panel C are 
generally considerably higher than those in Panel B. The estimates again indicate that current 
performance is strongly positively related to follow-on fund size.21 The coefficients are all 
positive and statistically significantly different from zero. Similar to the results reported above, 
the estimates are significantly larger for buyout than for venture capital, and for real estate than 
for venture capital (p-values 0.004 and 0.024, respectively), while the difference between buyout 
and real estate is statistically insignificant (p-value 0.858). Overall, the estimates in Table 1-3 
confirm two of the main predictions from the learning framework. First, both the likelihood of 
raising a follow-on fund and the size of that fund if one is raised are strongly positively related to 
                                                 
21 In unreported analysis, we test whether future fundraising is nonlinear in performance. We find 
a statistically significantly negative coefficient on the square of IRR, indicating concavity, but 
the effects are economically tiny. 
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performance in the current fund. Second, the sensitivity of future fundraising to current 
performance is larger for buyout funds than for venture capital funds. 
3.2 Sequence-specific estimates 
The estimates presented in Table 1-3 do not consider a key prediction of the learning 
framework, that the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance is declining in the 
sequence of funds managed by a given partnership. To test this prediction, in Table 1-4 we re-
estimate the equations from Table 1-3, including variables for the preceding fund’s sequence 
number as well as the sequence number interacted with IRR.22 Panel A of Table 1-4 presents 
estimates of equations predicting the probability of raising a follow-on fund. In Panel A, we 
focus on linear probability models because of the difficulty of interpreting marginal effects of 
interaction terms in probit specifications (and the potential bias in coefficient estimates resulting 
from including fixed effects in probit specifications).23 As in Panel A of Table 1-3, we find that 
current performance is positively related to the probability of raising a follow-on fund when all 
fund types are pooled, for buyout funds separately, and for venture capital funds separately. The 
coefficients are of similar magnitude to those in Table 1-3, and once again the difference 
between the coefficients for buyout and for venture capital funds is statistically significant (p-
value 0.001). The coefficient on IRR for real estate funds is similar to the one reported in Table 
                                                 
22 As in Table 1-3, results are similar if we use the preceding fund’s benchmark-adjusted IRR. 
The results are also unaffected by controlling for the time between successive fundraisings in the 
fund growth specifications, which addresses the concern that the declining sensitivity in the 
sequence may be confounded by the fact that older partnerships raise follow-on funds faster on 
average (Table 1-2 Panel E). 
23 See Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2000). 
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1-3 but is estimated less precisely, is not statistically significant, and is significantly different 
from the coefficient for buyout funds but not from that for venture capital funds (p-values 0.006 
and 0.708, respectively). For all funds taken together, and for buyout and venture capital funds 
individually, the coefficients on sequence number in Panel A of Table 1-4 are positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficients on the interaction of sequence number with IRR are 
negative and statistically significant. This pattern of coefficients matches the predictions of the 
learning framework of Section 1. 
Higher sequence numbers are associated with funds that have done well historically and 
hence have high current assessments of ability, so they are more likely to raise a follow-on 
regardless of current performance. In addition, ability is estimated more precisely over time, so 
the incremental effect of current performance on a fund’s ability to raise a follow-on fund grows 
smaller over time. Panel B of Table 1-4 presents OLS regressions predicting growth in fund size 
conditional on raising a follow-on fund, similar to those of Panel B of Table 1-3. The coefficients 
on IRR are positive, statistically significant (with one exception), and generally larger in 
magnitude than those in Panel B of Table 1-3. The coefficients on sequence number are all 
positive but not statistically significant. With the exception of buyout funds, the coefficients on 
the interaction of sequence number with IRR are negative and statistically significant. Panel C of 
Table 1-4 presents estimates of similar equations in which the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of growth in fund size plus two. As in Table 1-3, the R2 values indicate that these 
specifications fit the data better than those of Panel B. The coefficients on IRR are all positive, 
statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than those in Panel C of Table 1-3. The 
coefficients on the interaction of sequence number with IRR are all negative and, with the 
exception of buyout funds, statistically significant. In both Panels B and C, the coefficients 
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indicate that the sensitivity of fund growth to performance is greater (but not significantly so) for 
first-time buyout funds than for first-time venture capital funds, and that the gap between them 
grows quickly in the sequence of funds. For all fund types, Table 1-4 shows that the sensitivity 
of future fundraising to current performance is significantly decreasing in the sequence number 
of the current fund. For all funds taken together, and for venture capital funds individually, the 
effects are statistically significant for both the probability of raising a follow-on fund and the 
growth in fund size if a follow-on is raised. For buyout funds, the effect is significant only 
through the probability of raising a follow-on, and for real estate, only through the growth in 
follow-on fund size. All of our results continue to hold when controlling for vintage year fixed 
effects, and all match the predictions of the learning model. In contrast, our findings are 
inconsistent with a behavioral “return chasing” or “dumb money” explanation for private equity 
fund flows, by which investors chase returns without regard to their informativeness or 
disproportionately react to the performance of older, more famous partnerships. These 
explanations predict, contrary to our results, either a flat or an increasing sensitivity of future 
fundraising to current performance in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. Prior work, 
beginning with Kaplan and Schoar (2005), finds as we do that follow-on fund size is positively 
related to current performance, but this result alone cannot distinguish behavioral return chasing 
from rational learning. Overall, the evidence in Tables 1-3 and 1-4 suggests that the rational 
learning framework better describes the empirical relations between fundraising and performance 
than behavioral “naive reinvestment” or “return chasing” explanations. Investors appear to utilize 
information about what final fund performance is likely to be when deciding on whether a GP 
can raise a subsequent fund, and the size of that fund conditional on raising it. Later sequence 
funds are more likely to raise a follow-on fund controlling for performance, the sensitivity of 
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future fundraising to current performance is greater for buyout funds than for venture capital 
funds, and this sensitivity declines in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. All of these findings 
match the predictions of the learning framework. 
3.3 Measurement issues 
In all of the estimates presented above, we use the fund’s final IRR as the measure of the 
fund’s performance. A concern with doing so is that a fund’s ultimate performance is not known 
with certainty at the time the next fund is raised. The summary statistics presented in Table 1-1 
show that the typical fund that raises a follow-on fund does so after three years of life, while 
final fund performance is not known until the end of the fund’s life. An important question is 
whether the fund’s final IRR is a reasonable proxy for the information about performance that a 
fund’s investors use at time of subsequent fundraising in deciding whether and how much capital 
to allocate to a partnership’s next fund. There are several reasons to believe that the answer is 
“yes.” First, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) present a model in which a 
fund’s current investors have soft information about the likely profitability of a fund’s 
investments (obtained, for example, from close communication with the GPs), and use it when 
deciding whether to allocate capital to the partnership’s next fund. This soft information about 
performance is not reflected in the hard information about performance, “interim IRR,” available 
at that time, and is not observable to the econometrician. Soft information becomes observable to 
the econometrician only ex post, as it is reflected in the fund’s final IRR. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) find evidence supporting this idea: The performance of the follow-
on fund (if one is raised) is strongly correlated with the first fund’s final IRR, but uncorrelated 
with the interim IRR that was available at the time the follow-on was raised. Given this result, it 
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seems likely that a fund’s final IRR is a better proxy than its interim IRR for the information 
about performance investors use in deciding whether to allocate capital to the partnership’s next 
fund. Second, even if the interim IRR were the more desirable measure, in the Appendix we 
show that interim IRR (at time of fundraising) and final IRR are highly correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of about 0.6. Similarly, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find correlation 
coefficients of about 0.8–0.9 between interim IRR at five years and final IRR, consistent with the 
first few exits (or, in the case of venture capital, follow-on investments in portfolio companies) 
being strongly indicative of a fund’s ultimate performance. Moreover, to the extent that interim 
IRR is the preferable measure and is imperfectly correlated with final IRR, the standard errors-
in-variables effect implies that we will understate, not overstate, the sensitivity of future 
fundraising to performance. Notwithstanding these arguments, in the Appendix we present 
estimates of sensitivities of fundraising to performance in which we use the interim IRR at time 
of fundraising as our measure of fund performance. While we have interim IRR data for only 
somewhat less than half of our sample funds, we nonetheless obtain results similar to those 
presented in this section. 
4. Estimating Direct and Indirect Pay for Performance 
In this section, we use the theoretical framework discussed in Section 1, together with the 
regression estimates presented in Section 3, to estimate the magnitude of the total pay for 
performance relation facing private equity GPs. We compare the magnitudes of its direct 
component, from carried interest in the current fund, and its indirect component, from future 
fundraising. We consider two measures of pay for performance: the incremental revenue to GPs 
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for an incremental dollar returned to LPs, and the incremental revenue to GPs for an incremental 
percentage point improvement in IRR. 
4.1 Discounting future GP compensation 
Our estimates require a discount rate for future GP compensation. Unfortunately, the 
literature has yet to converge on a set of widely agreed-upon estimates of the cost of capital for 
different types of private equity funds, making it difficult to know what discount rate to use. The 
main problem in estimating discount rates is the lack of objective market values at sufficient 
frequency with which to compute a covariance of returns with public markets. At the same time, 
in the literature, estimates of buyout betas tend to be close to one, and estimates of venture 
capital betas tend to be in the range of two to three (Korteweg and Sorensen 2010, Driessen, Lin, 
and Phalippou forthcoming). Metrick and Yasuda (2011) estimate that the beta of venture capital 
is about two, leading to a cost of capital of about 15%, assuming a risk-free rate of 3% and a 
market risk premium of 6%. A buyout beta of one then leads to a cost of capital of about 9%. We 
use a discount rate of 9% for real estate as well. For calculations involving all funds taken 
together, we use a weighted average of these costs of capital (weighted by the number of funds in 
our sample), which works out to 12%. The results reported below in Tables 1-5 and 1-6 and 
Figure 1-1 use these discount rates.24 Our main conclusions are robust to alternative choices of 
discount rates based on the range of estimates reported in the literature, as discussed in Section 
4.3 below and presented in Figures 1-2 to 1-4. Collectively, we believe Figures 1-1 to 1-4 do a 
good job in spanning the range of beta estimates in the literature. In addition, by following the 
                                                 
24 We thank Andrew Metrick for suggesting these choices of discount rates. 
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approach described below, calculations analogous to the ones we present can be performed using 
any potential discount rate. 
4.2 Direct (explicit) pay for performance 
In this subsection we estimate direct pay for performance in the current fund, which is 
represented by the first term in equation (3) in Section 1. Our calculations assume that the fund 
has the standard 20% carry, and we use the relevant means in our sample (by fund type and 
sequence) as the baseline levels of performance and fund size. It is straightforward to perform 
analagous calculations for different breakpoints of fund size and performance using the sample 
distributions given in Table 1-2. Panel A of Table 1-5 shows that for first-time funds of all fund 
types, the sample mean IRR is positive and greater than a potential hurdle rate of 8%, so the 
carry is in the money. A 20% carry implies that GPs earn $0.25 (undiscounted) for an 
incremental $1 earned for LPs.25 To calculate the incremental revenue to GPs for a percentage 
point improvement in IRR, it is necessary to make further assumptions. We assume that the 
fund’s capital is called in equal annual installments, and the distribution corresponding to each 
capital call occurs T years later. The resulting IRR is algebraically equal to the IRR obtained by 
assuming that there is a single capital call and a single distribution spaced T years apart, which 
we take to be three years. 
                                                 
25 Our use of the standard 20% carry is motivated by evidence in the literature that carried 
interest rarely differs from 20%, especially in recent times matching the bulk of our sample. In 
Gompers and Lerner’s (1999) sample of 419 venture capital funds raised before 1992, 81% have 
carry between 20% and 21%. In Metrick and Yasuda’s (2010) sample of 238 funds from 1993 to 
2006, 95% of venture capital funds and 100% of buyout funds have carry equal to 20%. In 
Robinson and Sensoy’s (2011b) sample of 837 funds from 1984 to 2010, carry is equal to 20% 
for 89% and 97% of venture capital and buyout funds, respectively, and the average carry is 
20.44% and 19.96%, respectively. 
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Under these assumptions, the net-of-fee total dollar return to limited partners in the first 
fund, D, is given by , where r1 is the IRR (which is a net-of-fee measure) of 
the first fund and  is the size of the fund. Let R be the revenue earned by the GP. By the chain 
rule, . Inverting D and differentiating yields: 
 
We use this formula to convert incremental revenue per extra dollar returned to LPs to 
incremental revenue per incremental percentage point of IRR, and vice versa. Panel A of Table 
1-5 displays the direct pay for performance calculated using this formula with  = 0.25, 
corresponding to 20% carry, and the displayed sample parameters. For the average first time 
fund in our sample (size $262.3 million), improving IRR from a baseline of 15.75% to 16.75% 
results in $2.636 million in incremental revenue to the GP, or $1.876 million in present value. 
For buyout funds the present value is larger, $3.323 million, reflecting both the larger average 
size of buyout funds and the higher baseline level of performance. The present value for venture 
capital funds is the smallest ($0.795 million), and real estate funds fall in the middle ($2.290 
million). 
4.3 Indirect pay for performance from future fundraising 
We now turn to estimating indirect pay for performance arising from the effect of current 
performance on future fundraising. This effect corresponds to the second and following lines in 
equation (3) of Section 1. We require estimates of the terms, the and terms, and 
the  and terms in equation (3). The terms represent the expected 
(4) 
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fraction of a fund’s size that accrues to GPs as compensation, through a combination of 
management fees and carried interest. The appropriate values for are not obvious, and 
depend on the fee structure as well as the entire distribution of returns. We rely on Metrick and 
Yasuda (2010), who perform Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the distribution of using 
details of the compensation terms of a recent sample of venture capital and buyout partnerships. 
We use similar values for real estate funds (not covered by Metrick and Yasuda 2010) and the 
overall sample of funds. 
For the  and terms, we use the type- and sequence-specific averages in our 
sample. For example, suppose the fund of interest (current fund) is a first-time buyout fund. Then 
 and are the fraction of preceding buyout funds of sequence number 1 that raise a 
follow-on fund in our sample, and the average size of the follow-on, conditional on raising one. 
Panels F and C of Table 1-2 report that these values equal 76.5% and $685.7 million, 
respectively. In this way, all of the p (.) and f (.) terms used in our calculations are provided in 
Table 1-2. 
It remains to obtain estimates of the   and terms from the regression 
coefficients in Tables 1-3 and 1-4. In all of our calculations, we use the coefficients from the 
specifications without rather than with vintage year fixed effects, which lead to smaller estimates 
of indirect pay for performance. We begin with the coefficients from Table 1-3. The marginal 
effects from the probit regressions in Panel A are estimates of the change in probability of raising 
a follow-on fund for an incremental change in current performance, and so are direct estimates of 
  under the constraint that the estimate is the same for all i—i.e., sequence effects are 
ignored. 
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We use the coefficients from the logarithmic specifications in Panel C to obtain estimates 
of the   terms.26 In Panel C, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of follow-
on fund size divided by preceding fund size plus one—i.e., . The estimated 
regression coefficient, β, is an estimate of the derivative of this quantity with respect to ri, the 
IRR of the preceding fund: . Rearranging, we have 
 
Continuing the example of the first-time buyout fund, the expected incremental 
compensation from the next fund is given in equation (3) 
as . Metrick and Yasuda (2010) estimate an average 
for buyout funds of 17.72%. The marginal effect in Panel A of Table 1-3 for a one 
percentage point increment in IRR is equal to 0.00467, and the coefficient from Panel C of Table 
1-3 is equal to 0.00524 (after, in both cases, converting decimal IRR to percentage). As 
described above,  = 76.5% and = $685.7 million. Panel A of Table 1-2 reports that 
the average size of preceding buyout funds of sequence number 1 in our sample is = 
$417.5 million. Putting it all together, the incremental expected compensation from the next 
(second) fund for a one percentage point improvement in IRR in the current fund is equal to 
                                                 
26 A comparison of Panels B and C of Table 1-3 indicates that a logarithmic specification for 
follow-on fund size fits the data better. Our estimates are higher, generally by about 10%, if we 
use the coefficients from the raw growth specifications in Panel B instead. 
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0.1772 * [0.00467 * 685.7 + 0.765 * 0.00524 * (685.7 + 417.5)], or $1.351 million. This figure is 
a present value as of the beginning of the life of the second fund (this is how Metrick and Yasuda 
compute k), so we further discount for the average time between fundraisings (approximately 
three years in our data) to convert to present value as of the beginning of the current fund. In this 
way, we calculate the expected incremental compensation from the second, third, etc. follow-on 
funds following equation (3) of Section 1, discounting each appropriately using the fund type–
specific discount rates discussed above, and assuming a three-year gap between successive 
fundraisings. We then add the discounted expected incremental compensation from each future 
fund to arrive at the total estimated indirect pay for performance. 
4.3.1 Estimates ignoring sequence effects 
Panel B of Table 1-5 displays estimates of indirect pay for performance using the 
coefficients from Table 1-3 and the methodology described in Section 4.3, focusing on first-time 
funds. We present results for the quartile breakpoints of k reported by Metrick and Yasuda 
(2010), which are 15.75%, 17.72%, and 19.60% for buyout funds and 20.24%, 22.84%, and 
26.11% for venture capital funds. For all funds taken together and for real estate funds, we use 
15%, 20%, and 25%. As shown in equation (3), all of the estimates are proportional to k. We also 
present results for different values of N, the maximum number of future funds the GP could 
potentially run (e.g., before retirement). As discussed in Section 1, the estimates incorporate the 
realistic feature that failure to raise a follow-on is a once and for all event, so dropping out is 
permanent. 
In the columns labeled δTR/δIRR, we present estimates of the present value of the 
expected incremental revenue from future funds resulting from a one percentage point 
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improvement in current fund IRR, and in the columns labeled δTR/δD we use equation (4) to 
convert these estimates into those resulting from an extra dollar returned to LPs. To gauge the 
relative magnitudes of the present values of indirect and direct pay for performance, we present 
their ratios in the rightmost columns of Panel B of Table 1-5. The ratios do not depend on 
whether the performance measure is IRR or dollars because the term in brackets in equation (4) 
drops out when taking the ratio. It is evident from Panel B of Table 1-5 that indirect pay for 
performance from future fundraising is important in the private equity industry, and of the same 
order of magnitude as direct pay for performance. The ratios range from a low of 0.42 for 
venture capital funds with N = 3 and k = 20.24% to a high of 3.09 for buyout funds with N = 5 
and k = 19.60%. The estimates of indirect pay for performance are largest for buyout funds and 
smallest for venture capital funds, consistent with the patterns in Table 1-3. 
4.3.2 Estimates accounting for sequence effects 
The estimates presented in Table 1-4 suggest that the indirect incentives calculated in 
Table 1-5 are likely to be strongly affected by the declining sensitivity of future fundraising to 
current performance in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. The learning framework predicts 
two channels through which sequence effects are likely to be important. First, holding the 
sequence number of the “current” fund fixed, there is relatively less value from each potential 
subsequent fund, and hence relatively less value from increasing N. Second, as a partnership ages 
(the current fund becomes more advanced in the sequence of the partnership’s funds), indirect 
pay for performance will decline. The indirect pay for performance estimates presented in Table 
1-6 strongly support these ideas. We obtain these estimates by applying the methods described in 
Section 4.2., taking sequence effects into account. Wherever we previously used a coefficient 
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from Table 1-3, we instead use the corresponding level effect coefficient plus the product of the 
coefficient on the sequence interaction and the sequence number of the preceding fund, all from 
Table 1-4. For example, when calculating the incremental compensation from the second follow-
on fund for buyout funds, the estimate of is given by (from Panel A of Table 1-4) 
0.698 -0.091 * 2 = 0.516. In Panel A of Table 1-6, we calculate the (discounted) direct effect or 
explicit pay for performance for different sequence number current funds. The effects per 
incremental dollar returned to LPs are the same as in Table 1-5, but the effect per incremental 
percentage point of IRR grows with fund sequence reflecting the growth in fund size with 
sequence. In Panel B of Table 1-6, we estimate indirect pay for performance, holding k fixed at 
its median values from Table 1-5. Two patterns are evident. The estimates are smaller than their 
counterparts in Table 1-5, though still large, and decline with the sequence number of the current 
fund. The decline is very strong for venture capital funds and fairly weak for buyout funds, for 
which indirect pay for performance remains important well into a partnership’s sequence of 
funds. 
Figure 1-1 depicts the patterns in Table 1-6 graphically, and shows that for all funds 
taken together and for venture capital funds, indirect pay for performance declines to virtually 
zero by the time the partnership is managing its fourth fund, leaving only the direct component. 
Overall, the estimates indicate that indirect pay for performance is a substantial component of the 
total pay for performance relation facing private equity GPs, especially for funds early in a 
partnership’s life. Figures 1-2 to 1-4 show that our key cross-sectional conclusions are robust to 
alternative choices of discount rates. First, because GPs hold what is essentially an option on the 
equity returns of their portfolio, the cost of capital may underestimate the riskiness of the GP 
claim. For this reason, Figure 1-2 reports results using discount rates five percentage points 
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higher than our base cost of capital estimates. Second, based on the range of beta estimates in the 
literature it is possible (but unlikely) that venture capital funds have in fact a lower cost of capital 
than buyout funds. To assess the sensitivity of our conclusions to this possibility, Figure 1-3 
reports results assuming the most extreme low venture capital beta estimate (0.86; Woodward 
and Hall 2003) and high buyout beta estimate (1.3; Phallipou and Zollo 2005). Even with a lower 
discount rate for venture capital than for buyout, indirect pay for performance is still larger for 
buyout funds. Finally, Figure 1-4 uses high-end beta estimates of 3 for venture capital and 1.3 for 
buyout. Figures 1-2 to 1-4 continue to show that indirect pay for performance is higher for 
buyout funds compared to venture capital, and declines in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. 
We believe that collectively Figures 1-1 to 1-4 do a good job spanning estimates of discount 
rates in the literature. The figures show that while the magnitude of indirect pay for performance 
declines with increased discount rates, the estimates remain considerable in magnitude. 
Importantly, the figures show that our key cross-sectional conclusions are robust to alternative 
choices of discount rates. 
4.4 Factors Omitted from the Estimates 
There are several factors that could affect the magnitude of our estimates that are not 
explicitly modeled in the learning framework and which we do not have the data to estimate.27 
First, we ignore costs. Fixed costs do not affect general partners’ pay for performance incentives. 
However, costs do change as private equity funds grow and raise additional capital. In particular, 
as future funds grow in size, partnerships may hire new partners who receive some share of the 
                                                 
27 One potential such effect we can test comes from the notion that good performance leads to 
faster future fundraising. If so, GPs would get revenue from future funds earlier and potentially 
manage more funds over a career. However, in the data there is no significant relation between a 
fund’s performance and the time between fundraisings 
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revenue. Omitting this growth in the number of partners causes us to overestimate indirect pay 
for performance. To estimate the magnitude of this effect would require data we do not have: 
information on the number of partners, as well as the revenue-sharing arrangements between 
partners as partnerships progress through time. To the extent that new partners added on to future 
funds are likely to receive much lower shares of revenue than the original partners who were 
responsible for good performance in the prior fund, the bias will be small.28  
Another possibility is that a partnership’s carried interest percentage may respond to its 
prior performance. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) provide evidence that 
this adjustment sometimes happens when venture capital firms have extremely good 
performance. However, the sensitivity of these adjustments to performance is small. Hochberg et 
al.’s estimates (in their Table 1-6) imply that carried interest grows by about eight basis points 
for an incremental one percentage point improvement in IRR. An eight basis point change is 
0.4% of a base carry of 20%, so this effect causes our estimates to understate actual indirect pay 
for performance very slightly, by about 0.4%. 
The impact of good performance on the partners’ outside options could also influence 
estimates of indirect pay for performance. Good performance in a fund likely positively affects a 
partner’s human capital, which she could use to form a new partnership or to leave the private 
                                                 
28 Metrick and Yasuda (2011, p.27) report suggestive compensation numbers based on surveys of 
venture capitalists. Their numbers indicate that, consistent with our intuition, more senior 
partners (who presumably have been with the partnership since its earlier funds) earn 
considerably more total compensation than junior partners, and five to 39 eight times as great a 
share of the carried interest. We also note that while experienced general partners occasionally 
leave one firm to join another existing firm, Alter (2009) finds that none of the experienced 
venture capitalists in his sample do so. His evidence suggests that venture capital firms at least 
only rarely hire experienced partners with whom they would have to share a large portion of the 
revenue. 
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equity industry altogether and pursue other options. Since the value of these other options is 
likely to be positively related to the fund’s performance, this effect leads our estimates to be 
understated.29 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find evidence of performance persistence, as do Chung (2010), 
Hochberg et al. (2010), Phalippou (2010), and Robinson and Sensoy (2011a). Persistence would 
result in somewhat higher carry dollars in the subsequent fund, suggesting that it may be 
appropriate to use the upper range of the k estimates given by Metrick and Yasuda (2010) when 
calculating indirect pay for performance. Our Figures 1-1 to 1-4 use the median k to be 
conservative. Conversion to other values is straightforward as all estimates are linear in k. 
Finally, in all of our calculations, we assume that the direct, explicit pay for performance 
driven by the carried interest is “in the money,” so that GPs receive the full 20% of profits as 
carried interest. While our calculations are appropriate for the average fund in our sample, whose 
carry is in the money, this nonetheless represents an upper bound in the cross-section of funds, 
since many funds’ performance is such that they earn no carried interest. This effect implies that 
our estimates of direct pay for performance are an upper bound, and that for some funds the ratio 
of indirect to direct pay for performance is much larger than for the average fund. 
Overall, while costs that rise with fund size cause our estimates of the ratio of indirect to 
explicit pay for performance to be overstated, all other omitted factors discussed above cause 
them to be understated. Consequently, our conclusion that the indirect component of pay for 
                                                 
29 Alter (2009) reports that it is rare for the young California venture capitalists in his sample to 
defect to raise their own funds, with a cumulative rate of 7% over every four-year block of time 
in his data, less than 2% per year. If the rate for buyout partners is even lower than this, which 
seems unlikely, our estimates of the difference between buyout and venture capital pay-
performance sensitivities would be slightly overstated. 
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performance in private equity is important and substantial in magnitude is likely to be robust to 
refinements of our estimates. Moreover, such refinements are unlikely to overturn the support in 
the data for the key cross-sectional differences implied by the learning model: that venture 
capital funds have lower indirect pay for performance than buyout funds, and that pay for 
performance declines in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. 
5. Conclusion 
In the private equity industry, the possibility of future fundraising provides substantial 
indirect pay for performance incentives to general partners above and beyond the much-
discussed incentives from the explicit compensation system. Achieving high returns early on 
allows a partnership to establish a reputation for being able to generate returns, which is valuable 
as it allows partners to earn fees on larger funds in the future. We present a learning framework 
that characterizes this process, and show that its predictions better match the fundraising 
dynamics in the data than behavioral alternatives based on “naive reinvestment” or “return 
chasing.” In particular, both the likelihood of raising a follow-on fund and the size of that fund if 
one is raised are strongly positively related to current performance, the relations betwen future 
fundraising and performance are stronger for buyout funds than for venture capital funds, and 
these relations decline in the sequence of a partnership’s funds. 
From the learning framework we derive an explicit formula that we use to transform our 
estimates of the sensitivity of future fundraising to current performance into estimates of the size 
of indirect pay for performance in private equity. Our estimates suggest that the indirect 
component of pay for performance is of the same order of magnitude as the direct component 
from carried interest. Indirect pay for performance is particularly important for buyout 
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partnerships compared to venture capital and for newer partnerships that have yet to establish a 
reputation. Our results are all consistent with the learning framework, and suggest that learning 
about ability is a key driver of indirect pay for performance in private equity. 
This article contributes to the debate about the incentives of private equity general 
partners and their effect on value creation. Despite the central importance of general partner 
incentives to understanding the activities of private equity firms, we are the first to estimate how 
large their total incentives (direct plus indirect) actually are. Our results suggest that total 
performance-based compensation in private equity partnerships is larger, by a factor of about two, 
than commonly discussed, because most discussions focus on the carried interest alone. Total 
pay for performance in private equity is much larger and exhibits much more variation, both 
across partnership types and in the sequence of funds, than suggested by the carried interest 
alone. 
While the indirect pay for performance that we find is consistent with our learning 
framework, our results do not speak directly to whether the resulting total compensation system, 
including the dynamics of carried interest, is efficient. Understanding whether the total pay-
performance relations in private equity, in particular the fact that the direct carried interest 
typically does not increase much in the face of diminishing indirect pay for performance over 
time, are efficient and reflect optimal contracting is an important topic for future research. 
The analysis in this article could be applied to other forms of organization. Perhaps the 
most straightforward application would be to other asset management settings, such as hedge 
funds, mutual funds, and pension funds, because their explicit fee structures would allow for 
similar calculation of the returns to managing a larger quantity of funds. Calculating the indirect 
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pay for performance implied by the flow-performance (and termination-performance) relations in 
these settings would be an important addition to our understanding of these industries. 
Most generally, our analysis provides empirical evidence consistent with the idea started 
by Fama (1980) and Holmstrom (1999) that indirect pay for performance can be an important 
source of incentives inside firms. An advantage of studying private equity is that it is possible to 
quantify these incentives. Private equity is also an industry where incentives, both direct and 
indirect, are particularly important. The extent to which indirect, market-based incentives are 
important in other industries, both in absolute terms and relative to direct incentives, is likely to 
be an important topic of future research. 
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Figure 1-1 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 12%, 
Buyout 9%,Venture Capital 15%, Real Estate 9% 
 
This figure presents estimates of the ratio of the indirect to direct effect of an incremental 
improvement in performance in the current fund on GP revenue. The indirect effect is the 
estimated effect on expected revenue from future funds, while the direct effect comes from 
carried interest in the current fund. The figure presents estimates computed using the formulas 
provided in Section 4, sample parameters from Table 1-2, and regression coefficients from Table 
1-4. Estimates are computed for all funds taken together, buyout funds, venture capital funds, 
and real estate funds, for different assumptions about the current fund's placement in the 
partnership's sequence of funds. All estimates assume N, the number of potential future funds, is 
equal to five. Discount rates of 12%, 9%, 15%, and 9% are used for all funds taken together, 
buyout funds, venture capital funds, and real estate funds, respectively. These discount rates 
correspond to betas of 1 for buyout funds, 2 for venture capital funds, and 1 for real estate funds. 
The discount rate for all funds is a sample-size weighted average of the type-specific discount 
rates. 
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Figure 1-2 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 17%, 
Buyout 14%,Venture Capital 20%, Real Estate 14% 
 
This figure presents estimates of the ratio of the indirect to direct effect of an incremental 
improvement in performance in the current fund on GP revenue. The figure is identical to Figure 
1-1 except that it uses different discount rates. Discount rates of 17%, 14%, 20%, and 14% are 
used for all funds taken together, buyout funds, venture capital funds, and real estate funds, 
respectively. These discount rates are five percentage point increments from those used in Figure 
1-1. 
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Figure 1-3 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 10%, 
Buyout 11%,Venture Capital 8%, Real Estate 11% 
 
This figure presents estimates of the ratio of the indirect to direct effect of an incremental 
improvement in performance in the current fund on GP revenue. The figure is identical to Figure 
1-1 except that it uses different discount rates. Discount rates of 10%, 11%, 8%, and 11% are 
used for all funds taken together, buyout funds, venture capital funds, and real estate funds, 
respectively. These discount rates correspond to betas of 1.3 for buyout funds, 0.86 for venture 
capital funds, and 1.3 for real estate funds. 
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Figure 1-4 Ratio of indirect to direct pay for performance using discount rates: All Funds 16%, 
Buyout 11%, Venture Capital 21%, Real Estate 11% 
 
This figure presents estimates of the ratio of the indirect to direct effect of an incremental 
improvement in performance in the current fund on GP revenue. The figure is identical to Figure 
1-1 except that it uses different discount rates. Discount rates of 16%, 11%, 21%, and 11% are 
used for all funds taken together, buyout funds, venture capital funds, and real estate funds, 
respectively. These discount rates correspond to betas of 1.3 for buyout funds, 3 for venture 
capital funds, and 1.3 for real estate funds. 
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Table 1-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the sample funds. Panel A reports the distribution of the 
number of preceding funds per partnership. Panel B reports the distributions of 
preceding fund size and performance, follow-on fund size conditional on raising a 
follow-on, growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on (percentage 
difference between preceding and follow-on size), the time between successive funds 
(the time elapsed before raising a follow-on), and the percentage of preceding funds 
that raise a follow-on. Preceding funds meet the following criteria: fund size and 
performance (IRR) information is available, fund size is at least $5M in 1990 dollars, 
and the fund is raised before 2006.  The follow-on fund for each preceding fund (if 
one is raised) is the next fund raised by the same private equity partnership. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the number of preceding funds per partnership 
Fund Type 
Number of 
partnerships 
Number of preceding funds per partnership 
Mean Median Std Dev Min. Q1 Q3 Max. 
All 843 2.07 1 1.65 1 1 3 12 
Buyout 314 2.05 1.00 1.56 1.00 1.00 3.00 11.00 
Venture Capital 412 2.07 1.00 1.75 1.00 1.00 2.00 12.00 
Real Estate 117 2.13 2.00 1.47 1.00 1.00 3.00 9.00 
                  
                  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for fund size, performance, and fundraising 
  All Funds 
  Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
Preceding fund size ($M) 1745 497.9 210.0 82.4 500.0 
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 1745 15.1% 10.6% 0.5% 22.3% 
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising 
one ($M) 1469 792.2 314.0 136.0 728.4 
Growth in fund size conditional on raising 
a follow-on (%) 1469 92.4% 53.8% 0.0% 123.1% 
Time between successive funds (years) 1469 3.3 3.0 2.0 4.0 
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a 
follow-on   84.2%       
            
  Buyout 
  Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
Preceding fund size ($M) 645 866.4 380.0 169.2 900.0 
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 645 16.5% 14.3% 5.9% 25.4% 
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising 
one ($M) 549 1465.3 632.6 289.3 1500.0 
Growth in fund size conditional on raising 
a follow-on (%) 549 110.9% 70.0% 21.7% 140.3% 
Time between successive funds (years) 549 3.8 3.0 2.0 5.0 
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a 
follow-on   85.1%       
            
  Venture Capital 
  Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
Preceding fund size ($M) 851 217.7 125.0 56.0 254.0 
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 851 14.1% 5.8% -5.0% 17.6% 
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Follow-on fund size conditional on raising 
one ($M) 681 283.9 181.0 80.0 368.0 
Growth in fund size conditional on raising 
a follow-on (%) 681 78.6% 42.9% -8.3% 113.6% 
Time between successive funds (years) 681 3.3 3.0 2.0 4.0 
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a 
follow-on   80.0%       
            
  Real Estate 
  Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
Preceding fund size ($M) 249 501.0 314.9 106.0 622.8 
Preceding fund performance (IRR) 249 14.6% 14.1% 7.9% 21.9% 
Follow-on fund size conditional on raising 
one ($M) 239 694.2 425.0 145.0 817.3 
Growth in fund size conditional on raising 
a follow-on (%) 239 89.7% 48.9% -3.6% 100.6% 
Time between successive funds (years) 239 2.4 2.0 1.0 3.0 
Percentage of preceding funds that raise a 
follow-on   96.0%       
            
 
 
Table 1-2 Descriptive Statistics by Fund Sequence 
Descriptive statistics by preceding and follow-on fund sequence number. Panel A presents 
statistics for preceding fund size. Panel B presents statistics for preceding fund performance 
(IRR). Panel C presents statistics for follow-on size conditional on raising a follow-on. Panel D 
reports statistics for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow on (in percent). Panel E 
reports statistics for the number of years elapsed between successive fundraisings, conditional on 
raising a follow-on. Panel F reports the percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on.   
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for preceding fund size ($M) 
  All Funds   Buyout 
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1 612 262.3 112.0 50.0 271.0   247 417.5 220.0 100.0 500.0 
2 392 362.9 187.5 75.0 417.0   147 587.8 357.0 165.0 700.0 
3 271 488.2 250.0 109.7 518.0   101 812.5 469.0 220.0 900.0 
4 186 723.2 355.0 151.0 825.0   65 1397.5 825.0 400.0 1902.0 
5 109 861.4 312.5 148.0 750.0   35 1807.4 750.0 331.5 2100.0 
6 68 897.2 481.0 202.0 829.0   17 1978.0 1000.0 604.2 3496.9 
7 41 921.7 444.0 238.0 917.0   11 2041.7 1425.7 470.0 3200.0 
8 24 1265.3 787.5 345.5 1868.5   10 2354.4 1950.0 1324.8 3000.0 
9 18 2184.3 900.0 305.0 3781.0   7 4483.4 5000.0 3085.0 5300.0 
>=10 24 1536.3 848.9 400.5 1558.0   5 4427.9 5426.1 3272.0 5941.5 
Total 1745 497.9 210.0 82.4 500.0   645 866.4 380.0 169.2 900.0 
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(continued) 
      Venture Capital   Real Estate 
Sequence   
 
Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1     290 124.0 75.0 38.7 150.0   75 286.4 202.0 50.0 386.0 
2     192 169.9 106.0 54.9 218.5   53 438.0 273.9 126.0 600.0 
3     127 216.3 140.0 65.6 279.0   43 530.0 387.1 119.1 831.0 
4     87 264.6 176.0 100.0 300.0   34 607.7 518.9 225.0 830.0 
5     52 258.7 169.0 101.5 295.0   22 781.0 509.5 290.0 950.0 
6     38 350.3 247.0 170.0 505.0   13 1082.3 567.0 475.0 1000.0 
7     23 439.8 300.0 225.0 450.0   7 744.8 570.0 168.0 917.0 
8     13 518.5 500.0 311.0 750.0   1 82.0 82.0 82.0 82.0 
9     10 787.0 583.0 159.6 1000.0   1 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 
>=10     19 775.3 526.8 290.0 1100.0             
Total     851 217.7 125.0 56.0 254.0   249 501.0 314.9 106.0 622.8 
 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for preceding fund performance (IRR) 
  All Funds   Buyout 
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1 612 15.8% 12.2% 3.0% 22.4%   247 17.2% 16.5% 7.2% 26.5% 
2 392 13.5% 9.6% -0.4% 22.1%   147 16.8% 13.9% 4.6% 24.6% 
3 271 12.4% 10.3% 0.1% 22.3%   101 15.6% 12.9% 4.2% 25.3% 
4 186 19.1% 10.5% -0.6% 21.1%   65 13.3% 11.9% 4.5% 21.1% 
5 109 15.3% 10.0% -2.2% 26.0%   35 17.5% 12.4% 4.1% 33.2% 
6 68 19.6% 9.7% -2.5% 25.5%   17 16.8% 14.7% 8.9% 23.4% 
7 41 16.6% 10.3% -2.5% 17.9%   11 20.6% 17.9% 10.3% 35.3% 
8 24 17.7% 12.2% -2.5% 40.8%   10 24.6% 21.0% 11.7% 48.8% 
9 18 9.9% 6.4% 1.5% 22.8%   7 10.1% 8.8% 1.5% 22.8% 
>=10 24 7.2% 1.1% -4.9% 20.4%   5 0.7% -2.1% -7.9% 13.4% 
Total 1745 15.1% 10.6% 0.5% 22.3%   645 16.5% 14.3% 5.9% 25.4% 
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(continued) 
    Venture Capital   Real Estate 
Sequence   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1   290 14.0% 8.0% -1.6% 17.4%   75 17.5% 15.8% 10.9% 24.8% 
2   192 10.6% 5.0% -4.9% 16.5%   53 14.6% 14.1% 8.2% 23.0% 
3   127 10.1% 4.0% -6.9% 19.9%   43 11.6% 12.0% 6.9% 18.3% 
4   87 26.1% 2.9% -7.2% 20.6%   34 12.2% 13.6% 6.3% 21.0% 
5   52 14.2% 5.6% -8.6% 21.0%   22 14.6% 13.0% 7.7% 17.7% 
6   38 22.5% 2.6% -5.2% 29.9%   13 15.0% 12.3% 5.6% 25.4% 
7   23 16.8% 1.6% -6.9% 10.4%   7 9.6% 11.6% 5.8% 16.0% 
8   13 12.1% 1.1% -8.5% 16.5%   1 21.5% 21.5% 21.5% 21.5% 
9   10 7.2% 2.2% -1.0% 13.4%   1 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 
>=10   19 8.9% 1.2% -2.7% 25.1%             
Total   851 14.1% 5.8% -5.0% 17.6%   249 14.6% 14.1% 7.9% 21.9% 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for follow-on fund size conditional on raising a follow-on 
($M) 
  All Funds   Buyout 
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
2 462 422.7 215.9 90.0 472.0   189 685.7 390.4 180.0 767.0 
3 347 557.6 279.0 116.0 600.0   130 978.8 540.3 252.0 1000.0 
4 231 772.2 404.0 165.0 855.7   89 1380.6 850.0 405.0 1550.0 
5 163 1039.7 380.0 154.3 900.0   58 2070.4 855.0 392.0 2996.9 
6 100 1543.2 474.1 223.5 950.0   34 3505.4 1326.0 473.3 5125.0 
7 66 1030.3 464.2 252.9 917.0   17 1777.6 682.6 500.0 3100.0 
8 38 1658.0 735.0 315.0 1500.0   11 3763.4 1900.0 1170.0 3000.0 
9 23 1846.6 800.0 400.0 3085.0   10 3599.6 3433.0 1300.0 5150.3 
10 16 1800.3 760.5 237.1 3386.0   6 3985.6 3600.0 3272.0 5941.5 
>=11 23 3064.8 1100.0 290.0 2560.0   5 10789.5 12179.5 5426.1 15000.0 
Total 1469 792.2 314.0 136.0 728.4   549 1465.3 632.6 289.3 1500.0 
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(continued) 
    Venture Capital   Real Estate 
Sequence   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
2   201 175.3 114.2 57.2 225.0   72 422.6 304.6 100.0 675.1 
3   167 232.3 154.0 73.0 318.0   50 549.2 326.4 150.0 772.2 
4   101 273.4 191.0 116.1 375.0   41 680.2 537.9 145.0 846.0 
5   72 295.4 199.5 104.0 412.0   33 852.0 530.0 290.0 950.0 
6   44 360.9 247.0 172.5 527.5   22 875.2 506.5 340.0 900.0 
7   36 442.4 315.0 234.0 469.2   13 1681.2 707.5 498.0 1325.0 
8   21 517.0 400.0 300.0 750.0   6 1791.7 1065.0 594.0 1994.0 
9   12 534.3 480.0 232.3 703.0   1 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 
10   9 533.0 470.7 226.4 650.0   1 95.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 
>=11   18 919.1 691.3 102.5 1450.0             
Total   681 283.9 181.0 80.0 368.0   239 694.2 425.0 145.0 817.3 
 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on 
  All Funds   Buyout 
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1~2 462 112.6% 71.1% 19.0% 143.9%   189 119.7% 84.1% 38.5% 151.8% 
2~3 347 83.3% 56.3% 0.0% 125.0%   130 99.9% 77.0% 17.4% 155.5% 
3~4 231 92.4% 51.1% -0.2% 128.6%   89 122.7% 70.0% 30.8% 170.3% 
4~5 163 40.7% 31.6% -32.8% 76.8%   58 52.5% 40.7% -10.5% 88.8% 
5~6 100 125.7% 50.1% 12.0% 99.8%   34 146.8% 66.1% 45.7% 133.1% 
6~7 66 62.6% 34.6% -35.8% 80.6%   17 39.8% 31.7% -37.5% 82.4% 
7~8 38 150.0% 65.8% -14.8% 157.8%   11 277.5% 110.4% -8.2% 300.0% 
8~9 23 53.3% 26.0% -48.7% 100.0%   10 102.5% 42.3% -48.7% 254.2% 
9~10 16 22.9% 11.3% -60.1% 58.6%   6 51.2% 1.0% -55.2% 94.5% 
>=11 23 125.4% -1.0% -55.8% 164.1%   5 246.7% 105.0% 13.1% 225.1% 
Total 1469 92.4% 53.8% 0.0% 123.1%   549 110.9% 70.0% 21.7% 140.3% 
 
(continued) 
    Venture Capital   Real Estate 
Sequence   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1~2   201 97.9% 62.7% 7.4% 140.6%   72 135.1% 60.8% 5.6% 127.6% 
2~3   167 73.8% 39.6% -2.0% 113.6%   50 71.7% 51.8% -8.6% 88.7% 
3~4   101 71.9% 33.3% -11.9% 115.1%   41 77.6% 50.0% -0.2% 100.0% 
4~5   72 34.1% 25.4% -35.4% 62.5%   33 34.3% 26.2% -16.3% 87.5% 
5~6   44 135.8% 48.9% 0.0% 90.4%   22 72.9% 29.9% -20.0% 72.2% 
6~7   36 79.2% 37.6% -32.2% 79.4%   13 46.1% 25.0% -3.6% 65.6% 
7~8   21 51.3% 35.2% -20.8% 100.0%   6 262.1% 109.9% 4.2% 181.8% 
8~9   12 18.8% 12.7% -35.0% 80.9%   1 -23.2% -23.2% -23.2% -23.2% 
9~10   9 0.9% 7.3% -65.0% 55.5%   1 50.8% 50.8% 50.8% 50.8% 
>=11   18 91.7% -11.1% -74.8% 127.3%             
Total   681 78.6% 42.9% -8.3% 113.6%   239 89.7% 48.9% -3.6% 100.6% 
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Panel E. Number of years elapsed between successive funds, conditional on raising a 
follow-on 
  All Funds   Buyout 
Sequence Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1~2 462 3.93 4.00 2.00 5.00   189 4.43 4.00 3.00 6.00 
2~3 347 3.42 3.00 2.00 4.00   130 3.73 4.00 3.00 5.00 
3~4 231 3.23 3.00 2.00 4.00   89 3.48 3.00 2.00 5.00 
4~5 163 2.89 3.00 2.00 4.00   58 3.36 3.00 2.00 4.00 
5~6 100 2.78 3.00 1.00 4.00   34 3.06 3.00 2.00 4.00 
6~7 66 2.62 2.00 1.00 4.00   17 3.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 
7~8 38 2.32 2.00 1.00 3.00   11 2.36 3.00 1.00 3.00 
8~9 23 2.52 2.00 2.00 3.00   10 2.60 2.00 2.00 3.00 
9~10 16 2.19 2.00 1.00 3.50   6 2.67 2.50 1.00 4.00 
>=11 23 1.91 2.00 1.00 3.00   5 2.20 2.00 1.00 3.00 
Total 1469 3.33 3.00 2.00 4.00   549 3.75 3.00 2.00 5.00 
 
(continued) 
    Venture Capital   Real Estate 
Sequence   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3   Obs Mean Median Q1 Q3 
1~2   201 3.95 4.00 2.00 5.00   72 2.60 2.00 1.00 3.00 
2~3   167 3.45 3.00 2.00 4.00   50 2.54 2.00 1.00 3.00 
3~4   101 3.39 3.00 2.00 4.00   41 2.32 2.00 2.00 3.00 
4~5   72 2.88 3.00 2.00 4.00   33 2.09 2.00 1.00 3.00 
5~6   44 2.86 3.00 2.00 4.00   22 2.18 2.00 1.00 3.00 
6~7   36 2.78 3.00 2.00 4.00   13 1.69 1.00 1.00 2.00 
7~8   21 2.43 2.00 1.00 3.00   6 1.83 1.00 1.00 3.00 
8~9   12 2.50 2.00 1.00 3.50   1 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
9~10   9 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00   1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
>=11   18 1.83 2.00 1.00 2.00             
Total   681 3.34 3.00 2.00 4.00   239 2.35 2.00 1.00 3.00 
 
Panel F: Percentage of preceding funds that raise a follow-on 
Sequence All BO VC RE         
1 75.5% 76.5% 69.3% 96.0%         
2 88.5% 88.4% 87.0% 94.3%         
3 85.2% 88.1% 79.5% 95.3%         
4 87.6% 89.2% 82.8% 97.1%         
5 91.7% 97.1% 84.6% 100.0%         
6 97.1% 100.0% 94.7% 100.0%         
7 92.7% 100.0% 91.3% 85.7%         
8 95.8% 100.0% 92.3% 100.0%         
9 88.9% 85.7% 90.0% 100.0%         
>=10 95.8% 100.0% 94.7%           
Total 84.2% 85.1% 80.0% 96.0%         
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Table 1-3 Follow-on Fundraising Regressions 
Preceding fund-level regressions to explain follow-on fundraising. Panel A presents probit 
regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if a follow-on is raised and 0 otherwise. 
Marginal effects are reported and z-scores are given in parentheses. Panels B and C present OLS 
regressions for preceding funds that raise a follow-on fund. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
fund growth, defined as follow-on fund size divided by preceding fund size minus one.  In Panel 
C, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fund growth plus one. In all Panels,“All 
Funds” regressions include fund type fixed effects and model (2) includes vintage year fixed 
effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the PE firm level. In Panels B 
and C, t-statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Probit regressions for the probability of raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.316*** 0.324***   0.467*** 0.588*** 
  (4.788) (4.563)   (4.814) (4.742) 
Number of observations 1,745 1,622   645 560 
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.146   0.087 0.140 
 
(continued) 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.297*** 0.288***   0.187*** 0.393** 
  (3.337) (3.032)   (2.671) (2.487) 
Number of observations 851 786   249 115 
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.128   0.073 0.166 
 
Panel B: OLS regressions for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.663** 0.623**   2.314*** 2.152*** 
  (2.088) (2.045)   (4.119) (3.316) 
Constant 0.984*** 1.590***   0.675*** 2.034 
  (11.545) (2.770)   (7.390) (1.569) 
Number of observations 1,469 1,469   549 549 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.038   0.058 0.075 
 
(continued) 
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  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.492 0.426   1.955*** 1.723*** 
  (1.634) (1.413)   (3.029) (2.724) 
Constant 0.699*** 0.887***   0.602*** -0.107*** 
  (9.902) (4.489)   (4.810) (-2.691) 
Number of observations 681 681   239 239 
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.027   0.014 0.036 
 
Panel C: OLS regressions for log(fund growth + 1) conditional on raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.177*** 0.161***   0.524*** 0.466*** 
  (2.813) (2.798)   (5.065) (3.967) 
Constant 0.991*** 1.126***   0.926*** 1.114*** 
  (52.650) (12.882)   (45.103) (6.450) 
Number of observations 1,469 1,469   549 549 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.070   0.050 0.081 
 
(continued) 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.139** 0.101**   0.572*** 0.503*** 
  (2.553) (2.120)   (3.280) (2.901) 
Constant 0.886*** 1.003***   0.853*** 0.662*** 
  (59.797) (13.045)   (23.575) (60.784) 
Number of observations 681 681   239 239 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.088   0.024 0.073 
 
 
 
Table 1-4 Follow-on Fundraising Regressions: Sequence Interactions  
Preceding fund-level regressions to explain follow-on fundraising, with sequence interactions. 
Panel A presents linear probability regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if a follow-
on is raised and 0 otherwise. Panels B and C present OLS regressions for preceding funds that 
raise a follow-on fund. In Panel B, the dependent variable is fund growth, defined as follow-on 
fund size divided by preceding fund size minus one.  In Panel C, the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of fund growth plus one. In all Panels,“All Funds” regressions include fund 
type fixed effects and model (2) includes vintage year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are clustered at the PE firm level. T-statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Panel A. Linear probability model for the probability of raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.305*** 0.287***   0.698*** 0.683*** 
  (4.082) (4.141)   (5.447) (4.925) 
Preceding fund sequence number 0.033*** 0.035***   0.048*** 0.048*** 
  (7.425) (7.470)   (5.724) (5.035) 
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund 
sequence # 
-0.051*** -0.051*** 
  
-0.091*** -0.075** 
  (-2.686) (-2.957)   (-3.500) (-2.494) 
Constant 0.738*** 0.927***   0.650*** 0.802*** 
  (32.868) (39.113)   (18.709) (21.140) 
Number of observations 1,745 1,745   645 645 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.124   0.110 0.135 
 
(continued) 
 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.214*** 0.199***   0.227 0.144 
  (3.159) (3.427)   (1.578) (1.055) 
Preceding fund sequence number 0.030*** 0.035***   0.004 -0.004 
  (5.849) (5.780)   (0.287) (-0.338) 
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund 
sequence # 
-0.034** -0.039***   0.004 0.041 
  (-2.019) (-2.777)   (0.087) (0.888) 
Constant 0.696*** 0.902***   0.915*** 0.993*** 
  (28.294) (43.013)   (21.005) (58.993) 
Number of observations 851 851   249 249 
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.137   0.015 0.068 
 
Panel B: OLS regressions for growth in fund size conditional on raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 1.950*** 1.911***   1.977** 1.537 
  (3.142) (3.079)   (2.093) (1.640) 
Preceding fund sequence number 0.040 0.050   0.016 0.011 
  (1.246) (1.565)   (0.301) (0.247) 
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund 
sequence # 
-0.376** -0.375** 
  
0.127 0.215 
  (-2.468) (-2.501)   (0.355) (0.610) 
Constant 0.813*** 1.333**   0.636*** 2.092* 
  (6.011) (2.322)   (3.768) (1.657) 
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Number of observations 1,469 1,469   549 549 
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.055   0.056 0.076 
 
(continued) 
 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 1.964*** 1.936***   3.899*** 3.369*** 
  (2.695) (2.619)   (2.886) (2.611) 
Preceding fund sequence number 0.034 0.056   0.036 0.011 
  (0.888) (1.539)   (0.433) (0.131) 
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund 
sequence # 
-0.423** -0.433** 
  
-0.708** -0.603* 
  (-2.464) (-2.536)   (-2.103) (-1.704) 
Constant 0.562*** 0.607***   0.496 -0.183 
  (4.221) (2.588)   (1.604) (-1.618) 
Number of observations 681 681   239 239 
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.067   0.018 0.039 
 
Panel C: OLS regressions for log(fund growth + 1) conditional on raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.400*** 0.388***   0.580*** 0.466** 
  (5.390) (5.282)   (2.761) (2.197) 
Preceding fund sequence number -0.010** -0.007   -0.004 -0.006 
  (-2.037) (-1.534)   (-0.333) (-0.696) 
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund 
sequence # 
-0.066*** -0.066*** 
  
-0.021 -0.001 
  (-3.062) (-3.237)   (-0.305) (-0.014) 
Constant 1.006*** 1.104***   0.935*** 1.123*** 
  (45.394) (13.539)   (23.543) (6.858) 
Number of observations 1,469 1,469   549 549 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.085   0.047 0.078 
 
(continued) 
 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund IRR 0.358*** 0.334***   1.179*** 1.039*** 
  (4.288) (3.800)   (3.598) (3.219) 
Preceding fund sequence number -0.014** -0.008   0.011 0.005 
  (-2.512) (-1.440)   (0.506) (0.223) 
Preceding fund IRR*Preceding fund 
sequence # 
-0.063*** -0.066*** 
  
-0.221** -0.196** 
  (-2.831) (-3.057)   (-2.477) (-2.064) 
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Constant 0.925*** 0.991***   0.821*** 0.636*** 
  (39.443) (14.805)   (10.612) (19.044) 
Number of observations 681 681   239 239 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.113   0.037 0.085 
 
 
Table 1-5 Sensitivity of GP Lifetime Revenue to Current Performance 
This table presents estimates of the sensitivity of GP lifetime revenue to current 
performance, assuming the current fund is the first in the partnership's sequence of funds. 
Panel A presents estimates of the direct effect of a one percentage point improvement in 
net return to LPs (IRR) in the current fund, relative to the sample average return, on GP 
revenue from the current fund. Sample means are taken from Table 1-2.  We approximate 
the cash flow distribution that gives rise to the IRR as a single cash in and a single cash 
out, spaced 3 years apart. The GP revenue share of 25% is based on the standard carry of 
20% (for each $1 returned to LPs, GPs receive $0.25). At the baseline level of 
performance, the carry is in the money. We discount the incremental GP revenue at 5% for 
3 years because the cashflow out is 3 years in the future. The discounted direct effect per 
extra undiscounted dollar of return to LPs is therefore $0.216. 
Panel B presents estimates of the indirect effect of a one percentage point or one dollar 
improvement in net return to LPs in the current fund on expected GP revenue from future 
funds. Estimates are computed using the formulas provided in Section 4, using sample 
parameters from Table 1-2 and regression coefficients and marginal effects from Table 1-
3. N is the maximum number of future funds the GP could potentially run. k is the 
expected fraction of future fund sizes that the GP receives as compensation. δTR/δIRR and 
δTR/δD are the incremental indirect effect from an extra percentage point and extra dollar 
of return, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Direct effect of incremental performance on GP revenue from current fund 
 
      
All 
funds Buyout Venture 
Real 
Estate 
Current fund is first in sequence         
Mean current fund size ($M) 262.3 417.5 124.0 286.4 
Mean current fund IRR 15.75% 17.23% 14.04% 17.50% 
Years between cash in/out 3 3 3 3 
Revenue share     25% 25% 25% 25% 
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 2.636 4.340 1.209 2.290 
Discount rate     12% 9% 15% 9% 
Present value of GP revenue ($M) 1.88% 3.32% 0.80% 2.29% 
Present value of GP 
revenue/dollar     0.178 0.193 0.164 0.193 
 
Panel B: Indirect effect of incremental performance on GP expected revenue from future 
funds 
 
Indirect effect ($M)   Ratio of indirect to direct 
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effect 
All Funds   All Funds 
    N=3 N=5             
k   δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD   k   N=3   N=5 
15%   0.884 0.084 1.657 0.157   15%   0.471   0.883 
20%   1.179 0.112 2.210 0.210   20%   0.628   1.178 
25%   1.474 0.140 2.762 0.262   25%   0.785   1.472 
                        
Buyout   Buyout 
    N=3 N=5             
k   δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD   k   N=3   N=5 
15.75%   3.650 0.212 8.259 0.480   15.75%   1.098   2.486 
17.72%   4.107 0.239 9.293 0.540   17.72%   1.236   2.796 
19.60%   4.542 0.264 10.278 0.597   19.60%   1.367   3.093 
                        
Venture   Venture 
    N=3 N=5             
k   δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD   k   N=3   N=5 
20.24%   0.337 0.070 0.478 0.099   20.24%   0.423   0.601 
22.84%   0.380 0.078 0.539 0.111   22.84%   0.478   0.678 
26.11%   0.434 0.090 0.616 0.127   26.11%   0.546   0.775 
                        
Real Estate   Real Estate 
    N=3 N=5             
k   δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD   k   N=3   N=5 
15%   1.827 0.154 3.117 0.263   15%   0.798   1.361 
20%   2.435 0.205 4.156 0.350   20%   1.064   1.815 
25%   3.044 0.257 5.195 0.438   25%   1.329   2.269 
                        
 
 
Table 1-6 Sensitivity of GP Lifetime Revenue to Current Performance: Sequence Interactions 
This table presents estimates of the sensitivity of GP lifetime revenue to current 
performance, for different assumptions about the placement of the current fund in the 
partnership's sequence of funds. Panel A presents estimates of the direct effect of a one 
percentage point improvement in net return to LPs (IRR) in the current fund, relative to 
the sample average return, on GP revenue from the current fund. Sample means are 
taken from Table 1-2.  We approximate the cash flow distribution that gives rise to the 
IRR as a single cash in and a single cash out, spaced 3 years apart. The GP revenue 
share of 25% is based on the standard carry of 20% (for each $1 returned to LPs, GPs 
receive $0.25). At the baseline level of performance, the carry is in the money. We 
discount the incremental GP revenue at 5% for 3 years because the cashflow out is 3 
years in the future. The discounted direct effect per extra undiscounted dollar of return 
to LPs is therefore $0.216. 
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Panel B presents estimates of the indirect effect of an improvement in net return to LPs  
in the current fund on expected GP revenue from future funds. Estimates are computed 
using the formulas provided in Section 4, using sample parameters from Table 1-2 and 
regression coefficients and marginal effects from Table 1-4 which take sequence 
interactions into account. N is the maximum number of future funds the GP could 
potentially run. k is the expected fraction of future fund sizes that the GP receives as 
compensation. δTR/δIRR and δTR/δD are the incremental indirect effect from an extra 
percentage point and extra dollar of return, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Direct effect of incremental performance on GP revenue from current fund 
 
      All funds Buyout Venture 
Real 
Estate 
Current fund is first in sequence         
Mean current fund size ($M) 262.3 417.5 124.0 286.4 
Mean current fund IRR 15.75% 17.23% 14.04% 17.50% 
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 2.636 4.303 1.209 2.965 
Discounted     1.876 3.323 0.795 2.290 
              
Current fund is second in sequence       
Mean current fund size ($M) 362.9 587.8 169.9 438.0 
Mean current fund IRR 13.45% 16.83% 10.56% 14.56% 
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 3.503 6.018 1.558 4.311 
Discounted     2.493 4.647 1.024 3.329 
              
Current fund is third in sequence         
Mean current fund size ($M) 488.2 812.5 216.3 530.0 
Mean current fund IRR 12.41% 15.62% 10.14% 11.59% 
Incremental GP revenue ($M) 4.627 8.145 1.967 4.950 
Discounted     3.293 6.290 1.294 3.822 
 
Panel B: Indirect effect of incremental performance on GP expected revenue from future 
funds 
 
Indirect effect ($M)   Ratio of indirect to direct effect 
All Funds   All Funds 
k=20%   N=3 N=5             
Current 
fund 
sequence   
δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD 
  
Current fund 
sequence   N=3 
  
N=5 
1   1.034 0.098 1.331 0.126   1   0.551   0.709 
2   1.164 0.083 1.330 0.095   2   0.467   0.533 
3   1.063 0.057 0.927 0.050   3   0.323   0.282 
                        
Buyout   Buyout 
k=17.72%   N=3 N=5             
Current 
fund   
δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD 
  
Current fund 
sequence   N=3   N=5 
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sequence 
1   4.271 0.248 7.807 0.454   1   1.285   2.349 
2   6.048 0.251 9.779 0.406   2   1.301   2.104 
3   8.223 0.252 11.007 0.338   3   1.307   1.750 
                        
Venture   Venture 
k=22.84%   N=3 N=5             
Current 
fund 
sequence   
δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD 
  
Current fund 
sequence   N=3   N=5 
1   0.309 0.064 0.350 0.072   1   0.389   0.440 
2   0.332 0.053 0.354 0.057   2   0.324   0.346 
3   0.250 0.032 0.229 0.029   3   0.193   0.177 
                        
Real Estate   Real Estate 
k=20%   N=3 N=5             
Current 
fund 
sequence   
δTR/δIRR δTR/δD δTR/δIRR δTR/δD 
  
Current fund 
sequence   N=3   N=5 
1   3.139 0.265 4.482 0.378   1   1.371   1.957 
2   3.163 0.183 4.639 0.269   2   0.950   1.394 
3   2.790 0.141 4.291 0.217   3   0.730   1.123 
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Chapter 2. D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: what can we learn from insurers? 
 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the 
Journal of Financial Intermediation following peer review. The version of record Boyer, M.M. 
and L. H. Stern (2014), D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: What Can we Learn from 
Insurers? Journal of Financial Intermediation 23: 504-540.is available online at: 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2014.05.001 
 
1. Introduction 
 When a firm goes public, investors typically know very little about the cash flow 
prospects of a firm. A high level of information asymmetry prevails during the initial public 
offering of a firm. Investors are cognizant of governance risk, yet as of today, there is no easy 
and reliable way to assess this particular type of risk. As representatives of the corporation, 
directors and officers are personally liable30 for damages caused by the corporation’s actions, or 
absence thereof. Having their personal wealth exposed to such an important liability risk induces 
managers to request protection in the event a lawsuit is brought against them as representatives 
of the corporation. This insurance, known as directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O 
insurance hereinafter), is extremely common in public corporations.31  
The goal of this paper is to assess whether the information that insurers acquire in their 
underwriting process is valuable for capital markets. To achieve this goal we use a sample of 
                                                 
30  A corporate director’s duty goes beyond a simple firm value maximizing paradigm to include a 
fiduciary duty, a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. 
31 According to different Towers-Watson surveys (that were in the past published by Tillinghast Towers-
Perrin, and before that by Watson-Wyatt), approximately 95% of public corporations in the United States 
and 75% of public corporations in Canada provide such insurance to their managers. 
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Canadian firms that have become public through an initial public offering and that had the 
opportunity to purchase D&O insurance before the IPO to cover their directors and officers in 
the event of a costly lawsuit. Our results show that the higher a firm’s D&O insurance premium 
per dollar of coverage (which is known as the rate-on-line in the insurance industry), the higher 
the firm’s stock market volatility and idiosyncratic risk in the first year after the IPO, and the 
lower its return. In other words, firms that insurers deem riskier at the time of the IPO have a 
lower (higher) stock market return (risk or volatility) in the first year post-IPO. Our results 
suggest that D&O insurers possess information that could be valuable to stock market 
participants. The results are robust to many econometric specifications (simultaneous equations, 
treatment effects) and robustness checks. Although further research is needed to formally test it, 
the results in this paper imply that the price of D&O liability insurance may be used as an 
assessment of a firm’s governance risk; such information could prove to be valuable to market 
participants. 
 Our results provide new insights into the insurers’ ability to price risk. Baker and Griffith 
(2007a) find that corporate governance is key in the insurance underwriting process and the main 
focus of insurers’ risk evaluation. Insurers are interested in a firm’s “deep governance” features, 
i.e. the culture within the firm as well as its executives’ character. Provided that insurers use the 
correct technology to transform a firm’s characteristics into a D&O liability insurance premium, 
the insurance contract should provide information on the firm’s prospects, the quality of its 
management team and its “deep governance” features. Furthermore, insurers have the 
appropriate incentives to correctly measure the expected cost of litigation so that the structure of 
a D&O insurance contract could prove to be an unbiased measure of a firm’s governance risk. As 
suggested by Griffith (2006), disclosing D&O insurance information to capital markets could be 
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used as an antidote for the failure of boards to properly monitor managerial behavior. A 
“managerial character score” such as this one would be similar to credit ratings that are default 
probability indicators. 
The results in this paper have several financial economics implications. First, the positive 
correlation between insurance pricing and stock market volatility reconciles economic theory 
with empirical evidence by providing literature’s missing link: insurers charge a higher price ex 
ante to firms that are riskier ex post. Second, our findings are of interest for the asset pricing 
literature inasmuch as one believes that D&O insurance providers have a technology that allows 
them to assess one type of risk. This means that the rate-on-line should be priced in the cross-
section of returns in such a way that a factor constructed to capture the excess return of firms 
with a low rate-on-line over firms with a high rate-on-line should have a significant coefficient. 
Because of the low number of observations, we are currently unable to perform such an 
empirical asset pricing test.  
Third, our results provide a potential evaluation tool for investors in firms in which 
information asymmetry is important. This tool should be especially valuable when investors are 
looking for a way to assess the management quality and the risk associated with governance 
issues. A growing body of research suggests that a one-size-fits-all governance structure is 
ineffective in improving firm performance (see Larcker and Tayan, 2013). It seems instead that 
what matters are individual managerial characteristics and qualities.  And as D&O insurance 
prices reflect an insurer’s assessment of a firm’s “deep governance”, a firm’s rate-on-line should 
therefore be related to its personal and personnel characteristics. Although our results point in 
this direction, further research is needed to formally evaluate the extent to which D&O insurance 
information may substitute commercial governance indices. 
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The volatility and return results complement each other and are two sides of the same coin. 
If one was to interpret post-IPO volatility as a proxy for information asymmetry (or risk 
unknown to the market at the time of the IPO), then it would follow that, as investors become 
aware of additional risks after the IPO, realized returns drop. Both results suggest that insurers 
have information that investors don't have and that they value. Our results speak to the risk 
perceived by the insurance companies, provide a missing link in the literature, and complement 
the results stemming from the managerial incentives in Chalmers et al. (2002), the study closest 
to ours. Indeed, whereas Chalmers et al. (2002) find that insurers penalize abnormal insurance 
coverage purchased at the time of the IPO, they cannot find a significant relationship between 
post-IPO returns and the premium paid by firms. Moreover, they find a negative relationship 
between post-IPO volatility and the price of coverage, which they find puzzling.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short primer on 
directors’ and officers’ insurance contracts. We develop the hypotheses and describe the data in 
Section 3, and present the main results of the paper in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to 
robustness checks. Section 6 concludes with a discussion. 
 
2. Directors’ and officers’ insurance: a primer 
 Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contracts cover corporate directors and officers 
against lawsuits brought against them as representatives of the corporation. Diverging interests 
mixed with asymmetric information between managers (including both directors and officers) 
and shareholders is the main source of conflict, and potentially the costliest. The insurance 
company will reimburse the corporation and/or its managers for the costs of settling and 
defending the lawsuit up to the policy limit, provided the firm’s directors and officers have acted 
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honestly and in good faith. In theory, should managers and their company have acted in a 
fraudulent manner, the insurance company could decide not to honor the policy (see Weisdom et 
al., 2006, for more details on the three distinct types of coverage that are included in D&O 
insurance policies). Baker and Griffith (2008) argue that shareholders are the most likely firm 
stakeholders to sue directors and officers, and that security class actions on the basis of 
misrepresentation are the most costly type of lawsuits (also see the different Towers-Watson32 
surveys). The threat of a class action lawsuit is so important that it prompts firms to significantly 
invest in decreasing the potential cost of agency problems (see McTier and Wald, 2011).  
2.1 Timing of D&O insurance information release 
 An important feature is the timing of information release in the Canadian investment 
context since the release of D&O insurance information generally occurs much later after its 
purchase. The figure in Appendix 2-A provides a typical timeline of the purchase and release of 
D&O insurance information for the firms that are becoming public through an IPO. See 
Appendix 2-B for examples of information that can be found in management proxies related to 
the D&O insurance contract and that illustrate the timing of the purchase of D&O insurance and 
information release.  
2.2 The pricing of D&O insurance coverage 
Insurance companies must accurately assess the potential cost of each policyholder since 
they ultimately bear the full cost of any mistake. As a result, D&O insurance underwriters have 
developed specific risk assessment tools that allow them to properly select clients and their 
litigation risk. Underwriters use three sources of information: The written application that 
contains a full array of documentation, the public financial and accounting data analysis, and 
                                                 
32 According to many of these surveys, 20% of U.S. firms had at least one lawsuit brought against their 
directors in the previous ten years, of which half, and the most costly, came from shareholders. 
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interviews with the prospective insured’s senior management team.33 The information gathered 
by the insurer about a potentially insured firm’s internal processes and structure is not divulged 
to other market participants.34  
As in the pricing of any insurance contract, insurers must assess the probability that a claim 
will be paid as well as the severity of such a claim. Since the most costly D&O lawsuits originate 
from the firms’ shareholders, they are then likely linked to stock market performance. Using the 
Culture & Character approach of Baker and Griffith (2007a), we measure a firm’s potential cost 
of litigation based on its financial information, the industry’s perspective and its governance risk 
factors. Of particular interest is the fact that insurers appear to place the analysis of governance 
characteristics into two categories: Culture, which refers to the stringency of the firm’s formal 
and informal internal controls (how the information is disseminated in the firm), and Character, 
which refers to the directors’ and officers’ attitude toward risk. In essence, Culture seeks to 
identify the source of potential D&O litigation whereas Character aims at uncovering the 
managers’ sense of ethics.  
 
                                                 
33 Baker and Griffith (2007a) provide a valuable in-depth account of the pricing approach used by D&O 
underwriters using detailed interviews of 41 D&O insurance professionals (underwriters, actuaries, 
brokers, risk managers, lawyers and claim process specialists). They also report that, in the United States, 
the average settlement was $13.3 million for the period 1996-2001, $22.3 million for the period 2002-
2005 and $33 million in 2006-2007. 
34 See Knepper and Bailey (1998) and Baker and Griffith (2007a) for more details on the underwriting 
and auditing process of insurers. In the case of D&O insurance, the moral hazard hypothesis that is often 
linked to having insurance was shown to be inconsequential by Bhagat et al. (1987) who find that the 
decision to purchase D&O insurance does not decrease shareholder wealth. 
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3. Hypotheses development, data and variables description 
3.1 Hypotheses and data 
 The main hypothesis we develop in this paper is that firms that are riskier in the eyes of 
D&O insurance providers have a post-IPO stock return that is lower and more volatile. 
Underpinning this question is the assertion that providers of D&O insurance use a plethora of 
publicly unavailable information from which a premium emerges, much like a credit score. The 
question we seek to answer is whether such information is valuable to investors.  
As highlighted in Baker and Griffith (2007a), the risk assessment conducted by D&O 
insurers is partly based on private information regarding the inner working and the governance 
quality of the firms as well as on the D&O insurers’ risk underwriting technology that is insurer-
specific and not publicly known. Because they are usually absent from the offering prospectus, 
information about D&O insurance coverage and premiums is not publicly known at the time of 
the IPO, even though such information is revealed later in the life of the firm (see Appendix 2-A). 
When such information reaches the market, it should be embedded immediately in the prices. 
The null hypothesis is therefore that D&O insurance contract parameters have no power in 
explaining future risk and returns. The alternative hypothesis is that D&O insurance contract 
parameters have some ability to forecast a firm’s stock market risk and returns in the first year of 
public life post-IPO.  
H10: A firm’s D&O insurance rate-on-line at the time of the IPO has no power 
in explaining the firm’s first year stock market risk and return. 
H1A: A firm’s D&O insurance rate-on-line at the time of the IPO is linked to 
higher stock market volatility and lower return in the first year of trading.  
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 The measure we use to assess an insurer’s perception of a firm’s D&O liability risk is the 
“rate-on-line”. The rate-on-line is calculated as the ratio of the total premium paid to the 
maximum possible coverage (or the policy limit); it is essentially the price per unit of coverage. 
Since firms that pay a higher rate-on-line are more susceptible to file a claim, their stock market 
return in the first year post-IPO should be lower and more volatile. 35  If a D&O insurance 
contract’s rate-on-line conveys information, then a corollary to hypothesis H1A should be that 
the firm’s stock market performance after the information is revealed should be uncorrelated to 
such information. The information gathered by insurers to form an opinion regarding the IPO 
firm’s liability risk before the IPO date becomes known to market participants after the first year 
post-IPO. This information should then be incorporated in the stock prices so that D&O 
insurance information should not have any long-term predictive power.36  
Our results show strong support for rejecting hypothesis H10 in favor of hypothesis H1A, 
Consequently, we conclude that basic D&O insurance contract parameters have some power to 
predict stock market returns and risk in the first year post-IPO. 
                                                 
35 Boyer and Tennyson (2008) and Boyer (2003, 2013) argue that similar to any insurance contract, D&O 
insurance premiums depend on the frequency as well as on the severity of claims, as well as the cost of 
risk and other expenses. Assuming that premiums are the product of frequency (f), severity (s) and a 
proportional loading factor (m), and that severity can be measured by the policy limit, we believe that the 
rate-on-line (the ratio of premium to policy limit) is a good proxy for the frequency of lawsuits. To see 
why, let P=f*s*m so that P/S=f*m. If the loading factor is the same for all firms, then it will be picked-up 
in the regression constant when we use the log of the rate-on-line as an independent variable. Given that 
the different Towers-Watson surveys report that lawsuits are more likely to occur (and with more 
severity) following a decrease in the stock price, the result is that the D&O insurance market is efficient if 
the premium-to-coverage ratio is a function of the likelihood that the stock price will decline.  
36 In a previous iteration of the paper, we tested whether the first year’s D&O insurance information had 
any impact in explaining the second year’s return. In line with the efficient market hypothesis, we found 
that it had no impact. These results are available from the authors upon request.  
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The use of Canadian data is dictated by data availability challenges. For instance, basic 
D&O insurance contract characteristics are not publicly available for most U.S. firms (see 
Griffith, 2006). That is why Chalmers et al. (2002) and Kalchev (2004) have relied on a broker’s 
private book of business. A second strategy (see Linck et al., 2009) is to use the 27 firms 
incorporated in the state of New York and the 12 S&P firms that voluntarily disclose enough 
information to examine the determinants of D&O premiums paid by each company. 
Unfortunately, these companies do not reveal how much coverage they purchased, thus limiting 
the quality of the signal associated with the premium paid. A third alternative is to use excerpts 
from the Towers-Watson surveys, as in Cao and Narayanamoothy (2011) and Fier et al. (2010) 
who use only two survey years (2001 and 2002). A fourth approach is to use Canadian data as in 
Core (1997, 2000), Boyer (2003), Park Wynn (2008), Gillan and Panasian (2009), Li et al. 
(2011), Rees et al. (2011) and Boyer and Stern (2012) since Canadian firms typically disclose 
their D&O insurance coverage and premium. Unlike most studies on D&O insurance that 
examine large and well established firms (the notable exceptions being Chalmers et al., 2002, 
and Boyer and Stern, 2012), we focus on firms that just went public through an initial public 
offering (IPO).  
Chalmers et al. (2002) find that firms with more coverage at the time of the IPO are more 
likely to be sued for mispricing. However, the dataset used in Chalmers et al. (2002) does not 
include only D&O liability insurance protection contracts. Their dataset includes IPO liability 
insurance contracts (known also as Public Offering of Securities Insurance or POSI) that cover 
the firm's managers as well as the investment bankers, the venture capitalists and the angel 
investors who are seeking an exit. IPO liability insurance contracts are accordingly more 
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expensive.37 Also, in contrast to Chalmers et al. (2002) and Kaltchev (2006), our sample includes 
firms that opted for no insurance, thus reducing the potential bias involved in using only firms 
that purchased insurance from one particular insurance broker.  
To gather data to test our hypothesis, we used the same approach as in Huson and 
Pazzaglia (2007). Starting with the 2000-odd new securities issued in Canada over the period 
1995-2010, we are left with 340 firms that correspond to the classic definition of an IPO (see 
Huson and Pazzaglia, 2007, for more details). Financial data is collected from Compustat and 
from SEDAR, the Canadian equivalent of EDGAR. As many firms’ first proxy circular or annual 
reports are not available on SEDAR, and because there is much missing information in annual 
reports and management proxies, the number of usable observations drops to 241. We then 
removed the firms for which the first day of the D&O insurance contract is after the IPO 
completion date (11 observations), and the firms that report the D&O insurance premium and 
policy limit in the IPO prospectus (21 observations). The final dataset contains 209 observations. 
The first column of Table 2-1 displays the number of initiated IPOs per year, whereas the second 
column displays the number of completed IPOs per year.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Financial variables are collected as of the end of the first fiscal year post-IPO. The 
governance and insurance information is collected in the first available management proxy. All 
numbers are in Canadian dollars and a conversion to Canadian dollars as of the end of the firm’s 
fiscal year was applied when needed. 
                                                 
37  For instance in the case of the Addax corporation (IPO completed on February 16th 2006), the 
management proxy states that “The total 2006 premium payable is $374,500 for the D&O twelve month 
cover and $505,000 for the POSI 72 month cover”. 
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3.2 Description of variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables we use reflect the firm’s observed stock market risk and return 
following the date of the IPO. Starting with our risk measurements, the Volatility variable is 
calculated as the standard deviation of annualized daily returns. We expect firms that are deemed 
riskier by insurers, as reflected by a higher rate-on-line, to have higher stock market volatility. 
We also calculated the firm’s idiosyncratic risk of returns (Idiosyncratic) as in Ang et al. (2006) 
and used the standard deviation of the residual of a daily three-factor Canadian Fama-French 
model (see Francoeur et al., 2008, for the source of these factors).38  
To evaluate the stock performance of firms we use the First year excess return as well as 
the firm’s First year total return. If D&O insurance providers have private information regarding 
the operations and governance of insured firms, firms that have a higher risk assessment measure 
should have a lower return. First year excess return is equal to the First year total return of the 
firm post-IPO minus the return on the S&P/TSX, Canada’s main stock market index, over the 
same period. If D&O insurers are able to charge a higher premium to firms that will perform 
poorly because of their revealed poor governance and opaque operations, then the relationship 
between the first year excess return and our measure of D&O insurance risk will be negative.  
We also combine the risk and return variables by calculating three quasi-Sharpe ratios: 
Total Sharpe ratio, Excess Sharpe ratio, and Idiosyncratic Sharpe ratio. The first measure is 
computed by dividing First year total return by Volatility; the second, by dividing First year 
excess return by Volatility; and the third, by dividing First year total return by Idiosyncratic. If 
                                                 
38 Canadian factors are only available until 2009. 
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the rate-on-line is associated with higher volatility and lower returns, it should also be associated 
with lower quasi-Sharpe ratios.  
IPO issue prices were collected using the firms’ prospectus available on SEDAR. Values 
were verified using the FPInfomart database. Subsequent stock market price information comes 
from Bloomberg. 
3.2.2 Main independent variables 
The main variable of interest in this paper is the ratio of the total premium paid to the 
maximum possible coverage (or the policy limit). This information is released in the first 
management proxy after the firm becomes public39. As D&O insurance is considered by the 
board of directors to be a part of the managerial compensation package, the information that is 
released indicates the previous year’s protection (just as salary information relates to the 
previous year’s compensation). In the paper, this rate-on-line measure is modified in two ways, 
to make it more tractable. First, we use the natural logarithm of the ratio of the D&O premium to 
$1,000 dollars of coverage (Ln_ROL) to reduce the impact of very large rate-on-lines on the 
results. Second, we use the D&O premium divided by $1,000 dollars of coverage (Rate-on-line). 
In both cases, a firm that pays a higher rate-on-line is hypothesized to be perceived by the insurer 
as riskier since it is paying more per unit of coverage. We therefore test whether the rate-on-line 
is related to stock market volatility and returns (as well as the quasi-Sharpe ratios) in the first 
year of operations post-IPO.  
The decision to purchase or not to purchase insurance is used in the first step regression 
equation of the Heckman two-step procedure (see the Robustness section), to account for the 
                                                 
39 In some rare instances, the D&O insurance information is released in the prospectus. We thank a 
referee for pointing out this issue; we therefore deleted from our final sample all firms that divulged their 
D&O insurance information in their prospectus. 
  75 
possible selection bias where the rate-on-line was not random for the sample of firms we 
observed. In other words, we need to account for the fact that we do not observe the rate-on-line 
for firms that choose to remain uninsured. Insurance is thus an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firm reported that it carried D&O insurance in its first management proxy following its first 
annual report post-IPO, and it should be zero otherwise.40  
 
 Appendix 2-C provides a detailed description of all control variables. 
3.3 Sample Statistics 
Table 2-2 presents the main sample statistics, starting with the dependent variables, the 
variables related to the D&O insurance contract and finishing with the different control variables 
and the variables used in the treatment equation related to the decision to purchase D&O 
insurance. Dichotomous variables in Table 2-2 are those for which the entire sample statistic is 
not provided. 
[INSERT TABLE 2-2 ABOUT HERE] 
It is interesting to note that the average return in the first year is 11.5%, giving an average 
excess return in the first year of 4.4%, whereas the median return is only 7.8% with a median 
excess return of -2.9%. Eight companies did not reach the end of the first year of operations.  
Our sample consists of 148 firms that reported having D&O insurance in the first year 
post-IPO and 61 not reporting having insurance, which give us a take up of 71%, a percentage 
very similar to the average D&O insurance penetration in the Canadian market according to the 
different Tillinghast-Towers reports. In terms of the main variables of interest, information about 
                                                 
40 As in Core (1997), Park Wynn (2008), Lin et al. (2011) and Boyer and Stern (2012), we assume that 
the lack of D&O insurance information disclosure in a firm’s proxy circular means that the firm is 
uninsured. 
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the Rate-on-line is available for 96 firms out of the original 209. Of the 113 firms for which no 
rate-on-line is available, 61 did not purchase D&O insurance whereas the other 52 purchased 
D&O insurance but did not give enough details to calculate the rate-on-line. These 52 firms must 
be kept in the dataset regressions because the mere fact that they purchased insurance tells us 
something about their behavior toward insurance.  
4. Analysis of results 
The theoretical econometric model has the following structure. 
1- Firms decide to go public through an initial public offering; 
2- Firms decide to purchase D&O insurance or not; 
3- Insurers give firms that purchase D&O insurance a price per unit of coverage (rate-
on-line); 
4- The stock market reacts to the flow of information during the year. 
The variables that determine whether a firm goes public (step 1) are not measurable since 
we do not have access to information for non-public firms. After deciding to go public, a firm 
purchases a D&O insurance contract (or not) in step 2, an information that is available. 
Regarding step 3, we observe a firm’s rate-on-line only if it purchased insurance. To control for 
the potential selection bias in steps 2 and 3, we will conduct a classic Heckman two-step 
procedure as a robustness check.  
4.1 Preliminary results 
Table 2-3 separates the observations presented in Table 2-2 between firms that have D&O 
insurance and firms that do not, and offers some descriptive statistics. Of the 71% of IPO firms 
that reveal they purchased D&O insurance before their IPO date, the average premium is 
approximately $145,658 for an average coverage of $22 million. There is a very wide 
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distribution for the rate-on-line variable, which is reported as the premium paid per $1,000 of 
coverage. The 95th percentile rate-on-line is more than 7 times larger than the 5th percentile rate-
on-line, with an average of $7.19 per $1,000 of coverage and a median of $5.27 per $1,000 of 
coverage. This provides some justification for using a log-transformation of the rate-on-line.  
[INSERT TABLE 2-3 ABOUT HERE] 
When examining the decision to purchase insurance (the Insurance variable is equal to one 
if the firm revealed carrying D&O insurance, and zero otherwise), the hypothesis is that this 
decision should be influenced by financial and governance measures as well as other control 
variables. It is interesting to see that none of the return variables differ in distribution as a 
function of whether insurance is purchased or not. This provides a possible indication that the 
mere fact of purchasing insurance or not conveys no information to the market.  
In the second part of Table 2-3, we see that firms that take up insurance are in some respect 
significantly different from firms that do not. For instance, firms that are larger (in terms of 
market capitalization at the time of their IPO) are more likely to have D&O insurance. Firms that 
have operations in the U.S. are also more likely to carry D&O insurance. As the U.S. relies more 
on litigation to keep firms in line, it seems logical that the more important the presence in the 
U.S., the more likely a lawsuit could occur so that carrying insurance becomes more likely. The 
only other dimension over which insured and non-insured firms differ in means and median is in 
terms of their corporate structure. It seems that income trusts are more likely to have no 
insurance than common equity firms. Table 2-4 shows the results of a simple probit model 
regarding the decision to purchase D&O insurance for different model specifications. 
[INSERT TABLE 2-4 ABOUT HERE] 
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The results are consistent across model specifications, with four variables remaining 
generally significant throughout: Duality, US_Presence, ITCE and Hard. It therefore seems that 
firms that are more likely to purchase D&O insurance are those that have a chairman of the 
board who is not the CEO, that have activities in the U.S. and that are incorporated as common 
equity firms. Firm size, as measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity 
(lnMVE_IPO), seems to have only a marginal impact on the decision to purchase D&O insurance 
when controlling for other factors. These results are in line with most studies that examine the 
demand for D&O insurance (see Rees et al., 2011, Core, 1997 and Boyer, 2003). Specification 2 
will be the model used later as the Heckman’s selection regression (first stage) model since it is 
the one that has the best goodness of fit. 
4.2 The Predictive Power of D&O Insurance Rate-on-Line 
Table 2-5 reports the results from OLS regressions where we examine the relationship 
between the main independent variables (the log of the rate-on-line or the premium per $1,000 of 
coverage) and the first year excess return (Panel A) and the total return (Panel B) post IPO. In 
Panel A, the first regression model presents the results when we do not include the rate-on-line 
variables in the regression. We see that only two variables have the power to explain the returns 
in the first year post-IPO: return on assets and the type of incorporation. No other variable has 
any explanatory power at the 5% level or better. 
Model specifications 2 and 3 are very parsimonious and control only for basic financial and 
governance variables in addition to either rate-on-line measures: Specification 2 uses the natural 
log of the rate-on-line whereas Specification 3 uses the rate-on-line as the main independent 
variable of interest. In the next set of two regressions, we add more financial and governance 
control variables as well as variables related to the IPO (the fee ratio and the float). 
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Specifications 6 and 7 are similar to Specifications 4 and 5 with the difference that they control 
whether the firm went public during a “hard market year” in the D&O insurance industry (i.e., 
when premium levels were high). Across all model specifications, the price per unit of D&O 
insurance coverage (whether it is the log of the rate-on-line or simply the premium-to-coverage 
ratio) is negatively and significantly related to the firm’s excess stock market return in the first 
year after the IPO. Panel B shows regressions that predict first year total returns while 
controlling for systematic risks using three Canadian Fama-French measures. Results are the 
same in Panel B and in Panel A: the rate-on-line is negatively and significantly related to the 
firm’s stock market return in the first year post IPO. 
All results in both panels of Table 2-5 are consistent with the hypothesis that D&O liability 
insurers have information at the time of the IPO that should be valuable to stock market 
participants. Our results are economically significant. Using any model specification that uses 
the natural logarithm of the rate-on-line in Panel B of Table 2-5, we can conclude that a 50% 
increase in the rate-online (resp. a 10% increase) leads to an approximate 7.3% to 9.4% (resp. 
1.7% to 2.2%) decrease in the one-year excess return post IPO.  
[INSERT TABLE 2-5 ABOUT HERE] 
We then turn to examine whether the rate-on-line is related to other stock performance 
measures in the first year post-IPO: risk, and return per unit of risk. We use two measures of risk 
in our OLS regressions. Volatility is the standard deviation of annualized daily returns, whereas 
Idiosyncratic is the standard deviation of the residual of a daily three-factor Canadian Fama-
French model. We use the idiosyncratic risk to verify that our results on volatility are not 
contaminated by market volatility. With respect to the return per unit of risk, we shall use 
different quasi-Sharpe ratio measures by dividing a return measure by a risk measure.  
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Table 2-6 and Table 2-7 present the regression results for the two risk measurements. In 
both tables, the first specification presents the regression results when no rate-on-line variable is 
included. Specifications 2 & 3 control for financial variables and variables related to the firm’s 
governance. The second set of two regressions controls for the same variables, but a dummy 
variable to control for a hard insurance market is added. Finally, model specifications 6 & 7 
show how our results hold with a more parsimonious model specification.  
[INSERT TABLE 2-6 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2-7 ABOUT HERE] 
In all specifications, results show that the price of coverage is statistically and positively 
related to the one-year ahead total return volatility and idiosyncratic risk. In addition, the results 
are economically significant. Using Specification 4 in Table 2-7, the estimated coefficient for the 
natural logarithm of the rate-on-line shows that if the rate-on-line of the average firm in our 
sample was to increase by 50% (resp. 10%), the one-year post IPO volatility would increase by 
2.8% (resp. 0.7%). Apart from the rate-on-line variables, only firm size (as measured by 
lnMVE_IPO) and Float are significant at the 5% level or better in all model specifications in 
both tables. 
Results in Tables 2-6 and 2-7 are remarkably similar. Insurers appear to be able to charge a 
higher price to IPO firms that will have more volatile stock returns in the first year following 
their IPO. These results are in line with economic theory, in contrast with the results in Chalmers 
et al. (2002). Although we cannot assert that insurers are better at anticipating volatility than 
investors, we nevertheless believe that the metric provided by the rate-on-line could be very 
useful to market participants.  
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Our final set of results combines the first year excess return and volatility to analyze 
whether the excess Sharpe ratio (i.e. the ratio of the one-year excess return to volatility), the total 
Sharpe ratio (i.e. the ratio of the one-year total return to volatility), or the idiosyncratic Sharpe 
ratio (i.e. the ratio of the one-year total return to idiosyncratic risk) of our sample firms is 
negatively related to the D&O insurance rate-on-line. Results are presented in Table 2-8. No 
control variable seems to be consistently and significantly related to the excess Sharpe ratio of 
our sample firms. The only variable that is significant in explaining the return per unit of risk is 
the rate-on-line.  
[INSERT TABLE 2-8 ABOUT HERE] 
Again, our results strongly support the idea that the technology used by D&O insurers to 
transform the firms’ liability risk characteristics into an insurance premium has some power in 
explaining the firms’ first year basic stock market return characteristics. The data therefore 
supports the hypothesis that insurers are able to anticipate the performance of firms in their first 
year as a public company, even in a context where high information asymmetry prevails. 
The results presented in Table 2-5 through Table 2-8 use information that one could argue 
has already been incorporated by the investment banker in the offer price at the time of the IPO, 
or that it has been quickly and immediately incorporated in the stock price at the end of the first 
day. As a consequence, we could expect not to observe any link between known firm specific 
characteristics and the stock return in the first year. This offers an explanation for the low level 
of significance of most control variables in the regressions of Table 2-5 through 2-8.  
In Table 2-9, we therefore present regression results that only use the information that is 
unknown to investors at the time of the IPO: the rate-on-line, the return of market portfolio and 
the first day return. We also include a dummy variable to control for a hard insurance market, 
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meaning that insurance policies are less affordable and that they come with more stringent 
constraints. Panel A uses the first day return as an explanatory variable. In Panel B, the first day 
return is included in the dependent variable. In Specifications 1 through 6, we use as our 
dependent variable the first year total return net of the first day, while controlling for market 
return. In Specifications 7 and 8, we use the excess return in the first year net of the first day as 
our dependent variable. 
[INSERT TABLE 2-9 ABOUT HERE] 
In Panel A of Table 2-9, we see that the paper’s main hypothesis, that the rate-on-line 
conveys valuable information, is supported since returns and returns per unit of risk are 
negatively affected by both measures of the rate-on-line. The positive relationship between the 
rate-on-line and risk is not as significant though.41 When we focus solely on the first year return 
after the first day, as in Panel B of Table 2-9, then both measures of the rate-on-line remain 
negatively and significantly related to the total return and to the excess return. The magnitude of 
the coefficients of Ln_ROL and Rate-on-line in Panel B are similar to what we had in the 
previous tables.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
This section reports the results of a series of robustness tests to see how sensitive our 
empirical results are to various econometric specifications.42 First, we examine the possibility 
that the decision to purchase D&O insurance conveys information to the market that is not 
                                                 
41 If we concentrate only on the firms that have a high enough idiosyncratic risk (for instance more than 
2%), then the main results of the paper hold with a significance of better than 1% on our variables of 
interest. 
42 For brevity purposes, we mainly focus from this point forward on results related to return and to return 
per unit of risk. 
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captured when we use an OLS regression. Indeed, given that we do not observe the rate-on-line 
of firms which do not purchase insurance, the distribution of insured and non-insured firms is not 
random and could therefore bias the results. We use a Heckman (1979) two step approach to 
reduce the potential bias. The first step consists in a probit regression that measures a firm’s 
propensity to purchase D&O insurance before its IPO. Similar to the regression results in Table 
2-4, the dependent variable in this regression is Insurance. We model the firms’ decision to 
purchase insurance using Specification 2 in Table 2-4. The second step in the Heckman two-step 
procedure involves an OLS regression to determine the impact of the rate-on-line on the different 
post-IPO dependent variables.  
The second robustness analysis we conduct examines the consequences of a situation 
where the stock market risk and return are jointly determined and where each feedbacks into the 
other. We therefore modify the econometric models to simultaneously estimate the stock market 
returns and risk in the first year post-IPO. The econometric technique used is either a two-stage 
least square or three-stage least square regression to make sure that the results are not due to a 
misspecification of the econometric model.  
5.1 Likelihood of carrying D&O insurance and two-step regression 
The first robustness check is to verify whether the choice of being insured or not creates a 
significant selection bias in the sense that firms who choose to purchase insurance are 
fundamentally different from those that do not. We control for the potential selection bias by 
using a classic Heckman two-step approach in Table 2-10 (we only report the results from the 
second stage regressions), in order to explain the first year excess return, the first year total 
return, as well as the market excess quasi-Sharpe ratio (the selection regression model is omitted, 
but available from the authors). The basic results of the paper hold: there is a negative and 
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significant relationship between the two measures of the rate-on-line and the firms’ total return, 
excess return, and excess return per unit of risk in the first year post IPO. 
[INSERT TABLE 2-10 ABOUT HERE] 
As we see in Table 2-10, the two main variables of interest are significantly negatively 
associated with the return of firms that went public through an initial public offering. Not only 
do the selection bias regression results confirm the results presented in Table 2-5, the 
coefficients’ value are extremely similar. This should tell us that the impact of the selection bias 
is small. Even when we use market-adjusted quasi-Sharpe ratios as our dependent variable, the 
results are similar to the results presented in Table 2-8. This again suggests that the selection bias, 
if it exists, is relatively small and economically inconsequential (which is confirmed by the Wald 
test).  In unreported results, we find that the volatility results are also unchanged when 
controlling for the selection bias, and the inclusion of the full set of control variables. 
In Panel B of Table 2-10, we also report regression results where we explicitly control for 
systematic differences which may exist between firms that purchase insurance and disclose the 
policy limit and premium and those that purchase insurance but do not provide this information. 
The econometric model therefore has three steps: the decision to purchase, the decision to reveal 
all information, and the return in the first year. Using the inverse Mills ratio from probit model 2 
from Table 2-4, we run a Heckman selection model where the first dependent variable takes the 
value one for firms that disclose their policy limit and premium, and zero otherwise. The second 
stage is an OLS regression with our return and risk measures as dependent variables, and where 
the computed inverse Mills ratio variable is included as a control. Our results remain unchanged, 
which suggests that the impact of the disclosure selection bias is small or even inexistent. 
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5.2 Simultaneous (feedback) effects of risk and return 
The results of Table 2-11 take into account the potential simultaneous determination of risk 
and return in the model since feedback effects could exist between risk (however measured) and 
return. We test our main hypothesis using a two-stage least square (Panel A) as well as a three-
stage least square (Panel B) approach.  
[INSERT TABLE 2-11 ABOUT HERE] 
Correcting for the simultaneity of risk and return measures reduces the significance of the 
coefficients of interest but does not alter the overall results. In both panels we corrected for the 
selection bias and the feedback effect by including the inverse-Mills ratio in all of the regressions. 
Overall results show that the price-to-coverage ratio is positively associated with risk and 
negatively associated with returns. The main message of the paper is therefore supported using 
many different econometric models.  
We can therefore be confident that the paper’s main results presented in Tables 2-5 through 
2-8 are robust, which means that the firms’ first year returns are significantly related to their 
D&O insurance contracts’ rate-on-line. This suggests that insurers who offer D&O insurance 
protection are able to process information at the time of the IPO that investors should find 
valuable.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether insurers that provide firms and 
their managers with protection against the event of costly litigation are able to effectively process 
information that could be valuable to investors at the time of the firms’ initial public offering. 
More precisely, firms that seek to protect their managers against costly liability lawsuits may 
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purchase protection from insurers that examine each firm’s governance structure, organizational 
processes and its “character and culture” to arrive at a premium that reflects the firm’s risk of 
lawsuits. Even though this audit is performed prior to the IPO date, investors only learn this 
information much later, in the proxy statement, which is typically released a few months after the 
end of the first fiscal year. 
Whenever insurers decide to provide coverage to any policyholder, they assess the 
probability and severity of claims they could potentially be asked to cover. D&O insurance 
claims are generally related to lawsuits brought against the firm’s managers by shareholders or 
other stakeholders. Lawsuits are more frequent when the stock has performed poorly, and a 
lawsuit’s severity is greater when volatility is higher. Consequently, insurers that sell D&O 
insurance must use an audit technology (known as risk underwriting in the insurance industry) 
that yields a higher price of insurance when the expected loss is greater, whether this is due to a 
higher frequency of losses (i.e. lower stock returns) or a higher severity of lawsuits (higher stock 
volatility). The main results of this paper confirm this view of the D&O insurance world. We 
find that firms that pay a high price for their directors’ and officers’ liability insurance coverage 
tend to underperform in their first year since they are more likely to have a lower stock return 
and a higher volatility. Our results connect the premium paid before the IPO with the volatility 
post IPO, and thus provide a missing link in the literature. Our findings reconcile economic 
theory with empirical evidence as insurers charge more ex ante to firms that are risker ex post. 
Chalmers et al. (2002) found the opposite result, which was surprising.  
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that D&O liability insurers have material 
information about the internal structure of soon-to-be public firms that other investors do not 
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have.43 Given that the main determinant of the premium is the assessment of deep corporate 
governance (Baker and Griffith, 2007a), our study provides support for the idea that D&O 
insurance information could be a potential substitute to commercial governance indices. Further 
research to formally test this hypothesis is on our research agenda. For American investors, the 
information related to the purchase of D&O insurance is usually not available in the United 
States (see Griffith, 2006). Even in cases where some information is available, as in the state of 
New York (see Linck et al., 2009), only the premium information is provided, which is 
insufficient to draw any reasonable conclusion on the firm’s risk.  
The use of D&O insurance information as a tool to assess stock return and volatility falls 
within the recent push to find a way to properly account for a firm’s governance structure (see 
Rose, 2007, Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2009, Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010, Adams et al., 2010, 
and Larcker and Tayan, 2013, inter alia). As many governance factors are not properly specified 
or are completely unavailable to the general investor (see Baker and Griffith, 2007a), one has to 
wonder how much of the internal structure of the firm remains unknown to market participants. 
That is why Holderness (1990), O’Sullivan (1997), Core (2000) and Boyer and Stern (2012) 
argue that D&O insurance providers are more likely to be good firm monitors since they have a 
monetary incentive to price the contract properly.  
The results herein can be seen as a laboratory test that adds weight to calls for disclosure of 
D&O insurance information (see Griffith, 2006). Mandating the revelation of basic D&O 
insurance information (premium and coverage) could potentially be valuable to investors since it 
                                                 
43 In unreported results, we find that the predictive power of D&O insurance disappears after the first 
year. The likely reason is that market participants slowly incorporate in stock prices the information that 
was only available to insurers at the time of the IPO so that the information advantage of D&O insurers is 
dissipated. 
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would provide them with an unbiased signal about a firm’s risk of litigation against its directors 
and officers, perhaps because of some managerial mishaps or accidental incompetence. Since the 
vast majority of Canadian and American corporations purchase liability insurance on behalf of 
their directors and officers, it would seem efficient to have access to this risk measure.  
Further research is necessary in order to specifically assess the welfare implications of 
mandating such disclosure. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the interests of 
existing and new shareholders do not necessarily converge with respect to the disclosure of D&O 
insurance information. Furthermore, the generalization to large U.S. listed firms is uncertain 
since our results relate to the case of new Canadian firms that became public through an IPO. 
These caveats notwithstanding, the questions we raise in this paper are relevant and timely given 
the time and energy that investors and regulators devote to governance issues.  
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Table 2-1 Number of Canadian IPOs per year in sample: Year of IPO initiation and year of IPO 
completion 
For the firms in our sample, we present the number of IPOs initiated between 1995 and 2010, 
and completed between 1995 and 2011. 
 
Year IPO initiated IPO completed 
1995 4 2 
1996 11 12 
1997 16 15 
1998 5 6 
1999 9 8 
2000 10 12 
2001 9 7 
2002 25 27 
2003 14 13 
2004 26 26 
2005 26 22 
2006 20 23 
2007 12 8 
2008 2 8 
2009 3 2 
2010 15 10 
2011 - 6 
missing 2 2 
Total 209 209 
 
 
Table 2-2 Summary statistics of the sample data set 
We present for each variable mentioned in the paper the number of available data points, the 
mean, standard deviation and the value of the non-dummy variables for different distribution 
points. The table separates the different variables with respect to the categories in which they 
were presented in the paper. 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min 5% 25% Median 75% 95% Max 
Dependent variables 
 
              
First year total 
return 199 0.115 0.562 -0.939 -0.673 -0.180 0.078 0.306 1.200 2.928 
First year 
excess return 199 0.044 0.544 -1.027 -0.762 -0.262 -0.029 0.246 1.032 2.830 
Volatility 202 0.436 0.352 0.128 0.148 0.226 0.315 0.511 1.100 2.600 
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Idiosyncratic 186 0.0276 0.0224 0.0080 0.0092 0.0141 0.0198 0.0319 0.0685 0.1645 
SharpeExcess 197 0.265 1.331 -2.265 -1.352 -0.652 -0.050 0.978 2.631 5.085 
                      
Main 
independent 
variables     
 
              
Rate-on-line 
(per $1000) 96 7.191 5.273 1.000 2.088 3.775 5.675 9.354 15.500 37.500 
ln_ROL (per 
$1000) 96 1.762 0.654 0.000 0.736 1.328 1.736 2.236 2.741 3.624 
Insurance 209 0.708 0.456               
                      
Financial variables 
 
              
FirstDayReturn 193 0.040 0.111 -0.152 -0.061 -0.010 0.011 0.074 0.235 0.867 
MarketRet 207 0.077 0.190 -0.409 -0.281 -0.069 0.127 0.213 0.307 0.563 
RiskFree 186 0.024 0.007 0.008 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.029 0.035 0.038 
SMB 186 0.158 0.185 -0.173 -0.066 0.023 0.124 0.265 0.513 0.783 
HML 186 0.051 0.273 -0.443 -0.248 -0.093 0.002 0.114 0.731 1.301 
lnMVE_IPO 206 18.819 1.209 13.638 16.743 18.201 18.853 19.488 20.577 22.504 
Growth 190 1.313 1.814 0.003 0.308 0.697 0.927 1.232 3.149 17.767 
ROA 207 -0.004 0.199 -1.453 -0.277 -0.008 0.025 0.062 0.114 0.937 
Debt_Ratio 207 0.374 0.240 0.003 0.011 0.175 0.350 0.535 0.828 0.995 
                      
Governance variables 
 
              
Duality 209 0.273 0.446               
Blockholder 209 0.722 0.449               
Independence 209 0.708 0.164 0.182 0.429 0.600 0.714 0.818 1.000 1.000 
ITCE 209 0.464 0.500               
                      
Other variables 
 
              
Board_size 205 6.878 2.091 3 4 5 7 8 11 15 
Risky_Industry 209 0.335 0.473               
Age 205 25.97 29.92 0.000 0.323 5.000 14.000 38.40 97.17 130.00 
IPOfeerat 188 0.0584 0.0215 0.0065 0.0438 0.0550 0.0600 0.0600 0.0675 0.3240 
Float 204 0.546 0.320 0.048 0.140 0.243 0.495 0.887 1.000 1.023 
Big5 185 0.686 0.465               
US_Presence 209 0.536 0.500               
US_Sales 198 0.208 0.310 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.403 0.860 1.000 
                      
 
 
 
Table 2-3 Separation and test between firms that have D&O insurance or not 
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We test for differences in means and median between the sample of firms that purchased D&O 
insurance (148 firms) and firms that did not purchase D&O insurance (61 firms). A selection of 
independent control variables are presented. 
 
  No D&O insurance (61) D&O insurance (148) Tests* of 
differences in 
Return 
Variables Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Mean Median 
First year return 57 0.076 0.582 0.070 142 0.131 0.556 0.081 ns ns 
First year 
excess return 57 0.015 0.538 -0.037 142 0.056 0.547 -0.015 ns ns 
First day return 54 0.032 0.083 0.014 139 0.043 0.120 0.010 ns ns 
First day return 
(imputed) 61 0.029 0.079 0.001 148 0.041 0.117 0.004 ns ns 
Volatility 59 0.426 0.394 0.274 143 0.440 0.334 0.325 ns ns 
Idiosyncratic 49 0.028 0.027 0.015 137 0.028 0.207 0.020 ns ns 
Sharpexs 
(Excess 
return/volatility) 56 0.158 1.314 -0.182 141 0.308 1.341 -0.019 ns ns 
Other 
independent 
variables                     
Ln (MVE at 
IPO) 60 18.502 1.392 18.483 146 18.950 1.104 18.923 1.45% 1.73% 
Debt_Ratio (%) 60 0.351 0.256 0.318 147 0.383 0.233 0.354 ns ns 
ROA 60 -0.028 0.296 0.032 147 0.006 0.142 0.024 ns ns 
Growth 48 1.133 1.385 0.829 142 1.373 1.938 0.951 ns ns 
IPO fees / MVE 
at IPO 54 0.056 0.009 0.060 134 0.059 0.025 0.060 ns ns 
IPO fees / MVE 
at IPO 
(imputed) 61 0.057 0.009 0.060 148 0.059 0.024 0.060 ns ns 
Risky industry 61 0.266 0.444 0 148 0.365 0.483 0.000 7.86% ns 
US Presence 61 0.377 0.489 0 148 0.601 0.491 1.000 0.16% 0.32% 
US sales 59 0.109 0.257 0 139 0.250 0.322 0.010 0.07% 0.10% 
                      
Age 58 24.618 31.658 9.339 147 26.505 29.295 14.302 ns ns 
Float 59 0.609 0.330 0.636 145 0.520 0.311 0.427 3.91% ns 
Income trust 61 0.590 0.496 1 148 0.412 0.494 0 0.99% 1.93% 
Independence 61 0.725 0.184 0.750 148 0.701 0.156 0.707 ns ns 
Duality 61 0.311 0.467 0 148 0.257 0.438 0 ns ns 
Blockholder 61 0.639 0.484 1.000 148 0.757 0.430 1 5.15% 8.56% 
                      
* A t-stat was used to test the equality of the two sample means (with equal variance), whereas we used a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the test of equality of medians. Only differences significant at the 10% level or 
better are highlighted. 
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Table 2-4 Marginal impact on the decision to purchase D&O insurance. 
We evaluate the marginal impact of control variables on a firm's likelihood to purchase D&O 
insurance. The dependent variable is Insurance, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
purchased D&O insurance in the first year post IPO. Onle the marginal effects are reported for 
ease of interpretation of the estimated coefficients. 
lnMVE_IPO is the log of the market value of equity at the time of the IPO. Debt_ratio is the ratio 
of total debt to market value of equity at the time of the IPO. Growth is the market value of 
equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. ROA is the firm's 
return on assets. Duality takes on the value one if the CEO of the company is also the chairman 
of the board. Blockholder is an indicator variable equal to one if a shareholder owns 10% or 
more of the firm’s voting shares. Independance is the proportion of directors deamed 
independent in Canada. Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the company 
operates in one of the industries classified as risky in Bajaj et al. (2000). US_Presence is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has activities in the United States and zero otherwise. 
IPOfeerat is equal to the fees paid to the investment banker divided by the firm's market value of 
equity at the time of the IPO. Float is the ratio of the number of shares available at the IPO to the 
total number of shares outstanding. ITCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is an income 
trust and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the operating firm at the time of the IPO. Hard is equal to 
one if the D&O insurance market is characterized by higher than normal premiums. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
VARIABLES Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance Insurance 
 
              
 lnMVE_IPO 0.045 0.028 0.035 0.030 0.026 0.051*  
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)  
Debt_Ratio 0.063 0.055 0.068 0.093 0.065 
 
 
 
(0.141) (0.140) (0.139) (0.137) (0.140) 
 
 
Growth 0.008 0.006 0.001 0.018 0.002 
 
 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) 
 
 
ROA 
 
0.123 0.091 0.088 0.109 
 
 
 
 
(0.181) (0.186) (0.184) (0.193) 
 
 
Duality -0.172** -0.165* 
 
-0.137* 
 
-0.092  
 
(0.084) (0.084) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.082)  
Blockholder -0.008 -0.011 
 
0.092 0.032 0.056  
 
(0.074) (0.072) 
 
(0.077) -0.073 (0.076)  
Independence -0.146 -0.184 
 
-0.178 -0.037 -0.140  
 
(0.218) (0.214) 
 
(0.213) (0.211) (0.210)  
Risky 
industry 0.043 0.071 0.072 
 
0.053 0.072  
 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.068) 
 
(0.070) (0.070)  
US Presence 0.193*** 0.195*** 0.193*** 
 
0.188*** 0.151**  
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.068) 
 
(0.068) (0.068)  
IPOfeerat0 2.393 2.527 2.213 
   
 
 
(3.178) (3.572) (3.391) 
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Float 0.121 0.108 0.111 
   
 
 
(0.155) (0.153) (0.153) 
   
 
ITCE -0.157 -0.290** -0.280** 
 
-0.208** -0.269***  
 
(0.101) (0.117) (0.116) 
 
(0.094) (0.083)  
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 
   
 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
   
 
Hard 
 
0.230** 0.243** 0.0450 0.244** 0.291***  
 
 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.0700) (0.102) (0.084)  
Constant 
       
 
       
       
 PseudoR2 0.123 0.154 0.132 0.044 0.108 0.138 
 LL -88.485 -85.410 -87.653 -101.11 -94.306 -107.18 
 Observations 183 183 183 188 188 206 
 In all cases, the standard deviation is in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Model specification 2 is used as our first stage regression in our Heckman two-stage 
regression 
  
 
Table 2-5A OLS regression that measures the firms' first year excess return – Panel A 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' market-adjusted stock return in 
the first year following the IPO. The dependent variable is the first year total return minus the 
return of the market over the same year (FirstYearReturn - Mkt1Year). The two main variables 
of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the premium per thousand dollars of maximum 
coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We hypothesize that these two measures 
should be negatively related to the firm's first year excess return. 
FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at 
the time of the IPO (issue price multiplied by number of outstanding shares). Growth is the 
market value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. 
DebtRatio is the ratio of total debt to assets. ROA is the firm's return on assets. IPOfeerat is the 
ratio of the IPO fees paid per million dollars of market value of equity. Float is computed as the 
ratio of the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. ITCE is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of sales 
carried out in the US.  Independence is the proportion of board members that are classified as 
independent. Duality is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero 
otherwise. Blockholder is equal to 1 if there is a major shareholder that holds more than 10% of 
the shares after the IPO and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the operation entity before the IPO. 
Hard is a dummy variable equal to 1 to account for the period of time when D&O insurance 
premium were abnormally high. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
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     ln_ROL   -0.124**   -0.122*   -0.129**   
  
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.060)   
Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0167*** 
 
-0.0177*** 
 
-0.0183*** 
      (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
FirstDayReturn 0.596 
  
0.220 0.297 0.249 0.325 
 
(0.429) 
  
(0.395) (0.396) (0.400) (0.398) 
lnMVE_IPO 0.033 0.028 0.022 0.031 0.022 0.025 0.016 
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.051) 
Growth -0.011 
  
0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.034) 
  
(0.049) (0.048) (0.045) (0.044) 
DebtRatio 0.205 
  
0.323 0.316 0.326 0.318 
 
(0.164) 
  
(0.230) (0.232) (0.231) (0.232) 
ROA 0.892*** 0.927** 0.967*** 0.800** 0.836** 0.768* 0.810* 
 
(0.191) (0.362) (0.362) (0.391) (0.386) (0.422) (0.416) 
IPOfeerat -1.245 
  
-0.530 -0.518 -0.746 -0.697 
 
(1.605) 
  
(2.065) (2.066) (2.141) (2.134) 
Float -0.063 
  
-0.0841 -0.110 -0.104 -0.129 
 
(0.149) 
  
(0.257) (0.248) (0.272) (0.265) 
ITCE -0.259** 
  
-0.236 -0.231 -0.279* -0.268* 
 
(0.108) 
  
(0.145) (0.143) (0.160) (0.156) 
US_sales -0.134 
  
-0.160 -0.169 -0.146 -0.157 
 
(0.115) 
  
(0.183) (0.183) (0.180) (0.181) 
Independence -0.211 -0.164 -0.188 -0.086 -0.113 -0.088 -0.117 
 
(0.242) (0.295) (0.284) (0.358) (0.346) (0.368) (0.359) 
Duality -0.132 
  
-0.195 -0.213 -0.181 -0.201 
 
(0.106) 
  
(0.174) (0.176) (0.165) (0.167) 
Blockholder -0.127* -0.016 -0.029 -0.040 -0.057 -0.04 -0.061 
 
(-0.071) (0.095) (0.094) (0.113) (0.112) (0.110) (0.108) 
Age 0.002 
  
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(-0.001) 
  
(-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) (-0.003) 
Hard -0.006 
    
0.082 0.071 
 
(-0.132) 
    
(-0.196) (-0.197) 
        Constant -0.170 -0.146 -0.100 -0.208 -0.074 -0.081 0.037 
 
(0.852) (0.836) (0.847) (0.958) (0.997) (1.049) (1.086) 
        Observations 167 93 93 87 87 87 87 
R-squared 0.235 0.128 0.131 0.209 0.214 0.211 0.216 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2-5B OLS regression that measures the firms' first year total return – Panel B 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' total stock return in the first 
year following the IPO. The dependent variable is the first year total return (FirstYearReturn ). 
The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the premium per thousand 
dollars of maximum coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We hypothesize that 
these two measures should be negatively related to the firm's first year total return. 
FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. MarketRet, RiskFree, SMB and HML are the one year total 
returns of the Canadian market portfolio, the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and 
growth portfolios respectively. LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the 
time of the IPO (issue price multiplied by number of outstanding shares). Growth is the market 
value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. DebtRatio is 
the ratio of total debt to assets. ROA is the firm's return on assets. IPOfeerat is the ratio of the 
IPO fees paid per million dollars of market value of equity. Float is computed as the ratio of the 
number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. ITCE is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US.  
Independence is the proportion of board members that are classified as independent. Duality is 
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Blockholder is equal 
to 1 if there is a major shareholder that holds more than 10% of the shares after the IPO and 0 
otherwise. Age is the age of the operation entity before the IPO. Big5 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 when one of the top-5 Canadian Banks was the lead underwriter. Hard is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 to account for the period of time when D&O insurance premium were abnormally high. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
First 
year total 
return 
First 
year 
total 
return 
First year 
total 
return 
First year 
total 
return 
First year 
total return 
First year 
total 
return 
First year 
total return 
      
     ln_ROL   -0.180**   -0.226***   -0.232***   
  
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.079) 
 
(0.077)   
Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0251** 
 
-0.0300*** 
 
-0.0297*** 
      (0.010)   (0.009)   (0.009) 
FirstDayReturn 
   
0.140 0.319 0.310 0.477 
    
(0.469) (0.462) (0.513) (0.522) 
MarketRet 0.480** 0.564* 0.527* -0.008 -0.068 -0.270 -0.311 
 
(0.207) (0.299) (0.293) (0.286) (0.287) (0.364) (0.362) 
RiskFree 0.139 -6.457 -8.250 -1.467 -4.984 7.857 3.943 
 
(5.697) (6.743) (6.960) (10.64) (10.40) (15.84) (15.85) 
SMB 0.0783 -0.400 -0.416 -0.307 -0.287 -0.203 -0.189 
 
(0.217) (0.336) (0.340) (0.327) (0.328) (0.290) (0.291) 
HML -0.148 -0.177 -0.181 -0.513 -0.512 -0.577* -0.568* 
 
(0.133) (0.203) (0.205) (0.316) (0.317) (0.331) (0.330) 
lnMVE_IPO 0.114** 0.073 0.068 0.101* 0.089 0.072 0.061 
 
(0.044) (0.062) (0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.055) (0.056) 
Growth
   
0.021 0.018 0.010 0.008 
    
(0.061) (0.060) (0.053) (0.053) 
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DebtRatio 
   
0.398 0.400 0.394 0.398 
    
(0.245) (0.250) (0.263) (0.266) 
ROA 0.747*** 0.792* 0.854** 0.584 0.649 0.515 0.589 
 
(0.160) (0.432) (0.423) (0.444) (0.434) (0.459) (0.450) 
IPOfeerat 
   
-1.316 -1.269 -2.135 -2.001 
    
(1.831) (1.845) (1.814) (1.832) 
Float 
   
0.0432 -0.0630 -0.0257 -0.129 
    
(0.245) (0.237) (0.237) (0.236) 
ITCE 
   
-0.086 -0.083 -0.232 -0.218 
    
(0.189) (0.185) (0.198) (0.195) 
US_sales 
   
-0.276 -0.270 -0.239 -0.235 
    
(0.192) (0.197) (0.181) (0.187) 
Independence -0.045 0.031 -0.022 0.064 0.038 0.044 0.013 
 
(0.194) (0.315) (0.297) (0.418) (0.407) (0.452) (0.442) 
Duality 
   
-0.239 -0.252 -0.235 -0.247 
    
(0.206) (0.205) (0.210) (0.207) 
Blockholder -0.038 0.078 0.058 0.189 0.144 0.189 0.143 
 
(0.078) (0.082) (0.077) (0.148) (0.141) (0.144) (0.139) 
Age 
   
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Big5 -0.117 -0.273 -0.297 -0.252 -0.263 -0.223 -0.232 
 
(0.112) (0.192) (0.199) (0.157) (0.161) (0.155) (0.161) 
Hard 
     
0.363 0.338 
      
(0.300) (0.301) 
        Constant -1.962** -0.637 -0.557 -1.346 -1.106 -1.097 -0.885 
 
(0.821) (1.124) (1.152) (1.251) (1.309) (1.179) (1.236) 
        Observations 160 82 82 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.205 0.191 0.203 0.302 0.314 0.330 0.339 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2-6 OLS regression that measures the firms' idiosyncratic risk in the first year post-IPO 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' idiosyncratic risk calculated as 
the variance of the error term of a Canadian three-factor Fama-French market model in the first 
year following the IPO. The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the 
premium per thousand dollars of maximum coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. 
We hypothesize that these two measures should be positively related to the firm's idiosyncratic 
risk.  
LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the time of the IPO (issue price 
multiplied by number of outstanding shares). Growth is the market value of equity plus the book 
value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. DebtRatio is the ratio of total debt to assets. 
IPOfeerat is the ratio of the IPO fees paid per million dollars of market value of equity. Float is 
computed as the ratio of the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. 
ITCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of 
sales carried out in the US.  RiskyIndustry is equal to 1 if the firm is a member of a risky 
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industry as defined by Bajaj et al. Blockholder is equal to 1 if there is a major shareholder that 
holds more than 10% of the shares after the IPO and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the operation 
entity before the IPO. Big5 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when one of the top-5 Canadian 
Banks was the lead underwriter. Hard is a dummy variable equal to 1 to account for the period of 
time when D&O insurance premium were abnormally high. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
     ln_ROL   0.00533*   0.00607** 
  
 
(0.00272) 
 
(0.00274) 
Rate-on-line 
  
0.000714** 
       (0.000286)   
lnMVE_IPO -0.00330 -0.00758** -0.00734** -0.00712** 
 
(0.00234) (0.00326) (0.00331) (0.00322) 
Growth 0.00166** 0.000819 0.000856 0.00129* 
 
(0.000743) (0.000759) (0.000769) (0.000741) 
DebtRatio -0.00667 -0.00367 -0.00300 -0.00371 
 
(0.00629) (0.00882) (0.00874) (0.00909) 
IPOfeerat 0.00491 -0.0600 -0.0624 -0.0333 
 
(0.0482) (0.0471) (0.0474) (0.0464) 
Float -0.0137** -0.0262*** -0.0250*** -0.0237*** 
 
(0.00631) (0.00687) (0.00635) (0.00652) 
ITCE -0.00517 -0.00644 -0.00646 -0.00257 
 
(0.00352) (0.00464) (0.00449) (0.00515) 
US_sales 0.00578 0.0106 0.0108 0.00909 
 
(0.00459) (0.00707) (0.00706) (0.00739) 
RiskyIndustry 0.00694** 0.00875** 0.00961** 0.00780** 
 
(0.00313) (0.00399) (0.00391) (0.00391) 
Blockholder 0.00178 -0.00470 -0.00423 -0.00418 
 
(0.00268) (0.00354) (0.00336) (0.00341) 
Age -2.50e-05 -3.48e-05 -3.25e-05 -3.94e-05 
 
(3.04e-05) (3.83e-05) (3.68e-05) (3.61e-05) 
Big5 -0.00531 -0.00376 -0.00370 -0.00305 
 
(0.00327) (0.00464) (0.00456) (0.00434) 
Hard 
   
-0.00782 
    
(0.00509) 
     Constant 0.0957** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.0465) (0.0651) (0.0659) (0.0643) 
     Observations 158 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.367 0.587 0.594 0.600 
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  (5) (6) (7) 
    
VARIABLES 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk  
   
        ln_ROL   0.00636**   
      
 
(0.00242) 
     Rate-on-line 0.000764** 
 
0.000785*** 
      (0.000295)   (0.000265) 
    lnMVE_IPO -0.00689** -0.00729** -0.00703** 
    
 
(0.00328) (0.00281) (0.00284) 
    Growth 0.00127* 0.00142** 0.00141* 
    
 
(0.000749) (0.000699) (0.000727) 
    DebtRatio -0.00310 
      
 
(0.00901) 
      IPOfeerat -0.0388 
      
 
(0.0461) 
      Float -0.0224*** -0.0183*** -0.0166*** 
    
 
(0.00615) (0.00527) (0.00490) 
    ITCE -0.00289 -0.00453 -0.00476 
    
 
(0.00497) (0.00528) (0.00500) 
    US_sales 0.00937 
      
 
(0.00735) 
      RiskyIndustry 0.00880** 0.00889** 0.00984*** 
    
 
(0.00387) (0.00336) (0.00333) 
    Blockholder -0.00364 -0.00328 -0.00262 
    
 
(0.00328) (0.00309) (0.00299) 
    Age -3.68e-05 
      
 
(3.54e-05) 
      Big5 -0.00315 -0.00208 -0.00216 
    
 
(0.00427) (0.00429) (0.00428) 
    Hard -0.00719 -0.0101** -0.00965** 
    
 
(0.00490) (0.00478) (0.00467) 
    
        Constant 0.170** 0.169*** 0.168*** 
    
 
(0.0652) (0.0539) (0.0547) 
    
        Observations 83 84 84 
    R-squared 0.606 0.581 0.586 
    Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-7 OLS regression that measures the firms' stock volatility in the first year post-IPO 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' stock market volatility in the 
first year following the IPO. Volatility is calculated as the annualize standard deviation of daily 
returns. The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the premium per 
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thousand dollars of maximum coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We 
hypothesize that these two measures should be positively related to the firm's stock volatility. 
LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the time of the IPO (issue price 
multiplied by number of outstanding shares). Growth is the market value of equity plus the book 
value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. DebtRatio is the ratio of total debt to assets. 
IPOfeerat is the ratio of the IPO fees paid per million dollars of market value of equity. Float is 
computed as the ratio of the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. 
ITCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of 
sales carried out in the US.  RiskyIndustry is equal to 1 if the firm is a member of a risky 
industry as defined by Bajaj et al. Blockholder is equal to 1 if there is a major shareholder that 
holds more than 10% of the shares after the IPO and 0 otherwise. Big5 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when one of the top-5 Canadian Banks was the lead underwriter. Age is the age of the 
operation entity before the IPO. Hard is a dummy variable equal to 1 to account for the period of 
time when D&O insurance premium were abnormally high. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility Volatility 
        ln_ROL   0.0556*   0.0702**   0.0823***   
  
 
(0.0302) 
 
(0.0308) 
 
(0.0309)   
Rate-on-line 
  
0.00807** 
 
0.00910** 
 
0.0104*** 
      (0.00361)   (0.00386)   (0.00362) 
lnMVE_IPO 
-
0.0857*** -0.109** -0.107* -0.100* -0.0976* -0.101** -0.0977** 
 
(0.0226) (0.0541) (0.0548) (0.0533) (0.0542) (0.0476) (0.0484) 
Growth 0.0327*** 0.00549 0.00615 0.0147 0.0147 0.0199* 0.0198* 
 
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.0103) (0.0108) 
DebtRatio 
 
-0.174 -0.165 -0.175 -0.167 
  
  
(0.130) (0.129) (0.132) (0.131) 
  IPOfeerat 
 
-1.113 -1.128 -0.585 -0.643 
  
  
(0.708) (0.718) (0.733) (0.735) 
  Float -0.215*** -0.348*** -0.339*** -0.299*** -0.286*** -0.234*** -0.213*** 
 
(0.0742) (0.102) (0.0972) (0.0870) (0.0849) (0.0771) (0.0740) 
ITCE -0.112* -0.159** -0.159** -0.0825 -0.0860 -0.123 -0.126* 
 
(0.0595) (0.0697) (0.0681) (0.0831) (0.0806) (0.0774) (0.0731) 
US_sales 
 
0.132 0.134 0.102 0.105 
  
  
(0.112) (0.112) (0.115) (0.114) 
  RiskyIndustry 0.0594 0.0990* 0.109* 0.0802 0.0920* 0.0978** 0.110** 
 
(0.0388) (0.0579) (0.0555) (0.0546) (0.0521) (0.0465) (0.0447) 
Blockholder 0.00727 -0.0663 -0.0621 -0.0559 -0.0500 -0.0556 -0.0473 
 
(0.0437) (0.0451) (0.0436) (0.0411) (0.0406) (0.0405) (0.0395) 
Age 
 
-0.000673 -0.000646 -0.000765 -0.000733 
  
  
(0.000479) (0.000454) (0.000475) (0.000460) 
  Big5 
 
-0.0984 -0.0960 -0.0843 -0.0847 -0.0712 -0.0715 
  
(0.0764) (0.0770) (0.0696) (0.0705) (0.0716) (0.0729) 
Hard -0.153** 
  
-0.155* -0.148* -0.187** -0.181** 
 
(0.0662) 
  
(0.0808) (0.0769) (0.0760) (0.0732) 
  100 
        Constant 2.247*** 2.856*** 2.830*** 2.653** 2.641** 2.532*** 2.514*** 
 
(0.449) (1.050) (1.063) (1.039) (1.054) (0.902) (0.915) 
        Observations 180 83 83 83 83 84 84 
R-squared 0.453 0.612 0.617 0.633 0.637 0.609 0.613 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2-8 OLS regression that measures the firms' return-to-risk ratio in the first year post-IPO 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on different measures of the firms' return-
to-risk ratio (quasi-Sharpe ratios) in the first year following the IPO. The dependent variable are 
one of the following: Excess Sharpe (First year excess return divided by Volatility), Total Sharpe 
(First year total return divided by Volatility) and Idiosyncratic Sharpe (First year total return 
divided by Idiosyncratic Risk). The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as 
the premium per thousand dollars of maximum coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-
line. We hypothesize that these two measures should be negatively related to the firm's return-to-
risk ratio. 
FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. MarketRet, RiskFree, SMB and HML are the one year total 
returns of the Canadian market portfolio, the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and 
growth portfolios respectively. LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the 
time of the IPO (issue price multiplied by number of outstanding shares). Growth is the market 
value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. DebtRatio is 
the ratio of total debt to assets. ROA is the firm's return on assets. IPOfeerat is the ratio of the 
IPO fees paid per million dollars of market value of equity. Float is computed as the ratio of the 
number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. ITCE is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US.  
Independence is the proportion of board members that are classified as independent. 
RiskyIndustry is equal to 1 if the firm is a member of a risky industry as defined by Bajaj et al. 
Blockholder is equal to 1 if there is a major shareholder that holds more than 10% of the shares 
after the IPO and 0 otherwise. Age is the age of the operation entity before the IPO. Big5 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 when one of the top-5 Canadian Banks was the lead underwriter. 
Hard is a dummy variable equal to 1 to account for the period of time when D&O insurance 
premium were abnormally high. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Total 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Excess 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Excess 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Total 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Total 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Idiosyncratic 
Sharpe Ratio 
Idiosyncratic 
Sharpe Ratio 
        ln_ROL   -0.481**   -0.472**   -7.681**   
  
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(3.646)   
Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0579** 
 
-0.0696** 
 
-1.144*** 
      (0.0247)   (0.0263)   (0.427) 
FirstDayReturn 0.883 0.763 1.128 0.364 0.848 5.683 13.62 
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(1.025) (1.345) (1.343) (1.027) (0.982) (16.59) (15.79) 
MarketRet -0.119 
  
-0.551 -0.635 -9.775 -11.17 
 
(0.595) 
  
(0.782) (0.765) (13.02) (12.74) 
RiskFree 5.508 
  
-24.39 -35.84 -353.5 -543.3 
 
(24.29) 
  
(28.47) (27.77) (476.8) (461.8) 
SMB 0.647 
  
-0.213 -0.223 -4.169 -4.348 
 
(0.553) 
  
(0.726) (0.729) (11.84) (11.89) 
HML -0.599 
  
-0.994 -0.988 -17.19 -17.11* 
 
(0.374) 
  
(0.611) (0.597) (10.31) (10.09) 
lnMVE_IPO 0.225** 0.133 0.109 0.171 0.153 2.781 2.492 
 
(0.0952) (0.117) (0.113) (0.118) (0.117) (1.884) (1.858) 
Growth 0.0391 0.0193 0.0237 0.0600 0.0553 1.104 1.023 
 
(0.0694) (0.0885) (0.0835) (0.0957) (0.0922) (1.658) (1.598) 
DebtRatio 0.801* 0.968 0.951 1.045 1.027 16.69 16.37 
 
(0.482) (0.658) (0.662) (0.628) (0.629) (10.08) (10.10) 
ROA 1.952*** 1.886 1.956 1.482 1.492 20.94 21.08 
 
(0.441) (1.228) (1.197) (1.115) (1.083) (19.05) (18.52) 
IPOfeerat -1.867 -3.205 -2.681 -4.467 -4.137 -70.46 -65.30 
 
(3.795) (4.764) (4.707) (4.126) (4.136) (66.43) (66.56) 
Float -0.280 -0.191 -0.352 -0.633 -0.815 -9.800 -12.75 
 
(0.439) (0.810) (0.788) (0.652) (0.632) (10.47) (10.15) 
ITCE -0.362 -0.607 -0.564 -0.0610 -0.0631 -1.415 -1.463 
 
(0.354) (0.533) (0.531) (0.480) (0.467) (7.686) (7.476) 
US_sales -0.481* -0.437 -0.417 -0.686* -0.670* -11.29* -11.02* 
 
(0.269) (0.540) (0.540) (0.373) (0.373) (6.024) (6.005) 
Independence 0.127 -0.288 -0.387 0.470 0.483 6.914 7.186 
 
(0.618) (0.962) (0.954) (1.013) (0.984) (16.72) (16.23) 
Duality -0.419* -0.555 -0.622 -0.706 -0.774* -12.34* -13.48* 
 
(0.246) (0.454) (0.455) (0.428) (0.425) (7.201) (7.162) 
Blockholder -0.0220 -0.162 -0.235 0.639* 0.593 10.76* 10.02 
 
(0.219) (0.401) (0.407) (0.374) (0.361) (6.369) (6.165) 
Age 0.00646* 0.00613 0.00556 0.00661 0.00632 0.116 0.112 
 
(0.00355) (0.00673) (0.00674) (0.00594) (0.00579) (0.101) (0.0981) 
RiskyIndustry -0.276 -0.334 -0.411 -0.532 -0.650 -9.396 -11.35 
 
(0.236) (0.476) (0.483) (0.426) (0.438) (7.096) (7.294) 
Big5 -0.378 -0.526 -0.515 -0.681** -0.727** -10.93** -11.71** 
 
(0.263) (0.402) (0.401) (0.340) (0.343) (5.451) (5.514) 
Hard 0.247 0.0274 -0.0259 0.000379 -0.0927 0.492 -1.036 
 
(0.400) (0.446) (0.449) (0.557) (0.556) (9.045) (8.995) 
        Constant (1.854) -0.412 -0.157 -0.991 -0.442 -17.09 -8.007 
 
(1.828) (2.244) (2.244) (2.149) (2.181) (34.53) (34.91) 
        Observations 144 82 82 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.296 0.282 0.283 0.422 0.443 0.418 0.439 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2-9A OLS regression that measures the firms' first year return and risk assuming all the 
information is incorporated in the price on the first day. 
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We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' excess return, idiosyncratic 
risk, volatility and quasi-Sharpe ratio in the first year following the IPO. The two main variables 
of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the premium paid for one thousand dollar of maximum 
possible coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We hypothesize that these two 
measures should be negatively related to the excess return and the Sharpe ratio, and positively 
related to the idiosyncratic risk and the volatility. FirstDayReturn is the firm's stock return on the 
first day post IPO. Hard is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the D&O insurance market is 
expensive for the firms seeking insurance. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARS 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First 
year total 
return 
First year 
total return 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk 
Excess 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Excess 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
                  
ln_ROL -0.156***   -0.138**   0.00169   -0.452**   
  (0.0586) 
 
(0.0604) 
 
(0.00309) 
 
(0.182)   
Rate-on-line 
 
-
0.0205*** 
 
-0.0184*** 
 
0.000360 
 
-0.0525** 
    (0.00615)   (0.00593)   (0.000508)   (0.0221) 
FirstDayRet. 0.434 0.479 0.305 0.340 0.0246 0.0244 0.838 0.981 
 
(0.301) (0.316) (0.333) (0.356) (0.0225) (0.0228) (0.858) (0.901) 
MarketRet 
  
0.734*** 0.717*** 
    
   
(0.275) (0.271) 
    RiskFree 
  
1.642 0.557 
    
   
(8.736) (8.597) 
    SMB 
  
-0.336 -0.352 
    
   
(0.291) (0.293) 
    HML 
  
-0.0478 -0.0495 
    
   
(0.189) (0.190) 
    
         Constant 0.323** 0.192** 0.302 0.218 0.0227*** 0.0231*** 1.016*** 0.587** 
 
(0.133) (0.0939) (0.212) (0.190) (0.00582) (0.00435) (0.376) (0.236) 
         Observations 94 94 89 89 96 96 93 93 
R-squared 0.041 0.043 0.101 0.104 0.022 0.027 0.052 0.044 
 
 
Table 2-9B OLS regression that measures the firms' first year return assuming all the information 
is incorporated in the price on the first day, net of the first day. 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' stock market return net of the 
return on the first day. In all Models we control for the market return in the first year post IPO, 
but we only control for the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and growth portfolios in 
Models 1 through 4. In Models 7 & 8, the market return is deducted from the dependent variable. 
The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the premium paid for one 
thousand dollar of maximum possible coverage, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We 
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hypothesize that these two measures should be negatively related to the return net of the first 
day. 
MarketRet, RiskFree, SMB and HML are the one year total returns of the Canadian market 
portfolio, the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and growth portfolios respectively. 
Hard is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the D&O insurance market is expensive for the firms 
seeking insurance. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Return 
net of 1st 
day 
Return net 
of 1st day 
Return 
net of 
1st day 
Return net 
of 1st day 
Return 
net of 1st 
day 
Return net 
of 1st day 
Excess 
return net 
of 1st 
day 
Excess 
return net 
of 1st day 
                  
ln_ROL -0.122**   -0.106*   -0.139**   -0.134**   
  (0.0561) 
 
(0.0580) 
 
(0.0584) 
 
(0.0577)   
Rate-on-line 
 
-0.0156** 
 
-0.0156** 
 
-0.0203*** 
 
-0.0188*** 
    (0.00592)   (0.00635)   (0.00563)   (0.00602) 
MarketRet 0.155 0.150 0.672** 0.653** 0.531** 0.503* 
  
 
(0.359) (0.356) (0.295) (0.292) (0.256) (0.256) 
  RiskFree 23.27 21.75 3.022 1.910 
    
 
(15.22) (15.22) (8.887) (8.760) 
    SMB -0.171 -0.182 -0.167 -0.179 
    
 
(0.279) (0.280) (0.290) (0.291) 
    
HML -0.238 -0.235 
-
0.00931 -0.0178 
    
 
(0.208) (0.211) (0.195) (0.197) 
    Hard 0.467** 0.452* 
  
0.149 0.151 
  
 
(0.229) (0.229) 
  
(0.151) (0.149) 
  
         Constant -0.578 -0.634 0.134 0.0887 0.188 0.0878 0.240* 0.137 
 
(0.463) (0.453) (0.219) (0.199) (0.152) (0.130) (0.127) (0.0894) 
         Observations 86 86 86 86 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.158 0.158 0.079 0.084 0.085 0.093 0.022 0.027 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2-10A Two-step regression that measures the first year's stock return and return-to-risk 
ratio by controlling for the purchase of insurance 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' stock market return in the first 
year following the IPO controlling for the information imbedded in the purchase of insurance or 
not (model 2 in Table 4). The dependent variable is the return in excess of the market in Models 
1 and 2, the total return in Models 3 through 6, and the total return net of the market return 
divided by the one year volatility in Models 7 and 8. The two main variables of interest are Rate-
on-line, calculated as the premium-to-coverage ratio, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. 
We hypothesize that these two measures should be negatively related to the first year return. 
FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. MarketRet, RiskFree, SMB and HML are the one year total 
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returns of the Canadian market portfolio, the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and 
growth portfolios respectively. LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the 
time of the IPO (issue price multiplied by number of outstanding shares).  
 
 
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A) (6A) (7A) (8A) 
VARIABLES 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
excess 
return 
First year 
total 
return 
First year 
total 
return 
First year 
total 
return 
First 
year 
total 
return 
Return-
to-Risk 
ratio 
Return-to-
Risk ratio 
                  
ln_ROL -0.165***   -0.136**   -0.131**   -0.504**   
  (0.0634) 
 
(0.0608) 
 
(0.0621) 
 
(0.199)   
Rate-on-line 
 
-0.0274** 
 
-0.0205* 
 
-0.0202 
 
-0.0840** 
    (0.0126)   (0.0122)   (0.0135)   (0.0339) 
FirstDayReturn 0.762 0.831 0.790 0.868 0.877 0.949* 1.834 2.043 
 
(0.496) (0.532) (0.539) (0.547) (0.556) (0.565) (1.339) (1.404) 
MarketRet 
  
0.385 0.401 0.441 0.454 
  
   
(0.321) (0.337) (0.346) (0.382) 
  RiskFree 
  
-0.264 -0.267 -0.247 -0.250 
  
   
(0.278) (0.282) (0.276) (0.281) 
  SMB 
  
-0.273 -0.259 -0.184 -0.175 
  
   
(0.233) (0.257) (0.268) (0.314) 
  HML 
  
1.482 0.532 2.006 1.058 
  
   
(10.07) (9.679) (10.21) (9.820) 
  lnMVE_IPO 0.0678 0.0662 0.0795 0.0781 
  
0.159 0.154 
 
(0.0515) (0.0538) (0.0487) (0.0495) 
  
(0.108) (0.109) 
         Constant -0.857 -0.909 -1.083 -1.121 0.402 0.345 -1.698 -1.856 
 
(1.113) (1.227) (1.003) (1.046) (0.287) (0.381) (2.237) (2.316) 
         Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 129 129 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The first stage regression 
(i.e., the decision to puchase insurance or not) is given by Model 2 in Table 4. In none of 
the regression models presented in this Table can we reject the hypothesis that the two 
equation are independent. 
 
 
Table 2-10B Two-step regression that measures the first year's stock return by controlling for the 
decision to reveal the D&O insurance premium and policy limit 
We evaluate the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' stock market return in the first 
year following the IPO controlling for the information imbedded in the purchase of insurance or 
not (model 2 in Table 4) and the decision to reveal the premium paid and the coverage chosen. 
The dependent variable is the return in excess of the market in Models 1 and 2, and the total 
return in Models 3 and 4. The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the 
premium-to-coverage ratio, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We hypothesize that these 
two measures should be negatively related to the first year return. 
FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. MarketRet, RiskFree, SMB and HML are the one year total 
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returns of the Canadian market portfolio, the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and 
growth portfolios respectively. IMR is the inverse-Mills ratio calculated from the insurance 
purchase decision regression of Model 2 in Table 4. 
 
 
(5A) (6A) (7A) (8A) 
VARIABLES 
First year 
excess return 
First year 
excess return 
First year total 
return 
First year total 
return 
          
ln_ROL -0.160**   -0.114*   
  (0.0636) 
 
(0.0584)   
Rate-on-line 
 
-0.0245** 
 
-0.0155* 
    (0.0108)   (0.00885) 
FirstDayReturn 0.534 0.608 0.562 0.635 
 
(0.579) (0.572) (0.597) (0.596) 
MarketRet 
  
0.240 0.242 
   
(0.321) (0.322) 
RiskFree 
  
-0.264 -0.260 
   
(0.252) (0.253) 
SMB 
  
-0.382* -0.365 
   
(0.230) (0.230) 
HML 
  
0.588 0.0708 
   
(9.638) (9.450) 
lnMVE_IPO 0.0481 0.0461 0.0586 0.0569 
 
(0.0640) (0.0643) (0.0557) (0.0563) 
IMR -0.245 -0.256 -0.0724 -0.0834 
 
(0.286) (0.299) (0.291) (0.299) 
     Constant -0.282 -0.346 -0.509 -0.554 
 
(1.438) (1.458) (1.183) (1.215) 
     Observations 126 126 122 122 
Coefficients are reported with their robust standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
first stage regression (i.e., the decision to reveal the D&O insurance premium and 
coverage is given by InsDetails= Growth + ROA + Blockholder + Debtratio + 
Float + Riskyindustry + us + Age + Big5. In none of the regression models 
presented in this Table can we reject the hypothesis that the two equations are 
independent. 
 
 
Table 2-11A Two-stage least square simultaneous regressions for the first year total return and 
risk  
We evaluate simultaneously the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' stock market 
return and risk in the first year following the IPO. The dependent variables are the first year total 
return and the first year idiosyncratic risk in Models 1 and 2, and volatility in Model 3 and 4. The 
two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, calculated as the premium-to-coverage ratio, and 
ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We hypothesize that both measures should be negatively 
related to the first year return and positively to the first year risk.  
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FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. MarketRet, RiskFree, SMB and HML are the one year total 
returns of the Canadian market portfolio, the risk free rate and the two Fama-French size and 
growth portfolios respectively. LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the 
time of the IPO (issue price multiplied by number of outstanding shares). IPOfeerat is the ratio of 
the IPO fees paid per million dollar of market value of equity. Float is computed as the ratio of 
the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. ITCE is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out 
in the US.  Independence is the proportion of board members that are classified as independent. 
Duality is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Growth is 
the market value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. 
DebtRatio is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of equity at the time of the IPO. 
Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the company operated in one of the 
industries classified as risky in Bajaj et al. (2000). Age is the number of years separating 
inception from the announcement of the IPO. Blockholder is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
shareholder holds 10% or more of the firm's stock. Big5 is a dummy variable equal to 1 when 
one of the top-5 Canadian Banks was the lead underwriter. Hard is a dummy variable equal to 
one in the years where the D&O insurance market is expensive. IME is the inverse-Mills ratio of 
the probit regression explaining the purchase of insurance (Model 2 of Table 4). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Two-stage least square Two-stage least square 
VARIABLES 
First year 
total return 
Idiosyncratic 
First year 
total return 
Idiosyncratic 
     ln_ROL -0.265** 0.00436     
  (0.115) (0.00268) 
  Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0372*** 0.000549* 
      (0.0136) (0.000312) 
FirstDayReturn 0.532 
 
0.791 
 
 
(0.744) 
 
(0.736) 
 MarketRet -0.198 
 
-0.253 
 
 
(0.428) 
 
(0.421) 
 RiskFree 7.455 
 
1.914 
 
 
(14.66) 
 
(14.80) 
 SMB -0.238 
 
-0.230 
 
 
(0.369) 
 
(0.362) 
 HML -0.541* 
 
-0.538* 
 
 
(0.280) 
 
(0.274) 
 lnMVE_IPO 0.0827 -0.00783*** 0.0754 -0.00759*** 
 
(0.0753) (0.00169) (0.0736) (0.00169) 
Growth 0.00912 0.00123 0.00760 0.00121 
 
(0.0315) (0.000753) (0.0309) (0.000744) 
RiskyIndustry -0.249 0.00350 -0.300 0.00420 
 
(0.190) (0.00393) (0.189) (0.00393) 
ROA 0.283 
 
0.305 
 
 
(0.481) 
 
(0.470) 
 IPOfeerat -1.140 -0.0579 -0.851 -0.0615 
 
(2.316) (0.0551) (2.248) (0.0544) 
Float 0.100 -0.0187** 0.0116 -0.0174* 
 
(0.397) (0.00905) (0.388) (0.00891) 
ITCE -0.303 -0.00380 -0.329 -0.00406 
 
(0.347) (0.00736) (0.341) (0.00731) 
US_sales -0.167 
 
-0.142 
 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.265) 
 Independence 0.0612 
 
0.0405 
 
 
(0.492) 
 
(0.479) 
 Duality -0.320 
 
-0.367* 
 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.212) 
 Blockholder 0.306* -0.00360 0.278 -0.00305 
 
(0.183) (0.00412) (0.178) (0.00409) 
Age 0.00349 -9.49e-05 0.00352 -8.94e-05 
 
(0.00306) (6.75e-05) (0.00300) (6.74e-05) 
Big5 -0.211 -0.00369 -0.230 -0.00382 
 
(0.171) (0.00404) (0.168) (0.00398) 
Hard 0.323 -0.0123** 0.292 -0.0119** 
 
(0.307) (0.00549) (0.302) (0.00543) 
IMR 0.162 -0.0105 0.226 -0.0105 
 
(0.622) (0.0106) (0.611) (0.0106) 
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     Constant -0.446 0.178*** -0.241 0.175*** 
 
(1.157) (0.0315) (1.149) (0.0313) 
     Observations 86 86 86 86 
R-squared 0.297 0.581 0.317 0.589 
 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Two-stage least square Two-stage least square 
VARIABLES 
First year 
total return 
Volatility 
First year 
total return 
Volatility 
     ln_ROL -0.265** 0.0786*     
  (0.115) (0.0456) 
 
  
Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0372*** 0.00948* 
      (0.0136) (0.00531) 
FirstDayReturn 0.532 
 
0.791 
 
 
(0.744) 
 
(0.736) 
 MarketRet -0.198 
 
-0.253 
 
 
(0.428) 
 
(0.421) 
 RiskFree 7.455 
 
1.914 
 
 
(14.66) 
 
(14.80) 
 SMB -0.238 
 
-0.230 
 
 
(0.369) 
 
(0.362) 
 HML -0.541* 
 
-0.538* 
 
 
(0.280) 
 
(0.274) 
 lnMVE_IPO 0.0827 -0.111*** 0.0754 -0.107*** 
 
(0.0753) (0.0287) (0.0736) (0.0287) 
Growth 0.00912 0.0189 0.00760 0.0183 
 
(0.0315) (0.0128) (0.0309) (0.0127) 
RiskyIndustry -0.249 0.0628 -0.300 0.0750 
 
(0.190) (0.0669) (0.189) (0.0669) 
ROA 0.283 
 
0.305 
 
 
(0.481) 
 
(0.470) 
 IPOfeerat -1.140 -0.764 -0.851 -0.840 
 
(2.316) (0.936) (2.248) (0.926) 
Float 0.100 -0.293* 0.0116 -0.268* 
 
(0.397) (0.154) (0.388) (0.152) 
ITCE -0.303 -0.0621 -0.329 -0.0676 
 
(0.347) (0.125) (0.341) (0.125) 
US_sales -0.167 
 
-0.142 
 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.265) 
 Independence 0.0612 
 
0.0405 
 
 
(0.492) 
 
(0.479) 
 Duality -0.320 
 
-0.367* 
 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.212) 
 Blockholder 0.306* -0.0657 0.278 -0.0557 
 
(0.183) (0.0700) (0.178) (0.0696) 
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Age 0.00349 -0.00144 0.00352 -0.00134 
 
(0.00306) (0.00115) (0.00300) (0.00115) 
Big5 -0.211 -0.0683 -0.230 -0.0722 
 
(0.171) (0.0687) (0.168) (0.0678) 
Hard 0.323 -0.210** 0.292 -0.202** 
 
(0.307) (0.0933) (0.302) (0.0924) 
IMR 0.162 -0.147 0.226 -0.147 
 
(0.622) (0.181) (0.611) (0.180) 
     
     Constant -0.529 0.178*** -0.333 0.175*** 
 
(1.034) (0.0294) (1.027) (0.0293) 
     Observations 86 86 86 86 
R-squared 0.294 0.581 0.314 0.589 
Coefficients are reported with their standard deviation in parentheses.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The first stage regression from which the inverse-Mills 
ratio is calculated is drawn from Model 2 in Table 4. In none of the 
regression models presented in this Table can we reject the hypothesis 
that the equations are independent. 
 
 
Table 2-11B Three-stage least square simultaneous regressions for the first year total return and 
risk  
We evaluate simultaneously the impact of price per unit of coverage on the firms' stock market 
return in the first year following the IPO. The dependent variables are the first year total return 
and the first year idiosyncratic risk. The two main variables of interest are Rate-on-line, 
calculated as the premium-to-coverage ratio, and ln_ROL, the log of the Rate-on-line. We 
hypothesize that both measures should be negatively related to the first year return and positively 
to idiosyncratic risk.  
FirstDayReturn is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on 
the close of the first trading day. Mkt1Year is the market return during the first year of the IPO. 
LnMVE_IPO is the log of the firm's market value of equity at the time of the IPO (issue price 
multiplied by number of outstanding shares). IPOfeerat is the ratio of the IPO fees paid per 
million dollar of market value of equity. Float is computed as the ratio of the number of shares 
issued over the total number of shares outstanding. ITCE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm is an income trust. US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US.  Independence 
is the proportion of board members that are classified as independent. Duality is equal to 1 if the 
CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Growth is the market value of equity 
plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. DebtRatio is the ratio of total 
liabilities to the market value of equity at the time of the IPO. Risky_Industry is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the company operated in one of the industries classified as risky in Bajaj 
et al. (2000). Age is the number of years separating inception from the announcement of the IPO. 
Blockholder is a dummy variable equal to one if a shareholder holds 10% or more of the firm's 
stock. Hard is a dummy variable equal to one in the years where the D&O insurance market is 
expensive. InvMills is the inverse Mills' ratio obtained from Specification 2 in the Probit 
regression table. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Three-stage least square Three-stage least square 
VARIABLES 
First year 
total 
return 
Idiosyncratic 
First year 
total return 
Idiosyncratic 
     ln_ROL -0.280*** 0.00436*     
  (0.0962) (0.00245) 
  Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0381*** 0.000549* 
      (0.0113) (0.000285) 
FirstDayReturn 0.505 
 
0.724 
 
 
(0.587) 
 
(0.583) 
 MarketRet -0.0971 
 
-0.147 
 
 
(0.337) 
 
(0.334) 
 RiskFree 3.631 
 
-0.767 
 
 
(11.56) 
 
(11.73) 
 SMB -0.398 
 
-0.384 
 
 
(0.291) 
 
(0.287) 
 HML -0.437** 
 
-0.438** 
 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.217) 
 lnMVE_IPO 0.0832 -0.00783*** 0.0739 -0.00759*** 
 
(0.0628) (0.00154) (0.0615) (0.00154) 
Growth 0.00734 0.00123* 0.00658 0.00121* 
 
(0.0265) (0.000688) (0.0260) (0.000679) 
RiskyIndustry -0.326** 0.00350 -0.374** 0.00420 
 
(0.157) (0.00359) (0.156) (0.00359) 
ROA -0.000589 
 
0.0326 
 
 
(0.380) 
 
(0.373) 
 IPOfeerat -1.126 -0.0579 -0.830 -0.0615 
 
(1.945) (0.0503) (1.889) (0.0496) 
Float 0.0921 -0.0187** 0.000393 -0.0174** 
 
(0.332) (0.00826) (0.325) (0.00814) 
ITCE -0.265 -0.00380 -0.285 -0.00406 
 
(0.288) (0.00671) (0.283) (0.00668) 
US_sales -0.159 
 
-0.137 
 
 
(0.213) 
 
(0.210) 
 Independence 0.167 
 
0.143 
 
 
(0.388) 
 
(0.380) 
 Duality -0.294* 
 
-0.334** 
 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.168) 
 Blockholder 0.339** -0.00360 0.306** -0.00305 
 
(0.153) (0.00376) (0.148) (0.00373) 
Age 0.00339 -9.49e-05 0.00334 -8.94e-05 
 
(0.00255) (6.17e-05) (0.00251) (6.15e-05) 
Big5 -0.214 -0.00369 -0.226 -0.00382 
 
(0.143) (0.00369) (0.141) (0.00363) 
Hard 0.248 -0.0123** 0.221 -0.0119** 
 
(0.251) (0.00501) (0.247) (0.00495) 
IMR 0.0507 -0.0105 0.110 -0.0105 
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(0.507) (0.00970) (0.500) (0.00966) 
     Constant -1.068 0.199*** -0.902 0.197*** 
 
(1.367) (0.0325) (1.348) (0.0325) 
     Observations 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.332 0.649 0.355 0.651 
 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Three-stage least 
square 
Three-stage least square 
VARIABLES 
First year 
total 
return 
Volatility 
First year 
total return 
Volatility 
     ln_ROL -0.274*** 0.0786*     
  (0.0964) (0.0416) 
 
  
Rate-on-line 
  
-0.0375*** 0.00948* 
      (0.0114) (0.00485) 
FirstDayReturn 0.442 
 
0.663 
 
 
(0.594) 
 
(0.590) 
 MarketRet -0.112 
 
-0.162 
 
 
(0.341) 
 
(0.338) 
 RiskFree 4.565 
 
0.103 
 
 
(11.70) 
 
(11.86) 
 SMB -0.398 
 
-0.384 
 
 
(0.294) 
 
(0.290) 
 HML -0.421* 
 
-0.425* 
 
 
(0.223) 
 
(0.219) 
 lnMVE_IPO 0.0801 -0.111*** 0.0713 -0.107*** 
 
(0.0629) (0.0262) (0.0617) (0.0262) 
Growth 0.00647 0.0189 0.00578 0.0183 
 
(0.0265) (0.0117) (0.0260) (0.0116) 
RiskyIndustry -0.313** 0.0628 -0.361** 0.0750 
 
(0.158) (0.0610) (0.157) (0.0610) 
ROA 0.0621 
 
0.0919 
 
 
(0.384) 
 
(0.377) 
 IPOfeerat -1.204 -0.764 -0.908 -0.840 
 
(1.948) (0.855) (1.891) (0.845) 
Float 0.0795 -0.293** -0.0103 -0.268* 
 
(0.333) (0.140) (0.325) (0.139) 
ITCE -0.259 -0.0621 -0.279 -0.0676 
 
(0.289) (0.114) (0.284) (0.114) 
US_sales -0.148 
 
-0.128 
 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.212) 
 Independence 0.170 
 
0.147 
 
 
(0.392) 
 
(0.384) 
 Duality -0.279 
 
-0.320* 
 
 
(0.171) 
 
(0.170) 
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Blockholder 0.331** -0.0657 0.300** -0.0557 
 
(0.153) (0.0639) (0.149) (0.0636) 
Age 0.00336 -0.00144 0.00333 -0.00134 
 
(0.00255) (0.00105) (0.00251) (0.00105) 
Big5 -0.214 -0.0683 -0.227 -0.0722 
 
(0.144) (0.0627) (0.141) (0.0619) 
Hard 0.263 -0.210** 0.236 -0.202** 
 
(0.253) (0.0851) (0.249) (0.0843) 
IMR 0.0556 -0.147 0.114 -0.147 
 
(0.510) (0.165) (0.503) (0.165) 
     Constant -1.047 2.908*** -0.886 2.879*** 
 
(1.371) (0.553) (1.351) (0.554) 
     Observations 78 78 78 78 
R-squared 0.332 0.619 0.356 0.620 
Coefficients are reported with their standard deviation in parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The first stage regression from which the inverse-Mills ratio 
is calculated is drawn from Model 2 in Table 4. In none of the regression 
models presented in this Table can we reject the hypothesis that the 
equations are independent. 
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Chapter 3. A Learning-Based Approach to Evaluating Boards of Directors 
 
 
Using predictions from a learning model, this paper exploits the cross-sectional variation in the 
learning-induced decline in stock return volatility over director tenure to infer the marginal value 
of different kinds of directors. This new framework confirms prior empirical findings and 
documents new results. For example, directors joining better compensated boards have higher 
marginal value while the marginal value of a director joining an entrenched board is muted. 
Furthermore, the estimates imply that governance related uncertainty associated with the arrival 
of a new director accounts for 7% of return volatility, shedding light on the extent to which 
governance matters. 
1. Introduction 
 
Boards of directors are critical pillars in corporate governance. They are legally 
responsible for governing the firm and protecting the interests of shareholders. Yet, inasmuch as 
corporate directors are not perfect agents, providers of capital may find it beneficial to assess 
them.. There has been a debate going back to Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) about 
whether boards of directors are monitors of, or are tools of management.44  How does one 
measure whether boards of directors make a difference in the fortunes of a typical corporation? If 
they do make a difference, how can we quantify the extent to which boards affect value?  Are 
there systematic patterns in effectiveness between certain kinds of boards?  
                                                 
44 Smith (1776) wrote: “The Directors of [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers of other people’s 
money rather than their own, it cannot be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance 
[as owners]… Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company.” ([1937] p.700). One hundred fifty-six year later, Berle and Means (1932) argued: 
“…control will tend to be in the hands of those who select the proxy committee and by whom, the election of 
directors for the ensuing period will be made.  Since the proxy committee is appointed by existing management, the 
latter can virtually dictate their successors.” (p. 87). 
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These questions have been front and center in the governance debate for over a decade 
and have been addressed to some extent. The literature however often yields conflicting evidence 
and it is difficult to draw conclusions due to methodological issues. 45  Understanding the 
importance of boards and what the constituents of a well performing board are is still an open 
question. 
This paper attempts to shed some light on this issue by proposing a novel approach based 
on a theoretical model of learning, which yields a general method to assess how the market 
reacts to the appointments of directors. The model relies on the idea that the arrival of new 
directors creates uncertainty and through their actions, newly appointed directors provide 
information to investors who update their assessment of their ability to contribute to the 
generation of cash flows. As investors become more acquainted with their new board, they 
update their assessment of the board’s quality to a lesser extent. The resolution of governance-
related uncertainty leads to a decline in stock return volatility.  
The formal model of this process is borrowed from Pan, Wang and Weisbach (2015) who 
study learning about management and derive their stylized model based on the work of Pastor 
and Veronesi (2003). The model as applied to boards yields intuitive testable predictions about 
the relationship between stock return volatility and director tenure which motivate the empirical 
analysis. First, if directors do not purely engage in window-dressing but do in fact affect firm 
value, investors should react to their appointment and stock return volatility should subsequently 
decline over their tenure. Furthermore, stock return volatility should decline faster at the 
beginning of their tenure when uncertainty is highest. Second, the model predicts that volatility 
should decline by different amounts for different kinds of directors. In other words, the 
                                                 
45 See Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010). 
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magnitude of the decline in volatility over a director’s tenure is related to her marginal return to 
ability. Support for these predictions is found in the data. 
The focus on the second moment of stock returns stems from the observation that 
whereas the first moment provides the market’s assessment of the anticipated effect of a director 
upon her arrival, this is a very uncertain valuation at time zero. To wit, having a low expected 
value does not necessarily imply that a particular director is irrelevant. Hence, the mean does not 
provide a complete picture of the extent to which directors matter. Studying the second moment 
of returns provides a new and complementary lens through which to examine the importance of 
boards. 
The increase in return volatility upon the arrival of directors is driven by the conjunction 
of two effects: that director ability is relevant and that it is uncertain. Importantly, how much 
uncertainty there is about a director decreases at a predetermined rate due to Bayes’ rule. This 
rate is faster for higher ex-ante levels of uncertainty. The model therefore provides a theoretical 
framework to assess which directors matter more: after controlling for the ex-ante uncertainty 
about the ability of a new director, the cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the learning-
induced decline in return volatility provides an estimate of the marginal return to ability of 
different kinds of directors. For example, the results suggest that if the current board is 
entrenched, investors expect an incoming director’s ability to sway the fortunes of the firm to be 
muted. 
In addition, the model is useful to quantify the fraction of return volatility imputable to 
the uncertainty about the firm's board and to compare it to the uncertainty about management. 
The empirical analysis uses a sample of 18,579 directors on the boards of 2,228 firms, 
taken from the intersection of S&P 1,500 firms in BoardEx, CRSP and Compustat during the 
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2000-2014 period. The estimates indicate that when a director joins a board, stock return 
volatility jumps by 13% on average and subsequently declines over the next few years. This 
implies that learning about directors lowers volatility, presumably by reducing governance-
related uncertainty. Interpreted in light of the learning model, the decline in return volatility over 
the course of director tenure provides empirical support for the assumption that investors expect 
board members to be relevant in their valuation of the firm.   
An important concern with this interpretation is the potential endogeneity of director 
appointments. To wit, firms could reshuffle their boards in times of crisis, when volatility tends 
to be especially high. In particular, we might expect periods of turmoil to be accompanied by a 
transition in leadership. Therefore, all estimates exclude directors appointed within a year around 
a CEO turnover. For this subsample of director appointments, which is the one used in the 
regressions, the median (mean) ratio of the average return volatility over the three month period 
prior to the arrival of a new director to the average return volatility over the two year period 
preceding the director appointment is 0.94 (1.00). This suggests that for this sample, return 
volatility does not appear to be especially high in the period leading to the appointment. 
To alleviate the endogeneity concern further, the documented patterns still hold when 
restricting the sample to exogenous director appointments. First, results hold for a sample of 
appointments specifically designed to satisfy the new board independence-listing requirement set 
by the stock exchanges in the early 2000s. Many firms had to initiate board changes to comply 
with these new requirements and these appointments are unlikely to coincide systematically with 
a time when the firm’s fundamental volatility is high. Second, results hold for directors 
appointed to replace a board member who either passed away or retired. A board member is 
defined as retiring if she is over 70 and/or was sitting on multiple boards and left all her boards 
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within two years. Restricting the sample to directors appointed to replace a director who passed 
away or who retired yields a sample of board turnovers that are likely exogenous to firm 
conditions.  
The concern of potentially endogenous turnover is most valid when the firm is going 
through turmoil. Therefore, a further restriction that is imposed is that these appointments occur 
when the firm has had good stock return performance and low return volatility over the past year. 
A similarity score is used to compare the individual profiles of the departing directors 
who left due to deaths or retirements to the profile of the directors replacing them. Requiring that 
the departing and incoming directors share a similar profile helps further ensure that the firm did 
not appoint a particular director due to a major shift in strategy46. 
 A series of additional tests are designed to rule out the possibility that the documented 
volatility patterns are a byproduct of potentially endogenous director appointments. These tests 
also help to disentangle the investor learning hypothesis put forth in this paper from potential 
alternative explanations.  
First, stock return volatility patterns for young boards are compared to those of mature 
boards. There is presumably more governance related uncertainty for younger boards than there 
is for more seasoned boards. If the decline in stock return volatility reflects the resolution of 
governance related uncertainty, we should observe a stronger decline for these younger boards. 
Consistent with this idea, stock return volatility declines sharply over the average board tenure 
for relatively young boards while it does not for mature boards (controlling for firm age and 
board size). In contrast, if the documented volatility patterns were due to the endogenous nature 
                                                 
46 Note that the firms’ exposure to systematic risk does not appear to change over the learning period: plots of the 
firms’ market, SMB and HML betas over director tenure do not show any specific pattern. 
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of director appointments there would be no reason to expect different patterns based on the 
average tenure of board members. 
A potential alternative explanation for the decline in return volatility rests on the 
assumption that directors come on the board having little idea how to do their job thus creating a 
lot of noise around their decisions. As directors get better at their job over time, they develop 
skills which allow them to produce better decisions in the interest of the firm, which may drive 
the decline in return volatility. The findings contrasting young and mature boards is difficult to 
reconcile with this director learning alternative hypothesis though. If anything, it should be easier 
for new directors to learn to do their job if the board is more mature and can more effectively 
coach a newly appointed director. The director learning alternative explanation is addressed 
directly in additional tests below. 
Second, if the documented volatility pattern reflects investors learning about incoming 
directors, we should observe an attenuated decline in volatility for directors who are well-known 
to market participants. The data shows that this is the case: the decline in return volatility is 
sharply muted for well-known directors. 
The alternative director learning explanation is grounded in the idea that as directors get 
better over time, they develop skills to produce better decisions in the interest of the company 
which reduces return volatility. This paper exploits the fact that some directors are better 
equipped than others to produce better decisions when joining new boards: directors with board 
experience in the same industry who have held multiple previous directorships will arguably be 
quicker to adjust to the production function of a particular firm, thereby predicting a smaller 
decline in return volatility over their tenure. The investor learning hypothesis predicts the 
opposite: directors with industry expertise who have a rich history of directorships should be a 
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wealth of resources for the board and therefore be more relevant for firm value. The data 
supports the investor learning hypothesis: controlling for how much the market knows about 
them, “professional” directors are associated with larger declines in stock return volatility over 
their tenure. 
Third, the analysis is run using all firm-months instead of using the first years of director 
tenure to test the volatility-tenure relationship. This exercise is designed to ensure that the results 
are not inflated by zooming in on a narrow window. The results indicate that volatility declines 
significantly over the first three years following the arrival of new directors, but does not outside 
this window. 
Finally, a matched sample confirms that the drop in volatility exceeds what is observed 
for firms that do not experience the arrival of a director. These findings are consistent with the 
notion that the spike and subsequent decline in stock return volatility following director 
appointments reflect the uncertainty about how much a new director will sway the fortunes of 
their firm. 
The model has implications about the fraction of overall volatility attributable to the 
uncertainty about the board. Borrowing the methodology developed in Pan et al. (2015), the 
estimates imply that the uncertainty about a new director’s ability accounts for about 7% of 
overall stock return volatility on average. These estimates indicate that the arrival of corporate 
directors generates substantial uncertainty.  
Next, the learning slope is computed for each director-firm pair, by estimating the 
average decline in volatility over the course of their tenure, over and above the variation in 
volatility predicted by firm level covariates and macroeconomic factors. Performance (as 
measured by the firm’s return on assets and abnormal stock returns three years post appointment) 
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clearly improves following the appointment of high learning slope directors, (i.e. directors with 
learning slopes in the top decile), while it tends to stagnate for directors with learning slopes in 
the bottom decile. The diverging performance paths for top and bottom learning slope deciles 
provides suggestive evidence that the decline in return volatility reflects not only the extent to 
which a director can make a difference but also the extent to which they participate in value 
creation. 
This learning-based framework can be used to revisit the literature on boards and test new 
hypotheses on the importance of different governance attributes. The last section of the paper 
studies how some director, board or firm characteristics affect the volatility-tenure relationship, 
thereby testing which governance characteristics are important and under which circumstances. 
 The results suggest that chairmen and chairs of the compensation and audit committees 
are expected to be more important contributors than the average director. This is not the case for 
any of the other committee chairs. These findings shed new light on the channels through which 
board members impact firm value. There is no evidence that independent directors have a 
stronger effect on average. However, consistent with evidence in Masulis et al. (2012) and 
Faleye et al. (2012), independent directors with industry expertise do. In addition, investors 
expect independent directors joining firms with high monitoring needs to make a difference.  
Female directors do not contribute to firm value as much as their male counterparts on 
average. There is however evidence that as in the case of independent directors, female directors 
make a difference when the firm’s monitoring needs are acute, which is consistent with evidence 
in Adams et al. (2009) and Adams et al. (2012). Busy directors, directors with more board 
experience and those with work experience in the industry have higher marginal value. 
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 Boards dominated by a powerful CEO (i.e. CEOs with at least five years of tenure who 
cumulate the titles of CEO, President and Chairman of the board) are de facto potentially more 
entrenched. The results based on the learning-induced changes in return volatility indicate that 
the ability to make a difference for entrenched boards is muted, consistent with Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen (2014), who find that co-opted boards are less effective monitors. Among other 
proxies, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2015) use the percentage of directors with long tenures as a 
proxy for groupthink. The authors find that groupthink is detrimental for firm value in dynamic 
industries. Consistent with their finding, groupthink mutes directors’ marginal value. This result 
supports growing voices in the market for the need of board refreshment.47 In addition, directors 
joining small boards are more important and boards with a high Board Pay Slice, i.e. boards that 
compensate their directors generously relative to their CEO, play a larger role.  
 Finally, the results indicate that directors matter more in small firms, in firms that have 
had poor performance and in firms that operate in more complex industries. This last finding 
corroborates the evidence in Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2015) who show that groupthink is 
particularly detrimental in dynamic industries.  
This paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence that providers of capital 
expect corporate directors to play a role in the fortunes of their firm. Not all directors are equal 
though and this paper proposes a new framework to estimate the importance of various 
governance attributes. In addition, the estimates allow for a direct comparison of the extent to 
which governance related uncertainty affects stock return volatility relative to management 
uncertainty. More broadly, this paper also relates to the literature on learning in financial market. 
 
                                                 
47 In a speech from April 2015, Patrick S. McGurn, executive vice president and special counsel at ISS stressed the 
importance of board refreshment in governance assessments. 
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2. Background and related literature 
 Part of the literature on boards of directors is summarized in Table 3-5. Early empirical 
work focused on how board characteristics affect firm profitability. One of the questions most 
often raised addresses the composition of the board and in particular whether more independent 
directors increases firm performance or value (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat and 
Black, 2000). Much of the literature on boards examines the relationship between board 
characteristics and board actions. For example, researchers extensively studied how the 
composition of the board or its size impacts CEO turnover (Weisbach, 1988; Yermack, 1996; 
Wu, 2000), takeover probabilities (Shivdasani, 1993), or CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999). 
More recently, the literature has evolved to focus on the role of director networks and ties 
(Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Kuhnen, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 2012). Empirical studies have also 
looked at the dynamics of board composition (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Baker and 
Gompers, 2000). Theoretical work includes Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) who use a model of 
bargaining power between the board and the CEO, in which the structure of the board and its 
actions are derived endogenously. Harris and Raviv (2008) present a model that determines the 
optimal control of corporate boards as a function of the importance of insiders’ and outsiders’ 
information and the extent of agency problems. 
 Given the potentially endogenous nature of board turnovers, researchers have looked at 
plausibly exogenous director appointments or departures (see among others Nguyen and Nielsen, 
2010, Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel, 2014 and Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). A substantial part of 
the literature, reviewed in Yermack (2006), studies abnormal returns around director 
appointments. Recent articles using this methodology include Adams et al. (2012) who examine 
market reactions to female directors’ appointments. They find that gender is value-relevant as on 
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average, the market reacts positively to the appointment of female directors, particularly for 
firms that need more monitoring. Masulis et al. (2012) show that appointments of independent 
directors with industry expertise are associated with a significant positive abnormal return, while 
appointments of independent director without industry expertise are not. Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) find that the market reacts positively to the departure of busy directors. 
 Richardson et al. (2003) use a sample of directors with multiple directorships and find 
evidence that supports the idea that directors are important in explaining firms' governance, 
financial, disclosure and strategic policy choices. Larcker et al. (2013) investigate the role of 
directors by studying the effects of social networks. They show that boards are important in 
shaping firm performance whereas Fernau (2013) finds that the variation in firm performance is 
partially attributable to director fixed effects. The study conducted by Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) provides an opportunity to understand the workings of boards and shows that 
they do play an active management role when necessary. 
In a recent paper, Denis, Denis and Walker (2015) build on the intuition in Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2014) and show that in addition to the monitoring and advising roles put forth in the 
literature, corporate boards also have an assessment responsibility: they have to learn about the 
quality of the CEO and his match with the firm. Using spinoff transactions to explore the 
formation of boards, the authors find that board composition depends on the need for CEO 
assessment. Their results provide empirical evidence that learning about managerial competence 
is an important determinant of the structure of corporate boards. 
 In this paper, the assessment is performed not by the board but by investors, who learn 
about new directors. Using a Bayesian learning model, this paper provides estimates of the value 
of directors and studies the value relevance of director attributes and board characteristics. The 
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theoretical framework derived in this paper draws on the work by Harris and Holmström (1982), 
Murphy (1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and Holmström (1999) in the context of learning 
about managerial ability. Using a sample of CEO turnovers, Pan et al. (2015) implement the 
logic set up by Pastor and Veronesi (2003) to study learning about CEO ability. These two 
papers together lay the groundwork for the examination of the dynamics of stock return volatility 
following a change in the composition of the board. 
 
3. A learning model of board quality: theoretical framework and empirical implementation 
3.1 Bayesian learning 
Appendix 3-B develops the theoretical framework of rational learning that motivates the 
empirical hypotheses in this paper. It is based on Pan et al. (2015) who study learning about 
management. It features market participants who update their beliefs about the ability of newly 
appointed directors. The model serves the purpose of characterizing the relationship between 
uncertainty surrounding the appointment of new directors and stock price volatility.  
 The model generates the following predictions: 
1) Volatility decreases in a convex manner over director tenure. 
2) Return volatility increases with uncertainty about ability. 
3) Return volatility increases with the marginal return to ability of directors.  
By testing these predictions, the goal of this article is to uncover what drives learning 
about director ability, thereby shedding light on the importance of corporate boards. 
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3.2 Empirical design 
3.2.1 Regression model 
 The predictions from the learning model are tested using regression models that estimate 
the relation between the tenure of a newly appointed director and stock return volatility. The 
regression model is characterized by the following equation:  
 
 (1) 
 
where  is a board fixed effect for board k of firm i, 
 is a function of director j's tenure, allowing for a decreasing and 
convex relationship between volatility and tenure as predicted by the model, 
   is a set of firm level control variables, 
   is the calendar-month fixed effect. 
The null hypothesis is that tenure and volatility are not related (H0:  is insignificant). 
The alternative hypothesis is that the governance-related component of stock return volatility 
decreases as the market learns about the ability of a director (H1:  is significantly negative).  
 Regressions include board fixed effects to account for unobservable board and director 
characteristics. For example, directors with higher ability may self-select to serve on larger firms 
and the dynamics of information sharing and groupthink may vary across different board 
compositions. Board fixed effects control for such time-invariant board and director 
characteristics. Regressions with board fixed effects thus estimate learning about director ability 
from the time-series variation in volatility within a particular composition of the board. In 
addition, all regressions include a month fixed effect to account for macroeconomic factors that 
affect the volatility of all firms. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
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3.2.2 Data sources and descriptive statistics 
  The sample consists of 2,228 firms from the intersection of S&P 1,500 firms in BoardEx, 
CRSP and Compustat from 2000 to 2014. It comprises 18,579 directors and 13,074 new director 
appointments. 
  The relationship between director tenure and stock return volatility is estimated in 
monthly regressions following director appointments using two measures of volatility. Realized 
volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns within a month. Idiosyncratic volatility is the 
standard deviation of the residuals of a Fama-French three-factor model as in Ang et al. (2006). 
Appendix 3-A reports the definition of all variables. 
  Table 3-1 presents summary statistics. Panel A reports director and board summary 
statistics at the firm-year level. The average board consists of 9.4 directors, 12% of whom are 
women. On average, 19% of board members have experience as CEO of a public company and 
10% have previously had a directorship in the same industry. The average director is 61 years 
old and has been a director for 6.5 years. There is a new director on average every two years. 
The average director stays for over eleven years. On average, 79% of board members are 
independent. A board is “entrenched” if the CEO combines the titles of Chairman and President 
and has been in office for at least five years. Using this definition, 35% of boards are considered 
entrenched. Coles et al. (2015) use the percentage of directors with tenure greater than nine 
years as a proxy for groupthink. In this sample, 43% of board members are prone to groupthink. 
On average, 15% of board members sit on three or more boards. Board Pay Slice is defined as 
  127 
the sum of independent directors’ compensation over CEO total compensation, and averages 
25%.48 
 Statistics for the two volatility measures and betas are reported at the firm-month level in 
Panel B of Table 3-1. Average monthly realized (idiosyncratic) volatility is 11.7% (8.6%). Firm 
level financial statistics are reported at the firm-year level in Panel C. 
 [Insert Table 3-1] 
 
4. Empirical relationship between volatility and director tenure 
4.1 Full sample  
 The model implies that as the market learns about directors, its update of its assessment 
of their quality is reduced, and hence stock return volatility declines. This decline occurs as 
governance-related uncertainty dissipates as investors become more acquainted with their board. 
Figure 3-1 graphs the relationship between monthly average idiosyncratic volatility and director 
tenure for three samples of newly appointed directors. Panel A shows the volatility pattern for all 
newly appointed directors. In Panel B, only directors appointed solo are included (i.e. no other 
director are appointed over the six months period around their appointment). In Panel C, there 
are no other director appointments at least two years before and two years after the new director 
joins. For the three samples, volatility sharply increases at time zero, i.e. the arrival of new 
directors. 
If directors are relevant for firm value, their arrival adds a random variable to the firm’s 
value and as investors discover what that random variable is, return volatility declines. The spike 
                                                 
48 This is consistent with figures for the average S&P500 firm which spent $2.2 million in 2012 in basic board 
compensation and $10.7 million on average to compensate its CEO. Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
05-30/board-director-pay-hits-record-251-000-for-250-hours.html 
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in volatility suggests that the arrival of a new director may be viewed as a positive shock to the 
uncertainty about future profitability. The higher uncertainty pushes up volatility through a 
mechanism described in Pastor and Veronesi (2003). The idea is that when there is a new 
director, the effect of any news is amplified as the market updates both the effect of the news and 
their assessment of the director’s quality, and consequently their expectation of future events and 
their effect on firm value. This upswing is followed by a decline in volatility, as the uncertainty 
progressively resolves and investors no longer update their valuation of the firm according to 
their assessment of the new director's ability.  
[Insert Figure 3-1] 
 Three functional forms of director tenure are specified to determine whether the empirical 
relation between volatility and director tenure is consistent with the theoretical framework: a 
quadratic regression model, a logarithmic specification and a reciprocal specification. The 
convexity of the volatility-tenure relationship can be verified with all three specifications. Two 
restrictions are imposed in all specifications:  appointments must not overlap with a CEO 
turnover within a year and directors must remain on the board for at least five years to ensure 
that the decline in volatility is not driven by the high volatility in firms with high director 
turnover. Panel A of Table 3-2 presents regression results for the three functional forms and for 
the two volatility measures. All new director appointments satisfying the above two restrictions 
are included. All regressions estimate the volatility-tenure relation over the first five years of 
tenure. In Panel B, the tenure variables are interacted with an indicator variable equal to one 
when directors are appointed solo, i.e. no other directors are appointed during the six months 
period around their appointment. In Panel C, the tenure variables are interacted with an indicator 
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variable equal to one when there is no other directors appointed during the two year period 
preceding the appointment as well as during the two year period following the appointment. 
 All regressions control for firm level factors that affect the firm’s return volatility. The 
coefficient estimates for the control variables are significant in the expected direction. In 
addition, when the dependent variable is realized volatility, the regressions include the market 
beta, SMB beta and HML beta to control for factors that affect the volatility in average dividend 
growth. 
 In Panel A, the estimated coefficients on Tenure are negative and statistically significant 
for both measures of volatility, regardless of the functional form used. The coefficients on 
Tenure2 are positive and statistically significant, which indicates that volatility declines at a 
faster rate at the beginning of director tenure. There is therefore a negative and convex 
relationship between stock return volatility and director tenure in the data, which is in line with 
the predictions of the learning model. 
[Insert Table 3-2, Panel A] 
  In Panel B, the estimated coefficients on Tenure are negative and almost always 
statistically significant. They are also larger in absolute value when compared to those in Panel A 
and the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are positive. This suggests that directors 
appointed solo are associated with a smaller decline in volatility over their tenure on average. 
This is not surprising and supports the view that more directors joining adds more uncertainty. 
However, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that even single appointments are meaningful. 
[Insert Table 3-2, Panel B] 
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 Similar results are shown in Panel C of Table 3-2, where the tenure variables are 
interacted with an indicator variable equal to one when there is no other directors appointed 
during the two year period preceding the appointment as well as during the two year period 
following the appointment. 
[Insert Table 3-2, Panel C] 
  The results in the three panels of Table 3-2 indicate that investors behave according to the 
predictions of the learning model when updating their assessment of a new director's ability. 
4.2 Samples of plausibly exogenous director appointments 
  A potential alternative interpretation for the results derived above is that firms may 
appoint new directors in times of crisis, when volatility is high. For example, poor firm 
performance may prompt the need to bring a fresh perspective on the board. In addition, board 
changes frequently occur concurrently with management turnover (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1988 and Denis and Sarin, 1999), which may also coincide with a period of high volatility. It is 
therefore important to identify changes in board composition that are unlikely to occur as a 
response to corporate turbulences to ensure that the patterns documented in the previous section 
hold for exogenous director appointments. 
  In the tests below, only director appointments occurring when the firm is performing well 
in a low volatility environment are included. Specifically, the firm’s stock return performance 
the year preceding the appointment must exceed that of the S&P 500 and its average monthly 
stock return volatility over the three months preceding the appointment must be inferior to its 
average monthly return volatility over the previous two years. Director appointments must not 
overlap with a CEO turnover within a year and directors must remain on the board for at least 
five years.  
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  The first subsample of exogenous director appointments is constructed by selecting 
appointments that were specifically designed to ensure that the board would satisfy the new 
board independence requirements. Governance reforms in the early 2000s led the NASDAQ and 
NYSE exchanges to impose stricter listing requirements regarding the independence of corporate 
boards. 
  The introduction of new exchange listing requirements has been used in the literature to 
study the effect of board structure on firm value (Wintocki, 2007; Duchin et al. 2010), CEO 
compensation (Chhaochharia et al. 2009), and firm transparency (Armstrong et al. 2014). 
  The sample of exogenous appointments is constructed by restricting appointments to 
those that resulted in the board complying with the new 50% independence requirement when it 
did not prior to that director's appointment. A director appointment therefore qualifies for this 
sample if the director joins the board between 2002 and 2005 and the firm previously did not 
comply with the 50% independence requirement.  
  The second exogenous sample consists of newly appointed directors who replace 
directors who passed away or who retired. To construct the retiree replacement sample, a new 
director is included if she joins the board within six months following the departure of a director 
who is older than 70. Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that director retirements are typically not 
related to firm conditions. This sample is augmented with directors who served simultaneously 
on multiple boards and left all of their boards within two years49. These directors arguably left 
the boardroom for reasons exogenous to the situation of one particular firm. Directors who 
retired due to health reasons before reaching the maximum age requirement would be included in 
this subsample. Director deaths are identified in BoardEx. 
                                                 
49 Not including these directors does not affect the results. 
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Panel A of Table 3-3 shows regression results for the various subsamples of exogenous 
director appointments. For brevity, only results with the quadratic functional form and 
idiosyncratic volatility are shown, but the results also hold for the logarithmic and reciprocal 
specifications and realized volatility. Specification 1 in Table 3-3 provides regression results for 
the two subsamples pooled together. Specification 2 uses only the exchange mandated 
appointments while Specification 3 uses only the replacement directors. The results are 
unaltered: volatility decreases over the tenure of newly appointed directors and does so at a 
decreasing rate. 
[Insert Table 3-3, Panel A] 
To confirm that the documented relation between director tenure and volatility is not 
affected by the endogeneity of director appointments, Specifications 3 to 6 use the full sample of 
director appointments and Tenure is interacted with an indicator variable for each exogenous 
appointment type. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant. This 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the volatility-tenure relationship between the 
full sample and the exogenous samples. The results in the previous section are therefore unlikely 
to be driven by the potential endogeneity of director appointments. 
Panel B of Table 3-3 reports regression results for the subsamples of exogenous director 
appointments when the departing and replacing directors have a high similarity score. Such a 
score is constructed by looking at six attributes: gender, generation, job expertise, level of board 
experience, previous directorship in the same industry and job experience in the same industry. 
Two directors are considered to have a similar profile if they share at least four attributes out of 
the six, which is the median score for all incoming-departing director pairs for death or 
retirement replacements when the firm operates in an environment of good stock return 
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performance and low return volatility. Appendix 3-C provides details on the construction of the 
similarity score. Panel B of Table 3-3 uses only exogenous appointments occurring when the 
firm is performing well, its stock return volatility is low, the appointment does not overlap with a 
CEO turnover and the departing and incoming directors have a very similar profile. The 
conclusion from this exercise remains the same: volatility declines over the tenure of newly 
appointed directors. 
 [Insert Table 3-3, Panel B] 
 
4.3  Additional tests 
 The evidence above is consistent with learning-induced declines in volatility and supports 
the hypothesis that directors make a difference in the fortunes of their firm. Importantly, this 
pattern does not appear to be the product of the potential endogeneity of director appointments. 
Follow-on tests provide additional evidence that investors learn about incoming directors. 
4.3.1 Young vs. seasoned boards 
If the decline in stock return volatility reflects the resolution of governance related 
uncertainty, we should observe a stronger decline for young boards than for seasoned boards. 
Consistent with this idea, stock return volatility declines sharply over the average board tenure 
for relatively young boards but does not decline for mature boards, even after controlling for firm 
age and board size. If the documented volatility patterns were due to the endogenous nature of 
director appointments or to directors learning about their job, rather than investors learning about 
directors, there would be no reason to expect different patterns based on the average tenure of 
board members. If anything, we should expect it to be easier for directors to learn to do their job 
if the board is more mature and can more effectively coach a newly appointed director. 
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Panel A of Table 3-4 shows the estimated coefficients for the volatility and average board 
tenure relationship for all boards in Specification 1, for young boards in Specification 2 and for 
seasoned boards in Specification 3. Boards are categorized into terciles based on the average 
tenure of their members. Young (seasoned) boards are defined as those whose members' average 
tenure is in the first (third) tercile. 
[Insert Table 3-4, Panel A] 
Figure 3-2 graphs firm volatility as a function of average director tenure for young and 
seasoned boards in Panels A and B, respectively. It shows a distinct decline in volatility as young 
boards become more mature. In contrast, there is no apparent relation between average board 
tenure and volatility for seasoned boards.  
[Insert Figure 3-2] 
4.3.2 All firm-months, ex-ante uncertainty and professional directors 
  Specification 1 in Panel B of Table 3-4 shows regression results using all firm-months as 
opposed to restricting the sample to the first years of director tenure. First 3 yrs is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the first three years of tenure and is interacted with Tenure. The purpose 
of this exercise is to broaden the analysis to ensure that the relation between return volatility and 
tenure is not inflated when the estimation is restricted to the first years of tenure.  
  The coefficients on the interaction term is negative and significant. Therefore, volatility 
declines significantly more over the first three years of tenure than over other periods. Note that 
the estimated coefficient on Tenure is insignificant, which indicates that volatility does not 
significantly decrease over tenure outside the first three year window.  
[Insert Table 3-4, Panel B] 
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  Learning by market participants should be more important when prior uncertainty about 
the new director is high. This is an intuitive prediction derived from the model. To test whether 
the decline in volatility is reduced when the new director is well-known, High uncertainty is an 
indicator variable equal to one for directors who do not have previous board experience and do 
not have experience as CEO. Low uncertainty is an indicator variable equal to one for directors 
who have experience as the CEO of a public firm and have served on at least four corporate 
boards prior to joining this one. 
  Because the ex-ante uncertainty of a director is constant, regressions using the level of 
ex-ante uncertainty include firm fixed effects rather than board fixed effects. Specifications 3 and 
4 in Panel B of Table 3-4 show that stock return volatility declines significantly more over 
director tenure for directors characterized by high ex-ante uncertainty. Although the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term does not satisfy traditional levels of significance, it is positive 
which shows that well-known directors are associated with smaller declines in return volatility 
over their tenure. Because low initial uncertainty corresponds to more visible directors, this 
exercise rules out the interpretation that larger declines in volatility reflect more visible directors. 
Specification 5 in Panel B of Table 3-4 reports regression results for “professional” 
directors. The director learning alternative explanation is grounded in the idea that directors 
come on the board having little idea how to do their job, thus creating a lot of noise around 
their decisions. Directors get better over time and develop skills to produce better decisions in 
the interest of the company. The analysis exploits the fact that some directors are better equipped 
than others to produce better decisions when joining new boards: directors with experience in the 
industry who have held previous directorships will arguably be quicker to adapt to the production 
function of a particular firm and should be associated with a smaller decline in return volatility 
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over their tenure. The investor learning hypothesis predicts the opposite: controlling for how 
much the market knows about these directors, directors with industry expertise with a history of 
directorships should be a wealth of resources for the board and should be more relevant for firm 
value. Controlling for the level of ex-ante uncertainty about the ability of directors (using 
director age, number of previous boards, number of previous jobs and whether the director has 
been a CEO of a public company), Specification 5 in Panel B of Table 3-4 supports the investors 
learning hypothesis: professional directors are associated with bigger declines in stock return 
volatility over their tenure. 
4.3.3 Matched sample 
 A matched sample test is performed to ascertain that the drop in volatility exceeds what 
would be observed in firms that do not experience the arrival of new directors. Firms are 
matched based on industry and size. Each firm belongs to one of ten industries based on the 
Fama-French ten-industry classification. Each firm in the treated group is assigned to a control 
firm, which is the closest in size (assets) and operates in the same industry. The control firm 
must not experience a director appointment at least one year prior and one year after the 
appointment of a director in the treated firm. 
 Regressions similar to those in Panel A of Table 3-2 are run for the matched sample. If 
the decline in volatility for the treated firms indeed reflects learning about incoming directors by 
market participants, we should not observe a systematic decline in volatility for the control firms. 
Results are reported in Panel C of Table 3-4. As expected, there is no decline in the stock return 
volatility of control firms following the appointment of directors on the board of treated firms. 
[Insert Table 3-4, Panel C] 
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4.4 The importance of directors 
4.4.1 How much do directors matter? 
 Pan et al. (2015) estimate that around a CEO turnover, the uncertainty about the new 
CEO accounts for about a quarter of overall stock return volatility. This section uses Pan et al.'s 
estimate as a benchmark. CEOs undoubtedly have more impact on firm value than directors. But 
how much more is an open question. How do investors perceive the importance of directors 
relative to that of the CEO?  
 This section directly relies on the methodology derived in Pan et al. (2015), which is 
summarized in Appendix 3-D. It uses estimates of the average decline in volatility over director 
tenure, the average volatility in corporate dividends (σ) and the average volatility at the time 
directors joins (Vol0). 
 The average estimated decline in volatility over the first three years of tenure is 1.5%, the 
average volatility of corporate dividends (σ) is 23% and the average realized annual volatility 
when a director joins (Vol0) is 38%. Therefore, on average the uncertainty about new directors 
accounts for about 7% (  of return volatility when 
there is a new director, which implies that on average, the governance related uncertainty 
associated with the arrival of a new director is about a third of the uncertainty associated with 
new leadership (Pan et al., 2015). The authors however do not account for learning about 
directors, which may potentially affect their estimates of learning about the CEO, in particular 
when new directors join the board around CEO turnover. 
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4.4.2 Importance of directors and value creation 
The results derived above are consistent with the predictions of the learning model and 
imply that directors are relevant for firm value. While the model is agnostic about the sign and 
cannot speak to whether a larger decline in volatility implies that the director will be a “better” 
director, this is potentially an interesting question in itself. How does the average performance of 
firms after the appointment of directors for whom we observed a large decline in volatility over 
their tenure compare to the performance of those that appointed directors associated with small 
decline in volatility? The learning slope is a metric for each incoming director measuring the 
average decline in volatility over the first years of her tenure.  
Pan et al. (2015) construct learning slopes for CEOs and although the intuition is similar 
here, the execution is different. Specifically, whereas Pan et al. regress return volatility on CEO 
tenure in individual regressions for the first 36 months in office and use the estimated coefficient 
on tenure as a measure of the learning slope, idiosyncratic volatility is regressed on tenure 
controlling for factors expected to affect the level of volatility: 
 
 
(2) 
 
With  the idiosyncratic volatility of firm i at time t, 
 the board fixed effect for board k of firm i, 
  a vector of firm level covariates: ln(assets), M/B, ROA, dividend payer, 
leverage, 
 the tenure of director j on the board of firm i at time t, 
 the calendar-month fixed effect. 
Residual volatility is then defined as : 
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(3) 
Residual volatility is then regressed on tenure in individual regressions for each director-
firm pair for the first three years of director tenure. This procedure produces estimates of the 
average decline in volatility over the tenure of the director, over and above the variation in 
volatility predicted by firm covariates and macroeconomic factors: 
 
 
(4) 
The coefficient estimates  are multiplied by (-1) for ease of interpretation and 
normalized by their cumulative distribution function to yield a ranking between 0 and 1. They 
are referred to as the learning slope for each director, for each board she joins. 
Figure 3-3 shows the performance paths as measured by return on assets for high learning 
slope vs. low learning slope directors. Performance clearly improves following the appointment 
of directors in the top learning slope decile, while it tends to deteriorate for directors in the 
bottom learning slope decile. 
[Insert Figure 3-3] 
Similarly, Figure 3-4 reports the performance paths for high and low learning slope 
directors as measured by the abnormal stock return performance relative to the firm’s industry 
over the three year period following their appointment. Again, directors with high learning slope 
are associated with improved performance. Taken together, these results provide suggestive 
evidence that high learning slope directors are not only more important, as the learning model 
suggests, but are actually better agents for shareholders.  
[Insert Figure 3-4] 
The results in this section indicate that governance-related uncertainty accounts for a 
substantial percentage of overall stock return volatility. Furthermore, there is suggestive 
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evidence supporting the idea that larger declines in volatility can not only be interpreted as 
directors making a bigger difference, but also that this difference has positive effects. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that directors matter and are not simple rubber stampers. These 
results have important implications for governance research inasmuch as they help us better 
understand the value of board members and provide an estimate of the overall importance of 
governance in corporations. 
 
5. The marginal return to ability of directors 
5.1 Prior empirical evidence on board and director characteristics 
 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Yermack (2006) and Adams et al. (2010) provide 
surveys of the literature on boards of directors. One of the most studied features related to board 
composition is the degree of board independence. Weisbach (1988) shows that CEO turnover is 
more sensitive to firm performance for more outsider-dominated boards. However, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2000) report no relation between the percentage of 
outside directors and firm value (as measured by Tobin’s Q) or accounting measures of 
performance. On the other hand, Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) find a positive association 
between the percentage of outside directors and announcement returns following the adoption of 
poison pills. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that outside directors act in the best 
interest of shareholders. Harris and Raviv (2008) propose a model in which insider-dominated 
boards may be optimal. Overall, the evidence in the literature on the value of independent 
directors is mixed. 
 Concerns about the size of corporate boards are described in Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
and in Jensen (1993). Yermack (1996) and Wu (2000) provide detailed evidence that smaller 
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boards are beneficial for firm value. These papers document that small boards are more likely to 
replace CEOs based on poor performance and that smaller boards are associated with increased 
CEO pay-for-performance. 
 A number of studies have examined the effect of CEO power on the ability of the board 
to perform its role. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that CEOs are likely to increase their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the board over the course of their tenure, as their perceived ability is 
higher given that they repeatedly passed the replacement option test. Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) find that powerful CEOs, as measured by the extent to which they are involved in the 
board nomination process, are able to select less independent boards. Baker and Gompers (2000) 
find similar results when CEO power is proxied by CEO tenure. Coles et al. (2014) show that co-
opted boards are less effective monitors, as evidenced by lower pay-for-performance and lower 
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. 
 The literature has also studied the effect of personal director attributes on either firm 
value or some measure of performance or board actions. In particular, a number of empirical 
studies examine the effect of director gender. The evidence on the value of female board 
members is mixed. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that women are better monitors, although 
increased monitoring comes at the cost of lower firm performance. On the other hand, using data 
on mandatory announcements of director appointments, Adams, Gray and Nowland (2012) find 
that investors value female directors more than their male counterparts and Schwartz-Ziv (2015) 
shows that gender-balanced boards are more active. In particular, she finds that a critical mass of 
at least three female directors on a board changes the board dynamics, especially in times when 
the CEO is being replaced. Using the 2003 law on female board representation in Norway, Ahern 
and Dittmar (2012) find that the quota was associated with deteriorating performance. 
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 Researchers have studied the effect of the number of current directorships and provided 
mixed evidence as to whether busy directors are beneficial or detrimental to firm value. On the 
one hand, additional board seats bring experience and business connections that are potentially 
useful resources to be passed on to the firm’s management. On the other hand, overly committed 
board members do not have time to be effective monitors or deeply understand the business. 
Their contribution is therefore potentially adversely affected. Ferris et al. (2003) report positive 
announcement returns to the appointments of busy directors. In contrast, Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) find that investors react positively to the departure of busy directors, thus suggesting that 
busyness is not a desirable director attribute. Core et al. (1999) show that busy outside directors 
are associated with increased CEO compensation. Recently, Field, Lowry and Mkrtchyan (2013) 
shed some light on the subject by providing evidence that the firm’s life cycle is an important 
factor to consider when examining the value effect of busy directors. The authors argue that 
while large established firms benefit relatively more from monitoring than advising services on 
the part of directors, young firms derive more value from their network and experience. In line 
with this argument, the authors show that busy directors are beneficial for younger firms because 
they rely more on advising than monitoring, and detrimental for large corporations because they 
require the opposite. 
This succinct review of the literature on board attributes highlights that the way the 
literature traditionally studies boards of directors is to select a board or director attribute, 
examine its effect on firm value or some measure of performance or board action and conclude 
that boards or directors with this attribute are better or worse than those without. In this paper, 
the analysis relies on the learning-based framework to revisit part of this literature and offers 
new results on the importance of some governance attributes. Specifically, this paper exploits the 
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cross-sectional variation of the learning-induced changes in return volatility following the arrival 
of new directors. The learning model implies that a higher marginal return to ability is associated 
with larger declines in stock return volatility. Therefore, examining the effect of firm, board and 
individual attributes on the volatility-tenure relationship is a convenient novel approach to 
studying the importance of directors. A summary of the findings is included in Table 3-5, 
alongside a comparison with the results previously derived in the literature. 
[Insert Table 3-5] 
5.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
 The learning framework proposed in this paper offers an alternative method to measure 
the expected contribution of different kinds of directors and boards. The model shows that the 
uncertainty about director ability decreases at a predetermined rate over time due to Bayes' rule, 
and that this rate is faster for higher ex-ante levels of uncertainty. Hence, after controlling for ex-
ante uncertainty, cross-sectional analysis of declines in return volatility provides estimates of 
directors' marginal return to ability. In other words, the magnitude of the decline in volatility 
over the tenure of a director reflects her marginal value. Panels A and B of Table 3-6 report 
regression results with interaction variables to document the effect of director attributes on the 
decline in volatility following director appointments. Controls for ex-ante uncertainty include 
director age, number of previous jobs, number of previous board seats and whether the director 
has experience as the CEO of a public company. Directors appointed within a year around a 
CEO turnover are excluded. The median (mean) ratio of the average return volatility over the 
three month period prior to the arrival of a new director to the average return volatility over the 
two year period preceding the director appointment is 0.94 (1.00). This sample of director 
appointments is thus unlikely to coincide with fundamental shifts in strategy. 
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5.2.1 Director characteristics  
5.2.1.1 Position on the board 
 In Specification 1 in Panel A, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is negative 
and significant. This suggests that investors expect chairmen to be important elements of the 
board and have more impact on firm value than the average director. Note that CEOs are not 
included in the sample and that directors appointed within a year of a CEO turnover are 
removed. This result is therefore not attributable to chairmen cumulating the CEO and chairman 
functions. 
[Insert Table 3-6, Panel A] 
 Specification 2 investigates the role of independent directors. The literature on director 
independence provides mixed evidence regarding the effect of independent directors on firm 
value. Researchers have therefore looked at alternative settings (Choi et al., 2007) and alternative 
definitions of independence (Fracassi and Tate, 2012). In this sample, independent directors (as 
traditionally defined in the literature) are not expected to matter more, as evidenced by the 
insignificant coefficient on the interaction term. However, Specification 3 provides evidence that 
independent directors with industry expertise do have a stronger effect on value, consistent with 
evidence in Masulis et al. (2012) and Faleye et al. (2012).  In addition, Specification 4 shows that 
when the firm has high monitoring needs, independent directors are expected to be more 
important. Firms with high monitoring needs are large firms with an entrenched board.  
 Specification 5 provides insights into which board committees are more important by 
looking at the volatility-tenure relationship for committee chairs. Chairs of the audit and 
compensation committees appear to be particularly relevant. 
5.2.1.2 Personal attributes 
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 Panel B of Table 3-6 reports the effect of personal attributes on the learning-induced 
decline in volatility. Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that female directors are better monitors. 
However, they find that the additional monitoring comes at the cost of lower firm performance, 
especially for well-governed firms which do not need extensive monitoring. The results from the 
learning-based approach suggest that for the average firm, female board members do not 
contribute to firm value as much as their male counterparts. However, similarly to the case of 
independent directors, female directors appear to be especially important when the firm has high 
monitoring needs, as evidenced by the negative and significant interaction term in Specification 
2. This result provides evidence that female directors are particularly valuable when the need for 
monitoring services is acute. 
[Insert Table 3-6, Panel B] 
The literature on busy directors provides mixed evidence (Fich et al., 2006 and Ferris et 
al., 2003). Using the learning-based approach, the results indicate that busy directors are on 
average more important contributors.  
Specifications 4 and 5 show that directors with previous board experience in the same 
industry and directors with work experience in the same industry have higher marginal value.  
5.2.2 Board characteristics  
 This section relies on the premise that different types of boards have varying marginal 
contributions to firm value. In other words, some firms may provide their directors with an 
environment conducive to leveraging their ability as board members, while others may impede 
directors to engage fully, play their role and make a difference. For example, investors may be 
skeptical when a new director joins an entrenched board as they might not expect him to be able 
monitor management effectively. CEOs who have been in place for multiple years gained more 
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bargaining power over their board (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), so that the balance of 
power rests in favor of the CEO. Fracassi and Tate (2012) consider CEOs who cumulate the 
titles chairman of the board and president to be powerful CEOs. The results indicate that 
investors in firms with captured boards, which are prone to more agency costs, expect their 
directors to face obstacles in their ability to sway the fortunes of the firm. 
[Insert Table 3-6, Panel C] 
 Coles et al. (2015) use the fraction of directors with long tenures as a proxy for 
groupthink, and find that groupthink has a negative effect on firm value for firms in dynamic 
industries. Consistent with their findings, this proxy for groupthink is associated with decreased 
marginal value. 
 Investors should expect directors in firms that provide generous compensation to its 
board members relative to its CEO to contribute more. To test this hypothesis, the variable Board 
Pay Slice is constructed by dividing the sum of independent director compensation by CEO total 
compensation. High BPS is an indicator variable equal to one for boards in the top BPS quartile. 
The negative significant coefficient on the interaction term suggests that directors joining better 
compensated boards are expected to have significantly more impact. Yermack (1996) and 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) show that smaller boards are associated with higher firm value. Large 
Board is an indicator variable equal to one for boards with more than ten members, which is the 
sample mean. The results based on the learning framework suggest that directors sitting on large 
boards are associated with lower marginal value. 
 These findings depict how board characteristics affect investors' expectations regarding 
the contribution of their directors. In particular, the results in this section highlight that market 
participants believe that corporate directors are more important when their boards are small, not 
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entrenched, not prone to groupthink and compensate their directors generously relative to the 
CEO. 
5.2.3  Firm level characteristics 
 Panel D of Table 3-6 reports the effect of firm level attributes. Large Firm is an indicator 
variable equal to one for firms with total assets in the top quartile. The positive coefficient on the 
interaction term in Specification 1 shows that directors are less relevant in large firms.  
[Insert Table 3-6, Panel D] 
 Directors arguably play a more central role for firms experiencing poor performance. 
Poor performance is an indicator variable equal to one for firms with a stock return performance 
inferior to that of the S&P500 over the one year period preceding the appointment. The estimates 
indicate that directors are more important for firms with weak performance.  
 The learning-induced decline in volatility varies with industry complexity. The 
technology (consumer durables) industry is arguably a relatively more (less) complex and human 
capital intensive industry which faces greater (fewer) sources of risk. Firms in the technology 
(consumer durables) industry exhibit larger (smaller) valuation updates upon the arrival of new 
directors, thereby suggesting that directors are especially (less) valuable for firms that operate in 
more (less) complex environments.  
Using the learning-based framework, this section revisited part of the literature on boards 
and confirmed prior findings. It shed new light on the importance of some governance attributes. 
The results are summarized in Table 3-5.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper is based on the idea that part of a firm's stock return volatility is related to the 
uncertainty about its governance. As governance-related uncertainty dissipates, the governance 
component of volatility declines. By relying on the theory to relate the decline in volatility to the 
marginal return to ability of directors, this article explores the importance of governance 
attributes. 
The estimates provide empirical support for the view that directors matter. Results 
suggest that governance related uncertainty accounts for about 7% of stock return volatility when 
a new director joins the board, which is a third of the estimate for new leadership estimated by 
Pan et al. (2015). The learning-based decline in volatility documented in this paper is shown not 
to be driven by endogeneous director appointments and is independent from learning about the 
CEO. Going beyond the overall decline in volatility to study whether directors make a difference, 
the learning-based approach can be used to estimate the importance of different kinds of 
directors and boards.  
Chairmen, chairs of the audit and compensation committees, busy directors, independent 
directors with industry expertise and those joining firms with high monitoring needs have higher 
marginal returns to ability. While female directors do not have as much impact as their male 
counterparts on average, the evidence suggests that they are particularly important when the 
firm's monitoring needs are acute.  
Large boards, entrenched boards and boards prone to groupthink impede their directors' 
ability to influence the firm’s actions, while directors joining better compensated boards are 
expected to be more important.  Directors are more important when their firms recently 
experienced poor performance, in small firms and firms that operate in more complex industries.  
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The findings in this paper help delineate the channels through which directors can make a 
difference. In addition, the findings highlight that the importance of various governance 
attributes is highly context-specific. Taking the heterogeneity in firms' governance optimization 
problem into account is a necessary step to expand our understanding of the role governance. 
The learning-based framework may provide a potentially fruitful approach to examine this issue.  
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Figure 3-1 Volatility and Director Tenure 
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Figure 3-2 Volatility and Average Board Tenure 
Boards are categorized into terciles based on the average tenure of their members 
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Figure 3-3 Learning Slopes and Firm Performance 
This figure shows the performance path for the directors with high learning slopes (highest 
deciles) and those with low learning slopes (smallest deciles) 
 
 
Figure 3-4 Learning Slopes and Stock Performance 
This graph shows for each month of tenure, the average forward looking one year stock return 
relative to the firm's industry. 
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Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics for board characteristics, volatility and beta variables as well as 
firm financial attributes. Board characteristics and financial attributes are at the firm-year level whereas 
market variables are at the firm-month level. The definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Panel A: Director and Board Characteristics 
  
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25% Median 75% 
              
Tenure 
    
24,870  6.45 3.50 3.96 6.07 8.46 
Time between appointments 
    
20,866  1.83 1.28 1.05 1.50 2.17 
Time stay on board 
    
24,870  11.26 4.44 8.26 10.87 13.91 
Female 
    
24,805  0.12 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.19 
Age 
    
21,928  61 6 58 62 65 
Independent 
    
24,870  0.79 0.19 0.71 0.84 0.93 
Board size 
    
24,870  9.38 2.62 7.50 9.00 11.00 
Nomination member 
    
23,678  0.42 0.32 0.00 0.43 0.61 
Compensation member 
    
23,678  0.52 0.26 0.38 0.50 0.67 
Audit member 
    
23,678  0.56 0.23 0.42 0.59 0.68 
Member all three committees 
    
23,678  0.12 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.14 
Network size 
    
24,847  850 528 476 753 1101 
Busy 
    
24,870  0.15 0.19 0.00 0.09 0.22 
Entrenched board 
    
19,474  0.35 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Board Pay Slice 
      
6,499  0.25 0.30 0.07 0.15 0.34 
Other public directorships, total 
    
24,870  3.19 1.52 2.02 3.00 4.04 
Other public directorships, current 
    
24,870  1.99 0.81 1.43 1.87 2.37 
Tenure superior 9 years (groupthink) 
    
24,870  0.43 0.30 0.20 0.43 0.62 
CEO experience 
    
24,870  0.19 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.31 
CFO experience     0.07 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.14 
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24,870  
Professional directors 
    
24,870  0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.18 
Previous directorship in same industry 
    
24,870  0.10 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.15 
              
 
 
Panel B: Market Variables 
  
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25% Median 75% 
              
Realized volatility 
  
290,015  11.43 8.06 6.41 9.30 13.84 
Idiosyncratic volatility 
  
290,015  8.44 6.42 4.51 6.74 10.31 
Market beta 
  
290,015  1.05 1.04 0.57 1.01 1.48 
SMB beta 
  
290,015  0.64 1.57 -0.18 0.51 1.34 
HML beta 
  
290,015  0.22 2.08 -0.70 0.19 1.13 
              
 
 
Panel C: Firm Level Variables 
  
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
25% Median 75% 
              
Firm age 
    
23,016  23.06 18.71 10.00 18.00 33.00 
G-index 
    
10,391  9.39 2.56 8.00 9.00 11.00 
Ln (assets) 
    
24,864  7.66 1.76 6.42 7.54 8.76 
Dividend payer 
    
24,334  0.54 0.50 0 1 1 
Leverage 
    
24,773  0.19 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.29 
M/B 
    
24,843  3.41 52.37 1.42 2.15 3.49 
ROA 
    
24,862  0.04 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.08 
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Table 3-2A Volatility and Director Tenure – Panel A 
This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation estimated with three 
functional forms for two measures of stock return volatility, realized volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. 
The first five years of director tenure are used in all specifications. The sample does not include CEOs 
and excludes all directors appointments overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All 
model specifications include board fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. The definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
  
(1) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(2) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(3) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(4) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(5) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(6) 
Realized 
Volatility 
              
Tenure -0.099*** -0.119**         
  (-2.622) (-2.503)         
Tenure2 0.018** 0.022**         
  (2.407) (2.289)         
Ln(1+tenure)     -0.045** -0.050**     
      (-2.546) (-2.337)     
-1/(1+tenure)         -0.135** -0.152** 
          (-2.501) (-2.341) 
Ln(assets) -0.940*** -1.064*** -0.942*** -1.067*** -0.942*** -1.066*** 
  (-5.814) (-5.232) (-5.821) (-5.242) (-5.820) (-5.241) 
Dividend Payer -1.154*** -1.314*** -1.152*** -1.313*** -1.153*** -1.313*** 
  (-4.040) (-3.937) (-4.032) (-3.928) (-4.034) (-3.930) 
Leverage 1.558*** 1.801*** 1.555*** 1.797*** 1.555*** 1.797*** 
  (3.751) (3.640) (3.734) (3.624) (3.738) (3.627) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (2.654) (2.593) (2.673) (2.616) (2.667) (2.610) 
ROA -1.343*** -1.481*** -1.342*** -1.480*** -1.343*** -1.481*** 
  (-4.077) (-3.866) (-4.066) (-3.855) (-4.071) (-3.860) 
Market Beta   0.964***   0.964***   0.964*** 
    (12.123)   (12.119)   (12.121) 
SMB Beta   0.418***   0.418***   0.418*** 
    (20.345)   (20.340)   (20.343) 
HML Beta   0.077***   0.077***   0.077*** 
    (2.896)   (2.897)   (2.897) 
Constant 17.108*** 18.981*** 17.197*** 19.093*** 17.015*** 18.887*** 
  (13.630) (12.178) (13.672) (12.227) (13.503) (12.084) 
              
Observations 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 
R-squared 0.285 0.555 0.285 0.555 0.285 0.555 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Month fix. effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
              
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Table 3-2B Volatility and Director Tenure – Panel B  
Panel B: Director appointments not accompanied by another appointment around arrival  
This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation estimated with three 
functional forms for two measures of stock return volatility. It documents the effect of director 
appointments not accompanied by another director appointment six month around the appointment. The 
first five years of director tenure are used in all specifications. The sample does not include CEOs and 
excludes all directors appointments overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model 
specifications include board fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. The definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
  
(1) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(2) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(3) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(4) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(5) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(6) 
Realized 
Volatility 
              
Tenure -0.114*** -0.128**         
  (-2.660) (-2.511)         
Tenure2 0.018** 0.022**         
  (2.435) (2.313)         
Single appointment -0.047 -0.032 -0.101 -0.104 0.099 0.106 
  (-0.820) (-0.434) (-1.250) (-1.066) (1.609) (1.439) 
Single 
appointment*Tenure 0.022 0.013         
  (0.939) (0.438)         
Ln(1+tenure)     -0.107* -0.109     
      (-1.815) (-1.559)     
Single appointment*Ln(1+tenure)   0.092 0.088     
      (1.307) (1.021)     
-1/(1+tenure)         -0.314** -0.361** 
          (-2.089) (-2.116) 
Single appointment*-1/(1+tenure)       0.267 0.311 
          (1.570) (1.569) 
Ln(assets) -0.940*** -1.064*** -0.943*** -1.067*** -0.942*** -1.067*** 
  (-5.814) (-5.231) (-5.823) (-5.243) (-5.826) (-5.244) 
Dividend Payer -1.153*** -1.314*** -1.152*** -1.312*** -1.154*** -1.314*** 
  (-4.035) (-3.933) (-4.030) (-3.926) (-4.037) (-3.933) 
Leverage 1.558*** 1.801*** 1.556*** 1.797*** 1.556*** 1.798*** 
  (3.749) (3.639) (3.733) (3.624) (3.739) (3.628) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (2.662) (2.597) (2.691) (2.630) (2.694) (2.636) 
ROA -1.342*** -1.481*** -1.342*** -1.480*** -1.343*** -1.482*** 
  (-4.078) (-3.867) (-4.071) (-3.859) (-4.081) (-3.870) 
Market Beta   0.964***   0.964***   0.964*** 
    (12.123)   (12.120)   (12.124) 
SMB Beta   0.418***   0.418***   0.418*** 
    (20.345)   (20.343)   (20.349) 
HML Beta   0.077***   0.077***   0.077*** 
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    (2.897)   (2.897)   (2.897) 
Constant 17.134*** 18.999*** 17.269*** 19.165*** 16.974*** 18.842*** 
  (13.681) (12.219) (13.759) (12.312) (13.445) (12.022) 
              
Observations 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 
R-squared 0.285 0.555 0.285 0.555 0.285 0.555 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fix. 
effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
              
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 
 
Table 3-2C Volatility and Director Tenure – Panel C  
Panel C: Director Appointments, no other appointments over two year period 
This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation estimated with three 
functional forms for two measures of stock return volatility. It documents the effect of directors 
appointments not accompanied by another director appointment over the one year period prior to and the 
one year period following the appointment. The first five years of director tenure are used in all 
specifications. The sample does not include CEOs and excludes all directors’ appointments overlapping 
with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include board fixed effects as well 
as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of all variables is in 
Appendix 3-A. 
 
 
  
(1) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(2) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(3) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(4) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(5) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(6) 
Realized 
Volatility 
              
Tenure -0.098** -0.114**         
  (-2.465) (-2.365)         
Tenure2 0.018** 0.022**         
  (2.404) (2.286)         
Single appointment2yrs -0.007 0.006 -0.048 -0.054 0.042 0.052 
  (-0.131) (0.094) (-0.659) (-0.598) (0.751) (0.743) 
Single 
appointment2yrs*Tenure -0.001 -0.009         
  (-0.030) (-0.309)         
Ln(1+tenure)     -0.06 -0.064     
      (-1.437) (-1.271)     
Single appointment2yrs*Ln(1+tenure)   0.031 0.028     
      (0.477) (0.350)     
-1/(1+tenure)         -0.211** -0.255** 
          (-1.987) (-2.069) 
Single appointment2yrs*-1/(1+tenure)       0.157 0.213 
          (1.060) (1.181) 
Ln(assets) -0.940*** -1.064*** -0.943*** -1.067*** -0.943*** -1.068*** 
  (-5.819) (-5.235) (-5.826) (-5.247) (-5.827) (-5.248) 
Dividend Payer -1.154*** -1.314*** -1.153*** -1.313*** -1.154*** -1.314*** 
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  (-4.040) (-3.938) (-4.033) (-3.930) (-4.038) (-3.935) 
Leverage 1.558*** 1.801*** 1.555*** 1.797*** 1.556*** 1.799*** 
  (3.751) (3.641) (3.735) (3.626) (3.740) (3.631) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (2.653) (2.591) (2.679) (2.621) (2.684) (2.630) 
ROA -1.343*** -1.482*** -1.342*** -1.480*** -1.342*** -1.481*** 
  (-4.078) (-3.867) (-4.067) (-3.856) (-4.074) (-3.864) 
Market Beta   0.964***   0.964***   0.964*** 
    (12.123)   (12.120)   (12.123) 
SMB Beta   0.418***   0.418***   0.418*** 
    (20.345)   (20.342)   (20.346) 
HML Beta   0.077***   0.077***   0.077*** 
    (2.896)   (2.897)   (2.897) 
Constant 17.109*** 18.971*** 17.227*** 19.124*** 17.032*** 18.910*** 
  (13.683) (12.223) (13.753) (12.312) (13.519) (12.104) 
              
Observations 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 428,746 
R-squared 0.285 0.555 0.285 0.555 0.285 0.555 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed 
effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
              
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1             
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Table 3-3A Exogenous Director Appointments – Panel A  
Panel A: Exogenous appointments, good performance, low volatility 
This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation using samples of exogenous 
director appointments. The first five years of director tenure are used in all specifications. In all 
regressions, only director appointments occurring when the firm is performing well in a low volatility 
environment are included. Specifically, the firm’s stock return performance the year preceding the 
appointment must exceed that of the S&P 500 and its average monthly stock return volatility over the six 
months preceding the appointment must be inferior to its average monthly return volatility over the 
previous two years. Specification 1 restricts the sample to directors appointed to meet the new exchange 
independence requirement as well as directors appointed to replace directors who either retired or passed 
away. Specification 2 includes only exchange mandated directors and Specification 3 only replacement 
directors. In Specifications 4, 5 and 6, the full sample is used in the regression and indicator variables 
corresponding to the type of appointment are used. CEOs are excluded and the samples also exclude all 
directors appointments overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications 
include board fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent var.: Idio. Vol. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Tenure -0.550** -0.650** -0.196 -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.099*** 
  (-2.131) (-2.194) (-0.253) (-2.676) (-2.670) (-2.633) 
Pooled exogenous       -0.100     
        (-1.495)     
Pooled exogenous*Tenure       0.022     
        (0.734)     
Exchange mandated         -0.090   
          (-1.263)   
Exchange mandated*Tenure         0.017   
          (0.538)   
Retirement/death 
replacement           -0.261 
            (-1.556) 
Retirement/death replacement*Tenure         0.087 
            (0.941) 
Tenure2 0.070* 0.072 0.075 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 
  (1.722) (1.556) (0.609) (2.431) (2.431) (2.407) 
Ln(assets) -1.065** -0.880** -4.568** -0.940*** -0.940*** -0.940*** 
  (-2.387) (-2.072) (-2.497) (-5.813) (-5.813) (-5.812) 
Dividend Payer -1.324** -1.603** -0.732 -1.154*** -1.154*** -1.155*** 
  (-2.343) (-2.562) (-1.081) (-4.040) (-4.039) (-4.043) 
Leverage 1.715 0.774 6.015* 1.557*** 1.557*** 1.558*** 
  (1.303) (0.536) (1.981) (3.747) (3.748) (3.752) 
MB -0.007 -0.006 -0.082 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (-1.565) (-1.311) (-1.341) (2.651) (2.651) (2.653) 
ROA 0.378 -1.054 6.221*** -1.342*** -1.342*** -1.343*** 
  (0.315) (-0.855) -4.774 (-4.076) (-4.076) (-4.078) 
Constant 16.884*** 15.945*** 50.645*** 17.111*** 17.112*** 17.104*** 
  (4.384) (4.551) (3.687) (13.633) (13.635) (13.627) 
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Observations 18,035 15,965 2,415 428,746 428,746 428,746 
R-squared 0.322 0.31 0.436 0.285 0.285 0.285 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
              
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1             
 
Table 3-3B Exogenous Director Appointments – Panel B  
 
Panel B: This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation using a sample of 
exogenous director appointments. The first five years of director tenure are used in all specifications. In 
all regressions, only director appointments occurring when the firm is performing well in a low volatility 
environment are included. Specifically, the firm’s stock return performance the year preceding the 
appointment must exceed that of the S&P 500 and its average monthly stock return volatility over the six 
months preceding the appointment must be inferior to its average monthly return volatility over the 
previous two years. In addition, the departing director and replacement director must share a very similar 
profile, i.e. a SimScore ≥ 4. Specification 1 restricts the sample to directors appointed to meet the new 
exchange independence requirement as well as directors appointed to replace directors who either retired 
or passed away. Specification 2 includes only exchange mandated directors and Specification 3 only 
replacement directors. CEOs are excluded and the samples also exclude all directors appointments 
overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include board fixed 
effects as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of all 
variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent var. Idio. Vol. (1) (2) (3) 
        
Tenure -0.571**     
  (-2.078)     
Tenure2 0.078     
  (1.626)     
Ln(1+tenure)   -0.803**   
    (-2.112)   
-1/(1+tenure)     -1.137* 
      (-1.865) 
Ln(assets) -0.962* -0.978* -0.977* 
  (-1.722) (-1.733) (-1.732) 
Dividend Payer -1.280 -1.295 -1.298 
  (-1.468) (-1.488) (-1.489) 
Leverage 0.495 0.505 0.491 
  (0.284) (0.289) (0.280) 
MB -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
  (-2.981) (-3.023) (-3.021) 
  161 
ROA 0.84 0.806 0.782 
  (0.745) (0.709) (0.686) 
Constant 15.474*** 15.518*** 14.554*** 
  (3.453) (3.432) (3.154) 
        
Observations 10,964 10,964 10,964 
R-squared 0.305 0.305 0.305 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed 
effect yes yes yes 
        
Robust t-statistics in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 3-4A Additional Tests – Panel A  
Panel A: This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation using the average 
board tenure for all board in Specification 1, for young boards (average board tenure, tercile 1) in 
Specification 2 and seasoned boards (average board tenure, tercile 3) in Specification 3. CEOs are 
excluded and the samples also exclude all directors appointments overlapping with a CEO turnover over a 
one year period. All model specifications include board fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent var. Idio. Vol. (1) (2) (3) 
        
Average board tenure -0.127*** -0.326* -0.004 
  (-4.563) (-1.814) (-0.050) 
Average board tenure2 0.005*** 0.072** -0.001 
  (3.443) (2.497) (-0.280) 
Board size -0.109*** -0.038 -0.044 
  (-5.190) (-1.110) (-1.021) 
Firm age 0.823*** 1.438*** -0.072 
  (26.278) (9.775) (-1.228) 
Ln(assets) -1.082*** -0.847*** -0.563* 
  (-10.604) (-3.979) (-1.941) 
Dividend Payer -1.508*** -0.898*** -1.009*** 
  (-11.742) (-3.098) (-3.281) 
Leverage 1.594*** 1.579*** 1.429* 
  (4.598) (2.672) (1.663) 
MB 0.000** 0.001 0.001*** 
  (2.236) (1.012) (6.951) 
ROA -3.675*** -1.260*** -2.191*** 
  (-8.784) (-3.616) (-2.644) 
Constant 6.221*** 12.118*** 14.332*** 
  (6.660) (4.732) (6.949) 
        
Observations 1,656,575 419,320 409,427 
R-squared 0.343 0.213 0.249 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes 
        
Robust t-statistics in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 3-4B Additional Tests – Panel B  
Panel B: All firm-months, first 3 years, ex-ante uncertainty and professional directors. 
This table reports regression results for the volatility-director tenure relation using all firm-
months in Specification 1 and using an indicator variable for the first three years of tenure. The 
first five years of tenure are used in Specifications 2 through 5.CEOs are excluded and the 
samples also exclude all directors appointments overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one 
year period. All model specifications include board fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent var.: Idio. Vol. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Tenure 0.001 -0.174*** -0.147*** -0.149*** -0.108** 
  (0.326) (-3.984) (-3.170) (-3.208) (-2.158) 
First3 0.087**         
  (2.315)         
First3*Tenure -0.036**         
  (-2.094)         
Low uncertainty   -0.13   -0.063   
    (-0.621)   (-0.298)   
Low uncertainty*Tenure   0.096   0.072   
    (1.518)   (1.134)   
High uncertainty     0.117* 0.114*   
      (1.701) (1.651)   
High uncertainty*Tenure     -0.041* -0.039*   
      (-1.771) (-1.646)   
Pro director         0.171 
          (1.174) 
Pro director*Tenure         -0.094** 
          (-1.983) 
Tenure2 0.000 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 
  (0.364) (4.190) (4.161) (4.162) (3.225) 
Ln(assets) -0.844*** -1.035*** -1.031*** -1.031*** -0.733*** 
  (-6.387) (-8.264) (-8.234) (-8.240) (-4.983) 
Dividend Payer -0.895*** -1.499*** -1.500*** -1.502*** -1.211*** 
  (-4.991) (-8.190) (-8.202) (-8.207) (-7.020) 
Leverage 1.196*** 1.726*** 1.721*** 1.722*** 1.303** 
  (3.823) (4.057) (4.037) (4.044) (2.443) 
MB 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 
  (6.636) (2.242) (2.276) (2.272) (3.159) 
ROA -1.790*** -2.688*** -2.689*** -2.689*** -3.461*** 
  (-6.253) (-5.170) (-5.172) (-5.174) (-6.602) 
Director age         0.003 
          (0.897) 
Number previous jobs         -0.050** 
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          (-2.286) 
Number previous boards         -0.001 
          (-0.153) 
Experience CEO public company       0.077 
          (1.045) 
Constant 17.895*** 18.787*** 18.750*** 18.749*** 16.204*** 
  (11.888) (20.160) (20.137) (20.135) (13.798) 
            
Observations 1,388,539 419,220 419,220 419,220 235,380 
R-squared 0.262 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.36 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Robust t-statistics in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1           
 
 
Table 3-4C Additional Tests – Panel C  
Panel C: Matched Sample 
This table reports regression results from estimating the volatility-director tenure relation for a 
matched sample. Specifications replicate those of Panel A of Table 3-2 but for a matched 
sample.  Each firm for each of the three original samples is matched to the firm closest in size, 
based on total assets, that belongs to the same industry. Industries are based on the Fama-French 
10 industry classification. Control firms must not experience a director appointment at least one 
year before and one year after the appointment of a director in the sample firm. In these 
regressions, all variables are control firm variables, except for the tenure variables, which track 
the tenure of the new director in the sample firm. The first five years of director tenure are used 
in all specifications. The sample does not include CEOs and excludes all directors appointments 
overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include board 
fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The 
definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
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(1) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(2) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(3) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(4) 
Realized 
Volatility 
(5) 
Idiosyncratic  
Volatility 
(6) 
Realized 
Volatility 
              
Tenure -0.007 -0.013         
  (-0.158) (-0.236)         
Tenure2 0.005 0.004         
  (0.614) (0.422)         
Ln(1+tenure)     0.049 0.024     
      (1.089) (0.444)     
-1/(1+tenure)         0.086 0.036 
          (0.864) (0.301) 
Ln(assets) -0.840*** -0.783*** -0.840*** -0.783*** -0.840*** -0.783*** 
  (-7.251) (-5.676) (-7.251) (-5.676) (-7.255) (-5.678) 
Dividend Payer -1.783*** -1.813*** -1.783*** -1.813*** -1.783*** -1.813*** 
  (-11.035) (-9.863) (-11.031) (-9.861) (-11.028) (-9.860) 
Leverage 1.060*** 1.073*** 1.059*** 1.073*** 1.059*** 1.072*** 
  (2.970) (2.773) (2.967) (2.771) (2.966) (2.771) 
MB 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.793) (1.071) (0.802) (1.075) (0.804) (1.076) 
ROA -2.988*** -3.264*** -2.990*** -3.266*** -2.992*** -3.267*** 
  (-7.755) (-7.156) (-7.761) (-7.160) (-7.766) (-7.163) 
Market Beta   1.118***   1.118***   1.118*** 
    (24.236)   (24.236)   (24.234) 
SMB Beta   0.461***   0.461***   0.461*** 
    (20.773)   (20.773)   (20.773) 
HML Beta   0.110***   0.110***   0.110*** 
    (5.681)   (5.679)   (5.679) 
Constant 16.868*** 18.216*** 16.911*** 18.247*** 16.982*** 18.270*** 
  (17.646) (15.747) (17.706) (15.819) (17.377) (15.468) 
              
Observations 386,981 386,981 386,981 386,981 386,981 386,981 
R-squared 0.283 0.539 0.283 0.539 0.283 0.539 
Board fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fix. 
Eff. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
              
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Table 3-5 Summary of Previous Empirical Evidence and Evidence from the Learning-based 
Methodology 
    
Study 
  
Finding 
  
Evidence from 
Learning-based 
Approach 
Position on the Board         
              
Chairman   
Nguyen and Nielsen 
(2010) 
  
Larger stock price reaction to death of 
chairman 
  
Chairman has 
higher marginal 
value 
Audit 
member 
  
Nguyen and Nielsen 
(2010) 
  
Larger stock price reaction to death of 
audit committee member 
  
Chair of audit 
committee has 
higher marginal 
value 
Compensat. 
member 
  N/A   N/A   
Chair of 
compensation 
committee has 
higher marginal 
value 
Nominating 
member 
  
Nguyen and Nielsen 
(2010) 
  
Larger stock price reaction to death of 
nominating committee member 
  
No significant 
effect 
Independent 
directors 
  
Bhagat and Black 
(2000); 
Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) 
  
No relation between % outside 
directors and Tobin's Q/accounting 
measures 
  
Independent 
directors with 
industry expertise 
and independent 
directors joining 
firms with high 
monitoring needs 
have higher 
marginal value 
  
Duchin, Matsesaka, 
Ozbas (2010) 
  
Independent directors improve 
performance when their information 
cost is low 
  
  Weisbach (1988)   
Boards dominated by outside 
directors more likely to replace CEO 
in bad times 
  
  
Masulis, Ruzzier, Xiao 
and Zhao (2012) 
  
Positive correlation between the 
presence of independent directors 
with industry expertise and firm 
performance 
  
  
Gillan, Hartzell and 
Starks (2011) 
  
Powerful boards are substitute for the 
market of corporate control 
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Director Characteristics         
              
Gender 
  
Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) 
  
Female directors are better 
monitors, but at the cost of lower 
firm performance   
Female directors 
have lower 
marginal value 
on average. 
However, when 
the need for 
monitoring 
services is acute, 
female directors 
have higher 
marginal value 
  
Matsa and Miller 
(2012); 
Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) 
  
Female directors are associated with 
decreased firm value and 
profitability 
  
Busyness 
  
Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) 
  
Busy directors are associated with 
lower firm value 
  
Busy directors 
have higher 
marginal value 
  
Core, Holthausen and 
Larcker (1999) 
  
Busy outside directors are 
associated with increased CEO 
compensation 
  
  
Ferris, Jagannathan 
and Pritchard (2003) 
  
Positive announcement returns to 
appointments of busy directors 
  
  
Falato, Kadyrzhanova 
and Lel (2014) 
  
Busy directors are detrimental to 
board monitoring quality and 
shareholder value 
  
  
Field, Lowry and 
Mkrtchyan (2013) 
  
Busy directors are beneficial for 
small young firms but detrimental 
for large firms 
  
 
 
Board Level Characteristics         
              
Entrenched 
boards 
and powerful 
CEOs 
  
Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) 
  
Model predicts increased CEO 
bargaining power vis-a-vis the board 
over CEO tenure 
  
Boards with 
powerful CEOs 
have lower 
marginal value 
  
Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) 
  
More powerful CEOs are able to 
select a less independent board 
  
  
Fracassi and Tate 
(2012) 
  
Powerful CEOs appoint directors with 
ties to the CEO resulting in weaker 
monitoring 
  
Groupthink   
Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2015) 
  
Groupthink has a negative effect on 
firm value for firms in dynamic 
industries 
  
Directors joining 
boards prone to 
groupthink (with 
a high percentage 
of directors with 
long tenure) have 
lower marginal 
value 
  168 
Board size   
Yermack (1996); 
Eisenberg, Sundgren 
and Wells (1998) 
  
Inverse association between board 
size and Tobin's Q 
  
Smaller boards 
have higher 
marginal value 
Board Pay Slice N/A   N/A   
Better 
compensated 
boards have 
higher marginal 
value 
Firm Level Characteristics         
              
Firm size   N/A   N/A   
Directors have 
higher marginal 
value in small 
firms 
Prior 
performance 
  Mace (1971)   
Interview evidence that boards' 
activiness is limited to crisis situations 
  Directors have 
higher marginal 
value when the 
firm has recently 
performed poorly 
  
Larcker, So and 
Wang (2013) 
  
Board network resources are most 
valuable for firm with poor 
performance 
  
Industry   
Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2015) 
  
Groupthink is more detrimental for 
firms in more dynamic industries 
  
Directors have 
higher marginal 
value in complex 
and human 
capital intensive 
industries 
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Table 3-6A Cross-sectional Tests – Panel A 
Panel A: Position on the board 
This table reports regression results using interaction variables to identify director attributes that 
affect the volatility-director tenure relation. Individual terms for committee chairs, control 
variables, including controls for the ex-ante level of uncertainty are included but not reported for 
brevity. CEOs are excluded and the samples also exclude all directors appointments overlapping 
with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include firm fixed effects 
as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of 
all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic volatility (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Tenure -0.058 -0.082* -0.104* -0.137** -0.06 
  (-1.537) (-1.658) (-1.725) (-2.071) (-1.473) 
Tenure2 0.009 0.009 0.019** 0.002 0.016** 
  (1.314) (1.297) (2.512) (0.273) (2.005) 
Independent   -0.232** -0.304** -0.441***   
    (-2.168) (-2.157) (-2.839)   
Independent*Tenure   0.022 0.046 0.096*   
    (0.617) (0.901) (1.835)   
Job experience same industry     0.055     
      (0.255)     
Job experience same industry*Tenure     -0.041     
      (-0.572)     
Independent*Job experience same industry     0.411*     
      (1.925)     
Independent*Job experience same industry*Tenure   -0.134*     
      (-1.868)     
Chairman 0.345**         
  (2.431)         
Chairman*Tenure -0.081*         
  (-1.783)         
High monitoring needs       -0.668*   
        (-1.872)   
High monitoring needs*Tenure       0.276***   
        (2.888)   
Independent*High monitoring needs       0.905***   
        (2.707)   
Independent*High monitoring 
needs*Tenure       -0.216**   
        (-2.228)   
Nomination committee chair*Tenure         -0.044 
          (-0.553) 
Audit committee chair*Tenure         -0.157*** 
          (-4.368) 
Compensation committee chair*Tenure         -0.086** 
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          (-2.290) 
Governance committee chair*Tenure         -0.06 
          (-0.813) 
Risk committee chair*Tenure         0.253 
          (1.293) 
Social committee chair*Tenure         0.062 
          (0.636) 
Strategy committee chair*Tenure         0.217 
          (1.251) 
Technology committee chair*Tenure         0.024 
          (0.158) 
Constant 17.231*** 17.393*** 17.275*** 18.708*** 19.967*** 
  (14.517) (14.561) (14.393) (12.895) (17.792) 
            
Observations 369,321 369,321 369,321 170,499 330,506 
R-squared 0.352 0.352 0.353 0.349 0.348 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 
Table 3-6B Cross-sectional Tests – Panel B 
Panel B: Personal attributes 
This table reports regression results using interaction variables to identify director attributes that 
affect the volatility-director tenure relation. Control variables are included but not reported for 
brevity. CEOs are excluded and the samples also exclude all directors appointments overlapping 
with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include firm fixed effects 
as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of 
all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Tenure -0.072* -0.06 -0.026 -0.05 -0.049 
  (-1.861) (-1.233) (-0.608) (-1.303) (-1.271) 
Tenure2 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.009 0.009 
  (1.311) (0.288) (1.166) (1.242) (1.191) 
Female -0.171** -0.163       
  (-2.223) (-1.525)       
Female*Tenure 0.066** 0.068*       
  (2.391) (1.792)       
High monitoring needs   0.144       
    (1.037)       
High monitoring needs*Tenure   0.092***       
    (3.095)       
Female*High monitoring needs   0.207       
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    (1.172)       
Female*High monitoring needs*Tenure   -0.104*       
    (-1.757)       
Busy     0.119*     
      (1.770)     
Busy*Tenure     -0.042*     
      (-1.830)     
Board experience same industry       0.156   
        (1.535)   
Board experience same industry*Tenure       -0.054*   
        (-1.739)   
Job experience same industry         0.156 
          (1.376) 
Job experience same industry*Tenure         -0.113*** 
          (-3.296) 
Director Age 0 -0.002 0.002 0 0 
  (-0.140) (-0.677) (0.600) (-0.108) (-0.154) 
Number previous jobs -0.040* -0.050** -0.027 -0.040* -0.03 
  (-1.882) (-2.207) (-1.311) (-1.889) (-1.401) 
Number previous boards 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.228) (-0.053) (-0.125) (0.098) (0.156) 
Experience CEO public firm 0.07 0.073 0.011 0.069 0.067 
  (1.044) (1.129) (0.194) (1.030) (1.000) 
Constant 17.246*** 18.454*** 20.989*** 17.210*** 17.186*** 
  (14.513) (12.898) (20.357) (14.502) (14.469) 
            
Observations 369,321 170,499 266,480 369,321 369,321 
R-squared 0.352 0.349 0.331 0.352 0.352 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
            
Robust t-statistics in parentheses           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
 
Table 3-6C Cross-sectional Tests – Panel C 
Panel C: Board characteristics 
This table reports regression results using interaction variables to identify board attributes that 
affect the volatility-director tenure relation. Control variables are included but not reported for 
brevity. CEOs are excluded and the samples also exclude all directors appointments overlapping 
with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include firm fixed effects 
as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The definition of 
all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Tenure -0.092** -0.026 -0.133*** -0.047 
  (-2.279) (-0.395) (-3.179) (-0.999) 
Tenure2 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 
  (1.136) (0.718) (1.320) (0.240) 
Groupthink 0.057       
  (0.623)       
Groupthink*Tenure 0.063***       
  (2.904)       
High BPS   1.288*     
    (1.862)     
High BPS*Tenure   -0.530**     
    (-2.444)     
Large board     -0.492***   
      (-4.883)   
Large Board*Tenure     0.115***   
      (4.723)   
High monitoring needs       0.177 
        (1.302) 
High monitoring needs*Tenure       0.075*** 
        (2.735) 
Director Age 0 -0.007* 0 -0.002 
  (-0.094) (-1.869) (-0.110) (-0.683) 
Number previous jobs -0.040* -0.063*** -0.039* -0.050** 
  (-1.902) (-2.865) (-1.859) (-2.218) 
Number previous boards 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.238) (0.531) (0.269) (-0.061) 
Experience CEO public firm 0.068 0.031 0.071 0.07 
  (1.024) (0.510) (1.058) (1.091) 
Constant 17.364*** 11.394*** 17.284*** 18.424*** 
  (14.675) (6.122) (14.743) (12.863) 
          
Observations 369,321 113,998 369,321 170,499 
R-squared 0.353 0.355 0.353 0.349 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
          
Robust t-statistics in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table 3-6D Cross-sectional Tests – Panel D 
Panel D: Firm characteristics 
This table reports regression results using interaction variables to identify firm characteristics 
that affect the volatility-director tenure relation. Control variables are included but not reported 
for brevity. CEOs are excluded and the samples also exclude all directors appointments 
overlapping with a CEO turnover over a one year period. All model specifications include firm 
fixed effects as well as month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The 
definition of all variables is in Appendix 3-A. 
 
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic 
volatility 
(1) (2) (3) 
        
Tenure -0.131*** -0.069 -0.028 
  (-3.206) (-1.468) (-0.726) 
Tenure2 0.008 0.001 0.008 
  (1.162) (0.182) (1.104) 
Large firm -0.807***     
  (-4.876)     
Large firm*Tenure 0.133***     
  (5.336)     
Poor performance   -0.550***   
    (-6.014)   
Poor performance*Tenure   0.122***   
    (3.906)   
Consumer durables*Tenure     0.149* 
      (1.793) 
High tech*Tenure     -0.180*** 
      (-4.871) 
Director Age 0.000 0.003 0.000 
  (-0.005) (1.101) (-0.029) 
Number previous jobs -0.036* -0.022 -0.034 
  (-1.706) (-1.126) (-1.604) 
Number previous boards 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.047) -0.018 (-0.019) 
Experience CEO public firm 0.064 0.033 0.061 
  (0.948) (0.574) (0.901) 
Constant 11.112*** 22.260*** 10.703*** 
  (23.859) (93.469) (24.094) 
        
Observations 369,321 245,060 369,321 
R-squared 0.350 0.328 0.349 
Firm fixed effect yes yes yes 
Calendar month fixed effect yes yes yes 
        
Robust t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Appendix 1-A: Interim IRR 
In this Appendix, we present estimates of future fundraising as a function of a fund’s 
interim, as opposed to final, IRR (see the discussion in Section 3.3). Preqin provides interim IRR 
data for a subset of our main sample of preceding funds, but the time series of interim IRRs for a 
given fund is almost always incomplete (so it is not possible for us to use these data to estimate, 
for example, hazard models to predict future fundraising). Similarly, Preqin provides cash flow 
data for another (partially overlapping) subset, making it possible for us to compute interim IRRs, 
but the cash flow data for a given fund generally appear to be incomplete. Using these two 
sources of interim IRR data, we obtain interim IRR at the time of next fundraising for 801 of our 
1,745 preceding funds (using the Preqin interim IRR when both are available because the cash 
flow data are often incomplete). For preceding funds that do not raise a follow-on fund, we use 
the interim IRR after three years of life, matching the average time between successive 
fundraisings in our data. 
Panel A of Table A-1 shows that the correlation between this interim IRR for a fund and 
the fund’s final IRR is high. The correlation is 0.607 for all funds taken together, 0.551 for 
buyout funds, 0.618 for venture capital funds, and 0.228 for real estate funds. In Panel B we 
estimate probit regressions to explain whether a follow-on fund is raised, analogous to Panel A 
of Table 2-3. The estimated marginal effects are all positive and significant with the exception of 
real estate funds. For all fund types, the difference between the marginal effects reported in Panel 
B of Table A-1 and those reported in Panel A of Table 2-3 are statistically insignificant. In Panel 
C of Table A-1 we estimate regressions predicting (log) fund growth from preceding to follow-
on fund, analogous to those reported in Panel C of Table 2-3. Again, all of the estimated 
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coefficients are positive, all are significant except for buyout funds that narrowly miss 
significance, and none are statistically significantly different from the analogous coefficients 
reported in Panel C of Table 2-3. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Table A-1 suggests that, even if interim IRR were the right 
way for the econometrician to summarize the information set used by investors in assessing 
performance at the time of next fundraising (which is questionable, see the discussion in Section 
3.3), our results are unlikely to be materially biased by using the fund’s final IRR instead, and by 
doing so we gain the advantage of a substantially greater number of observations and enhanced 
statistical power. 
 
Table A-1: Correlation between Interim and Final IRRs and Follow-on Fundraising 
Regressions with Interim IRRs 
 
Panel A presents correlations between interim IRR at time of fundraising and final IRR for all 
preceding funds for which interim IRR data are available. For preceding funds that do not raise a 
follow-on, we use the interim IRR after three years (the sample average time to next fundraising). 
Panels B and C present preceding fund-level regressions to explain follow-on fundraising using 
this interim IRR. Panel B presents probit regressions in which the dependent variable is 1 if a 
follow-on is raised and 0 otherwise. There are no estimates for real estate funds because the 
dependent variable is always equal to one when interim IRR is available. Marginal effects are 
reported and z-scores are given in parentheses. Panel C presents OLS regressions for preceding 
funds that raise a follow-on fund. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
fund growth plus one. In Panels B and C,“All Funds” regressions include fund type fixed effects 
and model (2) includes vintage year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered at the PE firm level. In Panel C, t-statistics are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Panel A: Correlation between Interim IRR at time of fundraising and Final IRR 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
Correlation 0.607   0.551 
Number of observations 801   304 
 
(continued) 
 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
Correlation 0.618   0.228 
Number of observations 433   64 
 
 
Panel B: Probit regressions for the probability of raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund interim IRR 
0.383*** 0.459***   0.484*** 0.574*** 
  (3.165) (3.400)   (3.361) (3.437) 
Number of observations 801 715   304 255 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.124   0.096 0.142 
 
(continued) 
 
  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund interim IRR 
0.345* 0.399**   0.159 1.048* 
  (2.117) (2.229)   (1.486) (1.738) 
Number of observations 433 383   64 18 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.140   0.034 0.198 
 
Panel C: OLS regressions for log(fund growth + 1) conditional on raising a follow-on fund 
 
  All Funds   Buyout 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund interim IRR 0.126*** 0.099***   0.203** 0.217** 
  (3.549) (2.860)   (2.090) (2.202) 
Constant 0.947*** 1.108***   0.934*** 1.125*** 
  (39.406) (5.390)   (32.746) (4.432) 
Number of observations 651 651   251 251 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.116   0.013 0.123 
 
(continued) 
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  Venture Capital   Real Estate 
  (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
Preceding fund interim 
IRR 
0.099*** 0.062* 
  
0.816*** 0.660** 
  (2.655) (1.685)   (2.925) (2.410) 
Constant 0.825*** 0.960***   0.685*** 0.796** 
  (42.086) (2.841)   (8.916) (2.274) 
Number of observations 339 339   61 61 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.120   0.112 0.263 
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Appendix 2-A: Timeline of the D&O insurance acquisition and information release 
 
 
Firm operates as a private enterprise 
 
 
D&O insurance purchased or not (no public information) as a private enterprise (the insurer conducts an audit 
and negotiates with the firm the coverage and premium) 
 
 
 
Firm decides to go public 
 
 
 
Firm contacts investment banker and decides whether to purchase D&O insurance as a "new" public firm (no 
public information). The Offering prospectus that includes a pro-forma annual statement, the date of the IPO 
and the offering price is made public 
 
 
 
 IPO 
 
 
 
End of fiscal year (not necessarily 12 months after the IPO) 
 
 
 
First annual report as a public firm is released 
 
 
 
First management proxy is released. This is usually the first occurrence of public information about D&O 
insurance. The information relates to the previous year in all instances in the dataset. 
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Appendix 2-B: Examples. 
Two examples of how the information related to the D&O insurance contract is release and appears in 
management proxies to illustrate the timing of D&O insurance purchase. 
“Associated Brands (IPO on November 15th 2002): the management proxy dated May 5th 
2003 states that “directors and officers ... are covered under a directors’ and officers’ 
insurance policy that provides aggregate coverage to the insured individuals of $15 
million, subject to a $150,000 deductible on securities claims and a $75,000 deductible 
on other claims. The premium paid by the Fund for this coverage for the period from 
November 1, 2002 to October 31, 2003 was $180,965.” 
 
“Bridgewater Systems Corporation (IPO on December 14th 2007): the management 
proxy dated May 13th 2008 states that "The Corporation maintains directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance coverage with a deductible of $25,000 for each non-securities 
claim and $50,000 for each securities claim with a $10 million limit in aggregate. 
Coverage includes errors, omissions or breach of fiduciary duty by the directors and 
officers during the discharge of their legal duties. The Corporation’s annual premium is 
$73,576 (plus tax) which covers a twelve month period from December 1, 2007 to 
December 1, 2008.'' 
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Appendix 2-C: Definition of control variables.  
Unless noted otherwise, all independent variables are measured using accounting information 
available in the firms’ first annual report post-IPO. 
 
Financial variables 
 
We use FirstDayReturn as a control variable to account for the possible underpricing of IPO shares 
on the first day of trading to attract risk-averse investors (for a more thorough discussion, see Ritter, 1987, 
inter alia). This variable is computed as the price at the end of the first day divided by the offer price.50 
MarketRet is the one-year post-IPO return of the stock market as calculated by the total return of 
Canada’s main stock index. It should be positively correlated with the stock market return. RiskFree, SMB 
and HML are the risk free rate, and the two Canadian Fama-French size and growth portfolios (available 
until 2009 only) respectively. 
We measure firm size by the log of the firm’s market value of equity at the time of the IPO 
(lnMVE_IPO). Large firms should be less volatile and have less idiosyncratic risk, and have higher 
returns because more investors will scrutinize the activities of larger firms. We use a firm’s market value 
of equity at the time of the IPO to make sure that this measure of size is not confounded with stock 
market returns. The lnMVE_IPO variable is calculated as the log of the product of the offer price by the 
number of shares outstanding on the day of the IPO. 
assetsofvaluebook
sliabilitieofvaluebookIPOoftimeatequityofvaluemarket
Growth

  (see Core, 1997) 
measures a firm’s growth opportunities. A firm with a high growth ratio should be more profitable if the 
                                                 
50 For 16 firms, we do not have the price on the first day post-IPO (but only 3 of those have an 
IPO completion date post 1996, and only 1 gives us the information to calculate the rate-on-line). 
Instead of dropping the observation from our analysis, we decided to first assign a value of 0 for 
the first day return, and second to use the impute command in Stata using the first year return, 
the market return and the firm’s industry to impute the return on the first day. 
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growth options turn out to be in the money. Consequently, we expect high growth firms to have higher 
first year returns on average. We also expect firms experiencing higher growth to have more volatile 
returns. ROA is the return on assets computed as
AssetsTotal
NetIncome
. We expect firms with a higher ROA to 
have a better stock market performance.  
Finally, the last financial variable we use is the firm’s book leverage (or Debt_Ratio), which 
is
AssetsTotal
sLiabilitieTotal
. Stock market volatility and idiosyncratic risk should be lower if debt holders are 
exercising a greater level of monitoring. On the other hand, the more levered is the firm the higher should 
be its stock return volatility since it is more at risk of going bankrupt. The net effect is undetermined. 
 
Governance variables 
 
We collected several variables related to governance: CEO and chairman of the board duality, 
board composition and independence as well as the presence of a blockholder. We also control for the 
corporate structure.  
Duality is an indicator variable taking on the value one if the chairman of the board is also the 
company’s chief executive officer and zero otherwise. This particular feature of a board is usually viewed 
as an entrenchment red flag. If entrenchment is an issue then Duality could be associated with low 
volatility and a low idiosyncratic risk (because the CEO/COB does not want to risk bankruptcy), and low 
returns (if firm resources are spent on negative NPV projects). Because Duality affects both risk and 
return in the same direction, we do not expect to see much impact on the Sharpe ratio variables. 
Blockholder is an indicator variable equal to one if a shareholder owns 10% or more of the firm’s 
voting shares according to its first proxy statement. Similar to debtholders, blockholders should have 
more at stake in monitoring the firm. Consequently, Volatility and Idiosyncratic is expected to be lower 
when a blockholder is present.  
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Independence is the percentage of unrelated directors on the board of directors as reported in the 
firms’ proxy statements. The presence of a more independent board could increase returns if it prevents 
the entrenchment of management and if it reduces the likelihood of cash flow misappropriation.  
The ITCE variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is an income trust and zero 
otherwise. We include this variable since Halpern (2004), Gillen (2005), Zetzsche (2005) and Huson and 
Pazzaglia (2007) argue that income trusts are riskier than stock companies from a governance standpoint. 
Boyer and Stern (2012) find that firms incorporated as income trusts pay more to protect their directors 
and officers, ceteris paribus. Income trusts are required to pass along more of their operating cash flows 
to their investors, which reduces volatility as well as returns since earnings are typically not reinvested, 
which makes capital gains infrequent. Volatility and Idiosyncratic should also be lower since income 
trusts distribute more dividends, and are typically older and more mature firms than stock companies. The 
relationship between ITCE and the Sharpe ratio is therefore undetermined as the numerator and the 
denominator are expected to be lower if the firm is an income trust. 
 
Other variables 
 
Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm belongs to one of the ten two-digit 
SIC codes risky industries as identified in Bajaj et al. (2000). Firms that belong to one of these ten risky 
industries that were deemed riskier based on the number of cases settled as well as the average settlement 
amount should have more volatile stock returns and risk, and higher returns on average. Firms operating 
in risky industries should also be more likely to purchase D&O insurance if only because of the higher 
frequency of lawsuits.  
Age measures the number of years since the start of the company’s operations at the time of the 
IPO announcement. We expect this variable to have a negative relationship with stock market volatility 
and idiosyncratic risk since the more mature firms becoming public should have more stable cash flows, 
everything else equal. 
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The service offered by the investment banker at the time of the IPO is represented by the variable 
IPOfeerat, which is calculated as the total fees paid at the time of the IPO divided by the product of the 
offer price and the number of shares issued.51 We expect firms that purchase a higher level of service to 
have higher returns in the first year and lower volatility and idiosyncratic risk.  
Float is the ratio of the number of shares issued at the IPO on the total number of shares 
outstanding after the IPO. We expect that firms that have a higher float should have less volatile market 
returns because more investors are likely to follow the firm, therefore disseminating the appropriate 
information to the markets52. With respect to the decision to purchase D&O insurance or not, Float should 
be positively correlated with the decision to purchase. The reason is that the more shares are issued, the 
greater the probability of litigation and the greater should be the expected loss conditional on a claim 
arising (see Gutiérrez, 2003, and Boyer, 2003) since minority shareholders are the most likely originator 
of lawsuits against managers. At the same time, a greater float means that the “firm’s entrepreneur” has 
gotten rid of a larger portion of the firm, which should be a bad signal to markets. If such adverse 
selection is present, stock returns should be negatively related to the float.  
US_Presence is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports any activity in the United States 
(sales, assets, etc.). The variable was collected by reading annual reports for the year following the IPO. 
                                                 
51 For 21 firms, we do not have the fee paid. Since we felt that the cost of dropping these observations was 
too high (10% of our sample), we instead decided to impute a value for the fee ratio. 40% of the firms pay 
an IPO fee of exactly 6%, and 90% of the firms paid a fee ratio between 4.5% and 7%. We first opted to 
assign a value of 6% to the missing IPOfeerat variable values. We also calculated the predicted fee using 
the first day return, the log of the market value of the firm at the time of the IPO, whether the firm is 
incorporated as an income trust and the number of shares issued at the time of the IPO (a regression that 
has an adjusted R2 of 78%), and then calculated the IPOfeerat variable value using the same 
aforementioned rule (or assigned value 2% if the imputed value is negative). In all cases, the results are 
sensibly the same. 
52 It could also be the case that a higher float implies more differences of opinion which would generate 
more trading and more volatility. In this case, the net effect of Float on Volatility and Idiosyncratic is 
undetermined. We thank a referee for suggesting this possibility. 
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The United States being a more fertile environment for potential litigation (Clarkson and Simunic, 1994, 
Heys and Berenblut, 2012), we expect this variable to be positively correlated with the decision to 
purchase D&O insurance. A related measure to US_Presence is US_Sales that is measured as the ratio of 
sales that a firm reports doing in the United States to total sales. Sales in the United States should increase 
stock returns since it is a proxy for the potential growth in sales and profitability of the company.  
Hard is a dummy variable equal to one if the year the firm completed its IPO is deemed to be a 
hard market year by D&O insurance experts, and zero otherwise. A hard market is characterized by lower 
policy amounts with higher prices. We used the annual premium index available in the Towers Perrin 
reports to compute the ten year average premium and labeled as ‘hard’ all years above the ten year 
average. This resulted in years 2002 through 2006 to be considered a hard market, which is in line with 
the general consensus of D&O insurance market specialists.  
Big5 is a dummy variable equal to one if the lead IPO underwriter is one of the five main 
investment bankers in Canada. The five largest underwriters represent 70% of the Canadian market.  
Investment banker reputation is used as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry during the IPO 
process. 
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Appendix 3-A: Variable Definitions 
All board and director variables are from BoardEx, financial variables are from Compustat and market 
variables are from CRSP. 
 
Director 
Attributes  
  
    
Tenure  
Time since a director joined a board (in years). Constructed from BoardEx start 
and end role dates. 
First3 
Indicator variable equal to one each month of the first three years of the director's 
tenure 
Director age Age of the director (in years) 
Female 
Indicator variable equal to one if the director is female. From BoardEx and 
manually collected 
Independent Indicator variable equal to one if the director is independent 
Chairman Indicator variable equal to one if the director is the chairman of the board 
Busy 
Indicator variable equal to one if the director serves simultaneously on three or 
more boards  
Experience CEO 
public firm 
Indicator variable equal to one if the director is or has previously been CEO of a 
public corporation 
Board exp same 
industry 
Indicator variable equal to one if the director is serving or has previously served 
on the board of a firm in the same industry. Industries are based on the Fama-
French ten-industry classification 
Job exp same 
industry 
Indicator variable equal to one if the director is working or has previously worked 
for a firm in the same industry. Industries are based on the Fama-French ten-
industry classification 
Number 
previous boards 
Number of previous directorships held 
Low uncertainty 
Indicator variable equal to one for directors who have experience as the CEO of a 
public firm and have served on at least four corporate boards  
High uncertainty 
Indicator variable equal to one for directors who do not have previous board 
experience and do not have experience as CEO 
Pro director 
Indicator variable equal to one for directors who have held at least four previous 
directorships and have held directorships in the same industry  
Single 
appointment 
Director appointed solo, i.e. no other directors were appointed during the six 
month period around her appointment 
Single 
appointment2yrs 
Director appointments for which there are no other appointments during the two 
year period around her appointment 
  186 
Exchange 
mandated 
Appointments designed to meet the new exchange independence requirement. 
Director arrival results in the board complying with the new 50% independence 
requirement when it did not prior to that director's appointment. A director 
appointment therefore qualifies for this sample if the director joins the board 
between 2002 and 2005 and the firm previously did not comply with the 50% 
independence requirement. These appointments must occur when the firm's stock 
return has outperformed the S&P500 over the year preceding the appointment and 
the firm's average monthly stock return volatility over the six month period 
preceding the appointment is lower than the average over the two years preceding 
the appointment 
Retirement/death 
replacement 
Appointments within six months following the departure of a director who was 
over 70 years old, or of a director who served simultaneously on multiple boards 
and left all of her directorships within three years, or who passed away. These 
appointments must occur when the firm's stock return has outperformed the 
S&P500 over the year preceding the appointment and the firm's average monthly 
stock return volatility over the six month period preceding the appointment is 
lower than the average over the two years preceding the appointment 
Pooled 
exogenous 
Includes exchange mandated appointments and retirement/death replacements 
SimScore 
Similarity score for each incoming-departing director pair. See Appendix 3-C for 
details 
    
Appendix 3-A (continued) 
Board 
Attributes 
  
    
Avg board 
tenure  
Average tenure of the directors of a board in a given month (in years) 
Avg board 
tenure square  
Square of Average board tenure 
Young boards 
Boards are ranked based on the average tenure of their members, each month. 
Young boards are those in the first tercile 
Seasoned boards 
Boards are ranked based on the average tenure of their members, each month. 
Young boards are those in the third tercile 
Gender diverse 
board 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if at least one woman serves on the board  
Board size Number of directors on the board 
Large board Indicator variable equal to 1 if board size is larger than the sample mean 
Entrenched 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO has been in office for 5 or more years and 
cumulates the titles of CEO, Chairman and President 
Groupthink Percentage of directors on the board with tenure greater than 9 years 
Board Pay Slice 
Ratio of total independent directors compensation over CEO compensation 
(salary + bonus) 
High Board Pay 
Slice 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if Board Pay Slice is in the top quartile 
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Firm Level 
Variables 
  
    
Ln(assets)  Natural logarithm of total firm assets (item AT in Compustat) 
Dividend payer  Indicator variable to one if the firm pays dividends (item DVC in Compustat) 
Leverage  Long-term debt over total assets (item DLTT/AT in Compustat) 
MB 
Market to book ratio: Stock price at year end*common shares outstanding over 
total common equity ((PRCC_C*CSHO)/CEQ in Compustat) 
ROA  Return on assets: net income over total assets (NI/AT in Compustat) 
Firm age 
Age of the firm measured as the number of years since the first appearance of the 
firm in CRSP, as in Fama and French (2004) 
High monitoring 
needs 
Indicator variable equal to one for large firms with entrenched boards 
Poor 
performance 
Indicator variable equal to one for firms with a stock return performance inferior 
to that of the S&P500 over the one year period preceding the appointment 
Large firm Indicator variable equal to one if the firm's assets is in the top quartile 
    
Market 
Variables 
  
    
Idiosyncratic 
volatility  
Variance of the residuals of a daily Fama-French three factor model as in Ang et 
al. (2006), aggregated monthly, winzorized at the 1% cutoff 
Realized 
volatility  
Standard deviation of daily stock returns, aggregated monthly, winzorized at the 
1% cutoff 
Market beta  
Estimated coefficient on the excess market return in a daily Fama-French three 
factor model, aggregated monthly 
SMB beta  
Estimated coefficient on the SMB factor in a daily Fama-French three factor 
model, aggregated monthly 
HML beta  
Estimated coefficient on the HML factor in a daily Fama-French three factor 
model, aggregated monthly 
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Appendix 3-B: Learning Model 
The learning model is based on the theoretical work of Pastor and Veronesi (2003). The 
setup is similar to the stylized model in Pan, Wang and Weisbach (2015). In the model, the 
ability of directors refers to their capacity to facilitate the generation of cash flows. When newly 
appointed directors join a board, their personal aptitude and capacity to influence this particular 
board are uncertain, as is the degree of complementarity between their expertise and that of 
current board members. The uncertainty surrounding the ability of new board members resolves 
over time as these parameters are gradually revealed to the market. In the model, dividend 
growth follows a geometric Brownian motion: 
 
 where   is dividend for firm i at time t, 
    is the sum of directors’ unobserved abilities, which affects the  
  average dividend growth rate, 
   σ is dividend growth volatility. 
 Director j has the ability  to contribute to the generation of cash flows for firm i. This 
ability is unknown and unobservable but subject to learning. The ability of each director is 
assessed by investors over time. For each firm, the sum of directors' assessed abilities may be 
thought of as investors' assessment of the quality of the board. The ability of a director may 
depend on firm characteristics. For example, a director with relevant industry expertise may 
contribute more to firm value for a firm which operates in that particular industry. 
 It is assumed that there is symmetric information (see Holmström, 1999; Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992; Berk and Green, 2004 and Chung, Sensoy, Stern and Weisbach, 2012 for 
symmetric information about managers' abilities). Assuming that  follows a truncated normal 
(A1) 
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distribution with prior mean  and variance  and that director abilities are independent and 
identically distributed, individual assessed ability at time t is normally distributed: 
 
 The sum of assessed abilities also follows a normal distribution: 
 
 Under these assumptions, Bayesian updating by market participants leads to posterior 
assessments of directors' ability (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003): 
   
 
 The revised assessment of ability is a function of two terms:  and the expression in 
brackets. Agents observe a higher-than-expected signal about the ability of a group of directors 
when  is positive, and revise their expectations upwards accordingly. This 
revision depends on , which is the ratio of uncertainty about directors to uncertainty about the 
firm's dividends. This implies that conditional on the realization of the signal, the larger the 
uncertainty about directors, the larger the revision of assessed ability. Therefore, the Bayesian 
learning framework predicts a positive relationship between the uncertainty about the ability of 
directors and the magnitude of the revision of assessed ability. Bayesian updating generates 
posterior variance of the assessment of ability of the form: 
 
 The posterior variance of assessment of directors' ability  does not depend on the 
realization of the signal but has a negative and convex relationship with t. Therefore, the model 
(A3) 
(A4) 
(A5) 
(A6) 
(A2) 
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predicts a decreasing and convex learning curve: the uncertainty about ability dissipates over 
time and learning is faster at the beginning of director tenure. The revised variance  is always 
smaller than the initial variance  and represents the uncertainty about parameter θ. Ability  
is assumed constant for each director. As market participants learn about ability, the uncertainty 
dissipates and eventually   Timmermann (1993) shows that when agents do not know 
the true data-generating process for dividends, learning generates excess stock return volatility. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2003, 2009) formalize this intuition and derive an approximation for return 
volatility. In the context of this paper: 
 
 Equation (A7) directly motivates the empirical analysis in this paper. In the above 
equation,  represents the sensitivity of the  to the mean assessment of ability and 
can therefore be interpreted as the marginal return to directors' ability.  is , 
and can be interpreted as the ratio of uncertainty about directors to uncertainty about the firm's 
dividends (see Equation (A5)). Equation (A7) therefore implies that three components affect 
stock return volatility: fundamental volatility, ex-ante uncertainty about directors' ability and 
marginal return to ability ( . Equation (A7) can be rewritten as: 
 
 If directors take actions that influence the generation of cash flows, then MRA>0. In that 
case, return volatility is positively related to the uncertainty about directors' ability via . Note 
that we know from Equation (A5) that  declines at a predetermined rate over time due to 
Bayes' rule and that this rate is faster for higher ex-ante levels of uncertainty about ability. This 
(A7) 
(A8) 
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implies that after controlling for ex-ante uncertainty, cross-sectional analysis of declines in 
volatility provides estimates of directors' marginal value. In other words, the extent of the decline 
in volatility depends on the marginal value of that director.  
 In sum, the model presented above implies that if directors do not engage in window-
dressing but do in fact make a difference in the fortunes of the companies onto which boards 
they sit, then we should observe a decline in volatility over director tenure. Moreover, the decline 
should be more pronounced when directors are more value relevant. By exploiting the empirical 
analysis stemming from these predictions, this article offers a new methodological approach to 
evaluating corporate boards. 
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Appendix 3-C: SimScore 
SimScore counts the number of shared characteristics from a pool of six characteristics for 
incoming-departing director pairs when the departing director left due to death or retirement and 
the firm operates in an environment of good stock return performance and low return volatility at 
the time of appointment. All variables are constructed from BoardEx data and supplemented with 
manual data collection when necessary. An incoming-departing director pair gets one point for 
each characteristic in common, for a total of six possible points. 
              
Gender from BoardEx, supplemented with manual collection. 
              
Generations  
depression babies (born before 
1926)       
  
mature generation (born 1927-
1945)       
  baby boomers (born 1946-1964)       
  generation X (born 1965-1980)       
  generation Y (born after 1981)       
              
Job expertise 
based on the directors’ job history in BoardEx. Word searches are 
used to define eleven categories: 
              
  management           
  academia           
  politics           
  military           
  human resources         
  technology           
  science           
  marketing           
  law           
  finance           
  consulting           
              
Board experience 
indicator variable equal to one for directors who have held a 
minimum of two public directorships. 
              
Industry directorship 
indicator variable equal to one for directors who have held 
directorships in the same industry as the firm they are joining/leaving. 
              
Industry work 
experience  
indicator variable equal to one for directors who have worked in the 
industry of the firm they are joining/leaving. 
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SimScore summary statistics 
              
    Mean 3.49       
    25% 3       
    Median 4       
    75% 4       
    Std dev 1.22       
    Min 0       
    Max 6       
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Appendix 3-D: Estimating Director Related Uncertainty 
The methodological approach in this paper allows estimating the percentage of overall volatility 
imputable to the uncertainty surrounding the ability of directors at the time of their appointment 
(δ0/Vol0). This section directly relies on the methodology derived in Pan et al. (2015). It involves 
estimates of the average decline in volatility over director tenure, the average volatility in 
corporate dividends (σ) and the average volatility at the time directors joins (Vol0). 
From the return volatility approximation (see Appendix B for details): 
  
 
 
 
 
let  be the percentage excess volatility. Then, , and the 
percentage change in excess volatility from time 0 to time t is . 
The marginal return to ability is hypothesized constant over time, therefore, . Then, 
  . When t = 3, the percentage of overall volatility 
attributable to the uncertainty about new directors, . 
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